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TWINS SEPARATED AT BIRTH: A COMPARATIVE
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL ARISING
UNDER JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL
COURTS AND SOME PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE
Donald H. Zeigler*
INTRODUCTION
Article III of the Constitution empowers the federal courts to
hear cases arising under the Constitution, laws, and treaties of
the United States., The courts hear both civil and criminal cases
under this authority, and the grant extends equally to both.2
Consequently, one might expect the civil and criminal arising
under jurisdiction to be very similar. Instead, the two branches
developed very differently. It is as though twins were separated
at birth and grew up apart, each in its own unique way. We have
become used to the differences over time. No one questions
them.'
This article compares the development of the two branches of
the arising under jurisdiction and suggests some changes to make
the criminal branch more like the civil.4  Prior scholarly
treatment of the arising under jurisdiction focuses almost entirely
on the civil branch, and on the fascinating line of Supreme Court
decisions interpreting Congress's grant of the general original and
* Professor of Law, New York Law School. The author thanks Susan N. Herman,
Randolph Jonakait, Edward A. Purcell, and David Schoenbrod for their helpful comments
on a draft of this article. The author also gratefully acknowledges the research assistance
of Tim ONeal Lorah.
1. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
2. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264 (1879). As the Court stated, Article III:
embraces alike civil and criminal cases arising under the Constitution and
laws. Both are equally within the domain of the judicial powers of the United
States, and there is nothing in the grant to justify an assertion that whatever
power may be exerted over a civil case may not be exerted as fully over a
criminal one.
Id. (citation omitted).
3. Leslie L. Anderson, The Line Between Federal and State Court Jurisdiction, 63
MICH. L. REv. 1203, 1204 (1965) ("[J]urisdictional distinctions based upon subject matter
justify themselves only because we are historically used to some of them.").
4. Article III also extends the judicial power to other specific matters of federal
interest, such as admiralty and maritime cases and cases to which the United States is a
party. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. This article is limited to the general arising under
jurisdiction.
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removal civil arising under jurisdiction in 1875.' This article
presents a comprehensive historical review of both the civil and
criminal arising under jurisdiction from the Constitutional
Convention to the present. By comparing the two parts of the
jurisdiction as they developed throughout our history, the article
presents new perspectives on both branches.
Parts I through IV of this article present the historical
review. Part I examines the original understandings of the
arising under jurisdiction that developed at the Constitutional
Convention, during the ratification debates, and in the Judiciary
Act of 1789. Most law students know that the Judiciary Act did
not grant the lower federal courts original civil arising under
jurisdiction, thus leaving civil cases arising under federal law to
the state courts. It is less well known that Congress did grant the
lower federal courts virtually all of the original criminal arising
under jurisdiction. The record contains almost no evidence as to
why Congress made this dramatic differentiation. Part I offers
some possible explanations.
Part II explores the implementation of the arising under
jurisdiction from 1789 to the Civil War. During this period, most
developments occurred on the criminal side. Because of gaps in
federal criminal statutes, the courts began to exercise jurisdiction
over common law crimes. One such case, United States v. Smith,
interpreted Article III's original criminal arising under
jurisdiction very broadly in 1797.6 Although most commentators
begin discussion of the constitutional scope of the arising under
jurisdiction with the civil case of Osborn v. Bank,7 Smith
5. See, e.g., Donald L. Doernberg, There's No Reason For It; It's Just Our Policy: Why
the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule Sabotages the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction,
38 HASTINGS L.J. 597 (1987); Michael G. Collins, The Unhappy History of Federal Question
Removal, 71 IOWA L. REV. 717 (1986); Linda R. Hirshman, Whose Law Is It, Anyway? A
Reconsideration of Federal Question Jurisdiction Over Cases of Mixed State and Federal
Law, 60 IND. L.J. 17 (1984-85); James H. Chadbourn & A. Leo Levin, Original Jurisdiction
of Federal Questions, 90 U. PA. L. REV. 639 (1942); Ray Forrester, The Nature ofa 'Federal
Question", 16 TUL. L. REV. 362 (1942).
6. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1792) (No. 16,323). [The
reported date of 1792 is incorrect. The correct date for the Smith case is 1797. See JULIUS
GOEBEL, JR., 1 HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: ANTECEDENTS
AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801 630 n.82 (1971). Subsequent cites to this case will use the
reported date.]. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
7. See, e.g., Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 5, at 646; Forrester, supra note 5, at 366-
72; Hirshman, supra note 5, at 22-24; Doernberg, supra note 5, at 607-11.
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anticipates Osborn by twenty-seven years.8 In these and other
early cases,9 the Supreme Court set the broad outlines of the
constitutional arising under jurisdiction, making clear that it
extends to both civil and criminal cases in the original, removal,
and appellate modes. Also, throughout this period Congress
routinely enacted legislation calling for the enforcement of federal
criminal laws in state courts.
Part III describes the major expansions and contractions in
the arising under jurisdiction during Reconstruction, a chaotic
period marked by radical reform and retrenchment. During this
time, Congress greatly expanded the arising under jurisdiction to
secure the rights of blacks in the South. The Supreme Court,
however, refused to accept some of the new jurisdictional
grants,1 ° and, in time, Congress itself withdrew some of the
grants. Additionally, jurisdiction changed even by mistake. The
Commissioners charged with codifying the federal statutes
inserted a new provision making the original criminal arising
under jurisdiction exclusively federal. The marginal note
accompanying this provision misreads the applicable precedent
and wrongly asserts that it is unconstitutional for the state courts
to hear federal criminal cases. While there is no specific
indication that the legislators agreed, Congress nonetheless
enacted the provision. Finally, the Act of March 3, 1875,"
limited the general removal jurisdiction to civil cases, 2 thus
breaking sharply with Congress's past practice of making removal
jurisdiction coextensive in civil and criminal cases.
Part IV analyzes important developments from Reconstruction
to the present. While the Supreme Court struggled mightily
8. Common law crimes became very controversial, and the Supreme Court withdrew
jurisdiction over them in 1812, thus greatly restricting the scope of the original criminal
arising under jurisdiction. See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32
(1812). The Court held that Congress did not grant jurisdiction over common law crimes
in the Judiciary Act of 1789. By declining to make a constitutional ruling, the Court left
undisturbed the broad interpretation of the original criminal arising under jurisdiction in
United States v. Smith. See infra notes 117-34 and accompanying text.
9. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14
U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
10. The Court did, however, reaffirm the broad scope of the constitutional arising
under jurisdiction. See Davis, 100 U.S. at 257; Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247
(1867). See infra notes 317-26 and accompanying text.
11. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. This Act is best known for granting
original civil arising under jurisdiction to the lower federal courts. Id. § 1, 18 Stat. at 470.
12. Id. § 2, 18 Stat. at 470-71.
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throughout this period to define and limit the civil arising under
jurisdiction granted by the Act of 1875, the Court did not struggle
at all on the criminal side. Part IV explores this mystery. In
addition, it explains how the most recent case in the civil line,
Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson,13  makes the
standards for original and removal civil cases more like the
standards for criminal cases. Since Reconstruction, the Court also
affirmed that Congress can require the state courts to enforce
federal law, both civil and criminal. Finally, on the civil side, the
Court developed the doctrines of pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction.
After this historical review, part V of the article makes some
concrete proposals for change. At present, the general original
civil arising under jurisdiction is concurrent with the state courts.
The general original criminal jurisdiction, by contrast, is
exclusively federal. Additionally, in civil cases the federal courts
routinely exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that
are related to federal claims. Federal courts do not, however,
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state criminal charges.
Consequently, in most civil cases, litigants may bring related
federal and state claims together in either federal or state court.
In most criminal cases, however, prosecutors cannot bring related
federal and state criminal charges together in either system. I
propose changing these rules to make the original criminal
jurisdiction more like the civil. I propose that Congress make
jurisdiction over some federal crimes concurrent with the state
courts. Congress might start with drug offenses, which presently
are overwhelming the federal courts. 4 The state courts could
help solve the crisis by hearing a portion of these cases. I also
propose that Congress, or the federal courts themselves, authorize
the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction over state criminal
charges. If this change had been in effect in 1992, the acquittal
of the police officers that beat Rodney King and the subsequent
riots in Los Angeles that left at least forty-four people dead 5
13. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
14. See infra note 437 and accompanying text.
15. Louis Sahagun & Vicki Torres, Jittery L.A. Sees Rays of Hope, L.A. TIMES, May
3, 1992, at Al.
676 [Vol. 19:673
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and caused over one billion dollars in damage16 might not have
occurred. Prosecutors could have filed federal criminal charges
and appended the state charges. A federal jury would have been
drawn from a much larger geographical area than the state jury
that was drawn from the nearly all-white Ventura County,"
thus making conviction much more likely. 8
The changes I propose would aid prosecutors, but they might
also help defendants. Prosecutors would have enormous flexibility
in cases in which defendants violate both federal and state law.
They could file federal charges, state charges, or some
combination of the two. They either could prosecute the charges
jointly or make a reasoned decision that one or the other would
prosecute. Defendants might use the new rules to avoid
successive prosecution in federal and state court. At present, the
Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit
federal and state prosecutions for the same misconduct.' 9 The
Supreme Court treats the states and the United States as
separate sovereigns that may enforce their laws independently.20
However, the Court probably would prohibit second prosecutions
if the same federal or state charges were tried in one system and
then brought again in the other.
Part V also proposes two changes in current double jeopardy
law to enhance protection for defendants and to give prosecutors
16. Seth Mydans, Los Angeles Policemen Acquitted in Taped Beating, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
30, 1992, at Al; David Margolick, Switching Case to White Suburb May Have Decided
Outcome, N.Y. TIMES, May 1, 1992, at A20; Richard W. Stevenson, Riots Inflamed a
Festering South Central Economy, N.Y. TIMES, May 6, 1992, at A23.
17. Two percent of the residents of Ventura County are black, and only six of the 264
people in the jury pool were black. Robert Reinhold, After Police-Beating Verdict, Another
Trial for the Jurors, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1992, at Li, Lll. No black jurors were chosen for
the state prosecution. Richard A. Serrano & Carlos V. Lozano, Jury Picked for King Trial;
No Blacks Chosen, LA. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at Al.
18. For a detailed account of the federal and state criminal proceedings against the
Los Angeles police officers who beat Rodney King, see Laurie L. Levenson, The Future of
State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney King Trial, 41
UCLA L. REV. 509. 510-33 (1994).
19. The federal retrial of the police officers in the Rodney King case sparked an
outpouring of opinion, both pro and con, on this aspect of double jeopardy. See, e.g., Now,
Federal Review of the King Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992, at A26 (favoring a second trial
in federal court); William Satire, Against the Grain, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1993, at A15
(opposing the retrial); Charles S. Ralston, 2d King Case Trial No Double Jeopardy, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 15, 1993, at A18 (agreeing with Supreme Court precedent allowing successive
trials); It's Not Double Jeopardy in LA., N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at A20; Jeffrey A.
Meyer, Double Jeopardy in the King Case, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1993, at A18.
20. See infra notes 439-40 and accompanying text.
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a strong incentive to bring all charges together in one proceeding.
First, it proposes abandonment of the dual sovereignty rule, which
allows successive federal and state prosecutions for the same
misconduct, in all cases where federal and state charges could be
brought together. Second, it proposes adoption of the broad
transactional standards used in civil cases to define an "offense"
for double jeopardy purposes. If these two changes were made,
the rules of civil claim preclusion could apply with full force and
would require prosecutors to bring all charges together in one
proceeding.
I. THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDINGS
A. The Constitutional Convention
The Constitutional Convention convened in Philadelphia in
May of 1787.21 Delegates prepared and presented several plans
for the new government. All plans called for the creation of a
judiciary separate from the legislature and the executive. In
addition, the delegates generally agreed that the federal judiciary
should hear criminal and civil cases involving the national
interest.
On May 29, Edmund Randolph presented the so-called
Virginia plan.22 This scheme proposed the creation of a national
judiciary consisting of "one or more supreme tribunals, and of
inferior tribunals to be chosen by the National Legislature."2
The subject matter jurisdiction of the new federal courts was to
extend to
all piracies & felonies on the high seas, captures from an
enemy; cases in which foreigners or citizens of other
States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested,
or which respect the collection of the National revenue;
21. The Convention convened on May 14 and began work on May 25. 1 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, 1-2 (Max Farrand ed. 1966) (hereinafter RECORDS].
AS published by Farrand, the RECORDS, contain numerous citations and emendations. This
quotation, and subsequent quotations from RECORDS, do not indicate emendations and
omissions contained therein.
22. Id. at 20-22.
23. Id. at 21.
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impeachments of any National officers, and questions
which may involve the national peace and harmony.2
Randolph's language suggests that the federal courts should hear
both criminal and civil cases. "[P]iracies & felonies" are criminal,
and "questions which may involve the national peace" probably
was meant to encompass criminal prosecutions. 2
The Convention discussed the Virginia plan over the next two
weeks. Critics did not challenge the proposed subject matter
jurisdiction at this point. Instead, they argued that the new
Constitution should not require the creation of lower federal
courts, thus beginning a debate that was not finally resolved until
passage of the Judiciary Act of 1789.26 When the Convention
passed a motion eliminating the lower federal courts,27 James
Wilson and James Madison countered with the famous
compromise proposal "'that the National Legislature be
empowered to institute inferior tribunals.'" 2  This motion
passed,29 but the opponents of lower federal courts continued to
24. Id. at 22.
25. The beginnings of diversity jurisdiction can be seen in the language empowering
federal courts to hear "cases in which foreigners or citizens of other States applying to such
jurisdictions may be interested . .. ." Id. Charles Pinckney of South Carolina also
presented a plan on May 29. Id. at 16, 23. The details of the Pinckney plan are disputed.
See 3 id. at 595-609. The plan went through several drafts, and the original proposal
apparently was misplaced. Id. at 595. As reconstructed by Max Farrand, the original
proposal gave Congress the power to institute "a federal judicial Court" with the power to
"try Officers of the U.S. for all Crimes &c in their Offices...." Id. at 608. The plan also
proposed that the federal court would hear appeals from state courts in cases involving
treaties or the law of nations, federal regulation of trade or revenue, or where the United
States was a party. Id. Thus, Pinckney appears to have agreed with Randolph that federal
judicial power should extend to criminal and civil cases involving the national interest.
26. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
27. John Rutledge of South Carolina made the motion on June 5, arguing that the
state courts should hear all cases in the first instance. 1 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 124.
He contended that appeal to the Supreme Court would secure national rights and
uniformity of judgments, without encroaching unduly on the state courts. Id. Rutledge's
motion passed five states to four, with two state delegations divided. Id at 125.
28. Id at 125.
29. Id. On June 12 and 13, the Convention amended the jurisdictional provisions of
the Virginia plan. The amendments struck the references to "all piracies and felonies on
the high seas' and "all captures from an enemy,'" id. at 211, 220, and added the following
language: "That the jurisdiction of the national Judiciary shall extend to cases which
respect the collection of the national revenue, impeachments of any national officers, and
questions which involve the national peace and harmony. .. .'" Id. at 223-24, 232.
The record does not reveal why these changes were made. Professor Clinton suggests
that delegates opposing a strong federal judiciary may have decided to whittle away at the
Vermont Law Review [Vol. 19:673
press their case.3° When the Convention considered the judiciaryprovisions on July 18, several delegates spoke against the
jurisdiction of the federal courts following the Madisonian Compromise, and that Madison
and others counterattacked by proposing a general rather than a specific statement of
federal court jurisdiction. Robert N. Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal Court
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U. PA. L.
REV. 741, 764 (1984).
30. On June 15, William Patterson presented the so-called New Jersey plan as a
substitute for the Virginia plan. 1 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 241-45. The judiciary
paragraph established "a supreme Tribunal [of] Judges" but omitted any mention of lower
federal courts. Id. at 244. The New Jersey plan plainly contemplated that the Supreme
Court would hear both civil and criminal cases involving matters of national and
international concern:
[T]he Judiciary so established shall have authority to hear & determine in the
first instance on all impeachments of federal officers, & by way of appeal in the
dernier resort in all cases touching the rights of Ambassadors, in all cases of
captures from an enemy, in all cases of piracies & felonies on the high seas, in
all cases in which foreigners may be interested, in the construction of any
treaty or treaties, or which may arise on any of the Acts for regulation of trade,
or the collection of the federal Revenue ....
Id. at 244. On June 19, the Convention voted to reject Patterson's proposal and to continue
discussion of the Virginia plan. Id. at 322, 328.
Delegates considered two other plans that apparently were not formally presented
to the Convention. On June 18, in a speech to the Convention, Alexander Hamilton
outlined his plan. Id. at 291-93. (The full plan is set forth in 3 id. at 617-30.) Hamilton's
plan probably was influential with the Committee of Detail that drafted the Constitution,
see infra note 35 and accompanying text, because Hamilton's phrasing is closer to the
language of Article III than is the language of the other plans. The Hamilton plan
extended original jurisdiction to the Supreme Court:
in all causes in which the United States shall be a party, in all controversies
between the United States, and a particular State, or between two or more
States.... in all cases affecting foreign Ministers, Consuls and Agents; and an
appellate jurisdiction both as to law and fact in all cases which shall concern
the Citizens of foreign nations, in all questions between the Citizens of
different States, and in all others in which the fundamental rights of this
Constitution are involved, subject to such exceptions as are herein contained
and to such regulations as the Legislature shall provide.
3 id. at 626. Hamilton appears to have accepted the Madisonian compromise because the
judiciary article does refer to "[t]he Judges of all Courts which may be constituted by the
Legislature," and states that "nothing herein contained shall be construed to prevent the
Legislature from abolishing such Courts themselves." Id.
Another plan for a national judiciary was found in the papers of George Mason of
Virginia. This plan called for the creation of a Supreme Court, but lower federal courts
were to have only admiralty jurisdiction. See 2 id. at 432-33.
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Madisonian compromise,31 but after some debate, the Convention
reaffirmed it.
32
As to subject matter jurisdiction, the Convention unanimously
adopted a resolution offered by Madison "'that the jurisdiction
shall extend to all cases arising under the Natl. laws: And to such
other questions as may involve the Natl. peace & harmony. '" m
It thus appears that James Madison was responsible for the
phrase "arising under" that has so bedeviled generations of
judges, law professors, and lawyers.34 He may have thought the
phrase conveniently summarized the cases involving issues of
national law that had been mentioned in the various
constitutional plans.
On July 23, the Convention unanimously agreed to appoint a
five member Committee of Detail "for the purpose of reporting a
Constitution conformably to the Proceedings aforesaid."
35
Committee drafts of the judiciary provisions and amendments
made during the Convention provide significant information about
the framers' intentions. A draft written by Edmund Randolph
and edited by John Rutledge gave the federal courts jurisdiction
of "all cases, arising under laws passed by the general
Legislature." 36 Thus, the arising under jurisdiction at this point
31. When the resolution '[t]hat the national Legislature be empowered to appoint
inferior Tribunals' was raised, Pierce Butler argued that lower federal courts were
unnecessary and that the state courts "might do the business." Id. at 38. See also id. at
45. Luther Martin feared that lower federal courts would "create jealousies & oppositions
in the State tribunals, with the jurisdiction of which they will interfere." Id. at 45-46.
Edmund Randolph responded that the state courts could "not be trusted with the
administration of the National Laws," and Nathaniel Gorham argued that "[i]nferior
tribunals are essential to render the authority of the Natl. Legislature effectual...." Id.
at 46.
32. The resolution "[t]hat the national Legislature be empowered to appoint inferior
Tribunals- passed unanimously with nine states in favor and none opposed. Id. at 38-39.
33. Id. at 46; see also id. at 39. The Convention also deleted the provision for federal
court jurisdiction of "impeachments of national Officers. .. ." Id. at 39.
34. Unfortunately, there is no recorded debate on the Madison resolution.
35. Id. at 85. The members of the Committee were chosen the following day. They
were Oliver Ellsworth, Nathaniel Gorham, Edmund Randolph, John Rutledge, and James
Wilson. Id. at 97. Unfortunately, no minutes or journal accounts of the proceedings of the
Committee have been found. Clinton, supra note 29, at 772.
36. 2 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 146. This draft gives "the supreme tribunal"
jurisdiction of the cases specifically mentioned. Id. at 146-47. Other provisions make clear
that the authors also intended the lower courts to hear such cases. The draft empowered
Congress to establish inferior tribunals, id. at 146, and to give them "[t]he whole or a part
of the jurisdiction aforesaid according to the discretion of the legislature ... as original
tribunals." Id. at 147.
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did not include cases arising under the Constitution or treaties of
the United States. The draft also extended jurisdiction to other
cases, "as the national legislature may assign, as involving the
national peace and harmony. "
A draft written by James Wilson, also edited by Rutledge,
elaborates on the Randolph-Rutledge draft.38 Significantly,
criminal cases are specifically mentioned, but in a backhanded
manner. Instead of affirmatively granting jurisdiction over cases
involving violation of federal criminal laws, the draft reads: "& in
the States, where they shall be committed; The Trial of all Criml
Offences [sic]-except in Cases of Impeachment-shall be by
Jury."39  Nonetheless, the authors must have assumed that the
federal courts would hear criminal cases. They would hardly have
designated the venue and guaranteed jury trials for cases the
federal courts could not hear. Perhaps Wilson and Rutledge
believed that the power to hear cases "arising under Laws passed
by the Legislature of the United States"40 was sufficient to grant
criminal jurisdiction because the Legislature might pass both
criminal and civil statutes.4 ' This reading of the Wilson-
Rutledge draft is consistent with the earlier plans and the
discussions of the Convention.42
37. Id. at 147. Such cases included suits for "the collection of the revenue" and
several types of diversity jurisdiction. Id. Jurisdiction was extended over disputes
"between citizens of different states," "between a State & a Citizen or Citizens of another
State," 'between different states," and "in which subjects or citizens of other countries are
concerned." Id. Jurisdiction over admiralty cases also was granted. Id.
38. This document is set forth in id. at 163-75. The judiciary provisions appear in id.
at 172-73. The arising under jurisdiction still extended only to cases "arising under Laws
passed by the Legislature of the United States," id. at 172, but jurisdiction was added for
(clases affecting Ambassadors other public Ministers & Consuls," id., and the alienage
jurisdiction was defined more specifically than in the Randolph-Rutledge draft.
39. Id at 173. The final version of this language in Article III reads:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been
committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at
such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. 3, § 2, cl. 3.
40. 2 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 172.
41. The Wilson-Rutledge draft gave the legislature the power to "declare the Law and
Punishment" of several kinds of crimes, including "Piracies and Felonies committed on the
high Seas . . . counterfeiting . .. [and] Offences against the Law of Nations; . . ." 2
RECORDS, supra note 21, at 168.
42. Wilfred J. Ritz argues: "There is no clear expression in the records of the federal
convention of any intent to establish a national judicial system exercising a criminal
jurisdiction." WILFRED J. RITZ, REWRrIING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789:
682 [Vol. 19:673
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On August 6, the Committee of Detail presented a draft
Constitution that contained the judiciary provisions of the Wilson-
Rutledge draft.43 On August 27, the Convention made some very
important amendments. The delegates agreed to extend the
judicial power to equitable as well as legal cases" and to
controversies "to which the U- S- shall be a party."45  In
addition, a quick series of amendments4 greatly expanded the
arising under jurisdiction to read as follows: "The Judicial Power
shall extend to all cases both in law and equity arising under this
Constitution and the laws of the United States, and treaties made
or which shall be made under their authority; . . ." This new
language empowered the Supreme Court and lower federal courts
to hear cases either arising under the Constitution itself, or under
treaties, as well as cases arising under federal statutes.
It is intriguing to ponder why the phrase "laws passed by the
Legislature" was amended to read simply "laws." Perhaps Mr.
Rutledge, who proposed the amendment, thought the reference to
the legislature was unnecessary. It is at least plausible, however,
that he meant to extend jurisdiction to cases arising under federal
common law.' It plainly would take some time after the new
EXPOSING MYTHS, CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE 106 (Wythe Holt
& L.H. LaRue eds., 1990). Ritz believes that the Convention probably meant to give
Congress the power to legislate only a few specific crimes, with actual prosecution to occur
in the state courts. Id. Ritz's view seems too restrictive for several reasons. The judiciary
provisions of the various constitutional plans made specific references to criminal cases and
to cases involving the "national peace and harmony" in defining the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal courts. In addition, the final version of Article III refers to
criminal cases. Finally, the first Congress gave the lower federal courts jurisdiction over
federal criminal cases and subsequently enacted a crime bill. See infra notes 85, 103-06
and accompanying text. Since many members of the first Congress attended the
Constitutional Convention, it is unlikely they would have passed these measures if they
thought the Constitution did not allow the the lower federal courts to hear criminal cases.
43. 2 RECORDS, supra note 21, at 177, 186-87.
44. Id. at 428.
45. Id. at 430. Both the Pinckney and Hamilton plans proposed federal jurisdiction
in such cases. See supra notes 25, 30.
46. The phrase "The Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court shall extend to all cases
arising under laws passed by the Legislature of the United States" was amended first to
add the words "'this Constitution and the' before the word 'laws.' Id. at 430. Next, "the
words 'passed by the Legislature' were struck out," and following "U.S.,- the words "and
treaties made or which shall be made under their authority' were inserted. Id. at 431.
Finally, "The jurisdiction of the supreme Court" was replaced with "the Judicial power."
Id. The record contains little discussion of the amendments.
47. Id. at 576.
48. The federal courts exercised jurisdiction over federal common law crimes in the
early years of the Republic. See infra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
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government was in place for the legislature to pass a significant
body of laws. Moreover, given the relative paucity of legislation
and the ascendency of the common law during these times,
Rutledge may have thought limiting jurisdiction to cases arising
under federal statutes would seriously restrict the power of the
federal courts.
The Convention amended the judiciary provisions several
more times, but the changes were stylistic rather than
substantive.49 The Convention approved the draft Constitution
on September 17 and sent it to the states for debate and
ratification."°
B. The Ratification Process
The ratification process began shortly after the end of the
Constitutional Convention. Anti-union sentiment was very
strong, and the vote was very close in many state conventions. 51
Unlike the Constitutional Convention, which proceeded in closed
session,5 2 the state ratification process was open and highly
49. A committee was appointed on September 8 to undertake a final stylistic edit of
the draft Constitution. Id. at 547, 553. The members were Alexander Hamilton, William
Johnsoh, Rufus King, James Madison, and Gouverneur Morris. Id.
50. Id. at 648-49, 665-66.
51. The vote in Massachusetts was 187 in favor and 168 opposed. 13 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Commentaries on the
Constitution, Public and Private, Vol. 1, 21 February to 7 November 1787, xli (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1981) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION, VOL. 1]. In New Hampshire the vote was 57 to 47 in favor, and in Virginia
89 to 79 in favor. Id. at xlii. Proponents of the new Constitution engaged in much political
maneuvering and arm-twisting to gain state approvals. See John J. Fox, Massachusetts and
the Creation of the Federal Union, 1775-1791, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE STATES: THE
ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 121-27 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988) (recounting the
political struggle for ratificiation in Massachusetts); Jere Daniell, Ideology and Hardball:
Ratification of the Federal Constitution in New Hampshire, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
STATES: THE ROLE OF THE ORIGINAL THIRTEEN IN THE FRAMING AND ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 189-98 (Patrick T. Conley & John P. Kaminski eds., 1988)
(describing the New Hampshire process).
The Constitutional Convention had suggested to the Continental Congress that the
new government be established after nine states ratified the Constitution. 2 RECORDS,
supra note 21, at 665-66. New Hampshire became the ninth state to do so on June 21,
1788, and Virginia followed on June 25. COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 1,
supra, at xlii. In recalcitrant states, the ratification process continued after the new
government began operation. The final approval came in Rhode Island on May 29, 1790.
Id.
52. 1 RECORDS, supra note 21,.at 17.
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political.5" Delegates and private citizens wrote a steady stream
of pamphlets and newspaper articles arguing for and against
ratification.54 As in the Constitutional Convention, a myriad of
topics were discussed, and the judiciary received relatively little
attention.55  Nonetheless, much was said that reveals the
original understandings of the arising under jurisdiction, and of
concurrent and exclusive jurisdiction as well.
Delegates to state conventions criticised the arising under
jurisdiction on several grounds. They complained that it was
vague and ambiguous, and thus potentially very broad." They
53. Clinton, supra note 29, at 797-99.
54. The editors of COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 51, have
painstakingly assembled four volumes of such materials.
55. John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal Judicial System, 23 IND. L.J. 236,
236 (1948) ("Discussion in the country during the period of ratification usually found
livelier topics than courts orjudges.'). Some commentators have characterized the debates
on Article III as very controversial. See, e.g., Wythe Holt, "To Establish Justice": Politics,
the Judiciary Act of 1789, and the Invention of the Federal Courts, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1421,
1467 ("The judiciary provisions clearly provoked an outpouring of controversy and
antagonism.'); PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 20 (3rd ed. 1988) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER] ("The judiciary article,
which had aroused only relatively minor disagreement in the Convention, became a storm
center of controversy in the ratification debates.'). It is true that some speakers and
writers attacked Article III with much emotion. Nonetheless, a review of the many
volumes of original source materials reveals that relatively few pages focus on the
judiciary. Moreover, the record shows that other Article III issues were more controversial
than the arising under jurisdiction. Frank, supra, at 236. The diversity and alienage
jurisdiction were very controversial. See Holt, supra, at 1466-78. In addition, Article III's
omission of the right to a jury trial in civil cases may have provoked more pages of
complaint than any other issue concerning the judiciary.
56. Several delegates voiced this criticism in the Virginia convention. See 3 THE
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (J. Elliot ed., 1836) 565 (Grayson), 521, 523 (Mason), 572 (Gov. Randolph)
[hereinafter DEBATES]. This complaint was also raised in the North Carolina convention,
4 id. at 136 (Mr. Spencer), and in pamphlets, letters, and newspapers. 14 THE
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Commentaries on the
Constitution, Public and Private, Vol. 2, 8 November to 17 December 1787, 268-69 (John
P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1983) (pamphlet by "A Federal Republican"
complaining that the vowers of the federal courts are "exceedingly comprehensive')
[hereinafter COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 2]; 15 THE DOCUMENTARY
HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, Commentaries on the Constitution,
Public and Private, Vol. 3, 18 December 1787 to 31 January 1788, 264-65 (John P.
Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1984) (letter dated January 5, 1788 from Samuel
Osgood to Samuel Adams commenting that the arising under jurisdiction makes "[tihe
Extent of the Judicial Power . . . as indefinite & unlimited as Words can make it.')
[hereinafer COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 3]; id. at 513 (Eleventh essay by
"Brutus" published in the New York Journal, January 31, 1788, noting the broad scope of
the arising under jurisdiction).
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also feared that it would cause serious interference with the state
courts. 7 Some delegates thought that federal and state judges
would bicker jealously, causing tension and inefficiency."
Inevitably, some suggested that the way to avoid these problems
was to jettison lower federal courts and leave cases arising under
federal law to the state courts, with possible Supreme Court
review.59
Proponents of the new Constitution answered the objections
to the arising under jurisdiction by minimizing its scope and by
stressing the need for a national judiciary.' They also stressed
Governor Randolph in Virginia appeared to recognize just how troublesome the
phrase "arising under" might become. His comments foreshadow ChiefJustice Marshall's
discussion of the scope of the jurisdiction in Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) where Randolph said:
[Federal jurisdiction] is ambiguous in some parts, and unnecessarily extensive
in others. It extends to all cases in law and equity arising under the
Constitution. What are these cases of law and equity? Do they not involve all
rights, from an inchoate right to a complete right, arising from this
Constitution?
3 DEBATES, supra, at 572. In Osborn, Chief Justice Marshall defined the arising under
jurisdiction very broadly. He asserted that a case by or against the Bank of the United
States for simple breach of contract would arise under federal law because the issue of
whether the Bank had a right to sue, or to enter into the contract, depended on the federal
statute creating the Bank and defining its powers. He conceded that these issues might
not come up in the case, but he asserted that they still formed "original ingredient[s] in
every cause." Osborn, 22 U.S. at 824. In Randolph's terms, the federal issues in the breach
of contract case might be seen as inchoate; that is, partial or imperfect, begun but not
completed, as opposed to complete, or fully presented. John Marshall attended the
Virginia convention and may have been present the day that Randolph made these
remarks. Marshall spoke to the Convention on Friday, June 20, 1788, and Randolph made
the above-quoted comments on Saturday, June 21. See 3 DEBATES, supra, at 551-62. The
Osborn case is discussed infra at notes 164-73 and accompanying text.
57. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 56, at 527 (Mason), 325 (Henry), 563 (Grayson).
This criticism was echoed in the press. See COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, VOL.
1, supra note 51, at 415-16 (first essay by "Brutus" in the New York Journal, October 18,
1787), 333 ("Centinel I," an essay published in The Independent Gazetteer in Philadelphia
on October 5, 1787); COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 3, supra note 56, at 513,
515 (Eleventh essay by Brutus); COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 2, supra note
56, at 268-69 (essay by "A Federal Republican").
58. See, e.g., 3 DEBATES, supra note 56, at 569-70 (Grayson); 4 id. at 136-37 (Spencer).
59. See, e.g., 4 id. at 155 (Spencer).
60. John Marshall pointed out that the arising under jurisdiction would be limited to
cases involving matters that Congress could legislate about. 3 DEBATES, supra note 56, at
553. Madison wrote in a letter to George Washington, "The great mass of suits in every
State lie between Citizen & Citizen, and relate to matters not of federal cognizance."
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, VOL. 1, supra note 51, at 408. Thus, in Madison's
view, "the far greater number of causes-ninety-nine out of a hundred-will remain with
the state judiciaries." 3 DEBATES, supra note 56, at 538; see also 4 id. at 163 (Maclaine).
Madison also cited the political axiom that "the judicial power should correspond with the
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that jurisdiction would be concurrent with the state courts in most
cases.
61
The Federalist Number 82, written by Alexander Hamilton,
contains the most thorough discussion of concurrent and exclusive
jurisdiction during the ratification process.6 2 Hamilton noted
that exclusive federal jurisdiction over the cases in Article III,
Section Two, might be inferred from the mandatory language of
Section One.63 However, he thought this interpretation would
"amount to an alienation of State power by implication," and thus
be unwise.64 Hamilton believed that Congress could give the
federal courts exclusive jurisdiction over cases arising under
federal statutes. 65 He also believed, however, that unless
Congress did so explicitly, the state courts "will of course take
cognizance of the causes to which those acts may give birth.'
Concurrent jurisdiction could extend to criminal as well as
civil cases. In Virginia, James Madison reminded the delegates
that although Congress was authorized by the Confederation to
establish courts for trying piracies and felonies committed on the
high seas, it had instead given the state courts jurisdiction over
legislative" in defending the arising under jurisdiction. 3 id. at 532. In North Carolina,
Davie pointed out that the arising under jurisdiction provided the central means for
enforcing federal law. 4 id. at 158.
61. See, e.g., 4 id. at 141 ("The opinion which I have always entertained is, that they
will, in these cases, as well as in several others, have concurrent jurisdiction with the state
courts, and not exclusive jurisdiction.") (Gov. Johnston); 3 id. at 553-54 (The state courts
"have a concurrence ofjurisdiction with the [lower] federal courts in those cases in which
the latter have cognizance.") (Marshall); 4 id. at 163 ("There [are] a number of other
instances, where, though jurisdiction is given to the federal courts, it is not taken away
from the state courts.") (Maclaine).
It was generally believed that admiralty and maritime jurisdiction should be
exclusively federal because of the need for uniformity of decisions in cases involving
relations with foreign countries. See 3 id. at 532 (Madison); 571 (Randolph); 4 id. at 159
(Davie).
62. THE FEDERALIST, No. 82 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).
63. Id. at 492. Hamilton made this inference from Section 1, stating: "'rhe judicial
power of the United States shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior
courts as the Congress shall from time to time ordain and establish." Id. (emphasis added
by Hamilton).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 493.
66. Id. The federal courts follow Hamilton's prescriptions to this day. See infra note
386 and accompanying text. As a necessary corollary, Hamilton argued that the Supreme
Court must have appellate jurisdiction over state cases involving matters of national
concern. Otherwise, "the judiciary authority of the Union may be eluded at the pleasure
of every plaintiff or prosecutor." Id. at 494.
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these cases.6 7 He continued, "Now, sir, if there will be as much
sympathy between Congress and the people as now, we may fairly
conclude that the federal cognizance will be vested in the local
tribunals.' °
Ultimately, the proposed Constitution withstood the
challenges in the state conventions. Many states proposed
amendments to Article III to further limit federal court
jurisdiction.6 9  The proposed amendments, and the Madisonian
compromise that left the structure and jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts to the national legislature," together ensured that
the debate about the federal judiciary would continue with full
force into the first session of the new Congress.
Nonetheless, by the time ratification was complete, some
fundamental principles had been established concerning the
federal judiciary and the extent of its power. The judicial power
of the United States was limited to the cases set forth in Article
III, and the arising under jurisdiction extended to both civil and
criminal cases. Congress could create lower federal courts and
give them jurisdiction over the cases in Article III, but Congress
could also decline to create lower federal courts and leave almost
all of the cases in Article III to the state courts in the first
instance. 7' The jurisdiction of the lower federal courts generally
was to be concurrent with the state courts unless Congress
specifically made it exclusive.
67. 3 DEBATES, supra note 56, at 536.
68. Id.
69. Some states proposed eliminating part of the diversity jurisdiction of the lower
federal courts, see, e.g., 3 id. at 660 (Virginia); 4 id. at 246 (North Carolina), or imposing
a $1500 amount in controversy requirement; see, e.g., 1 id. at 323 (Massachusetts). Several
states suggested limiting the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts to admiralty cases, see,
e.g., 4 id. at 246 (North Carolina); 3 id. at 660 (Virginia); 2 i. at 546 (Pennsylvania); 1 i.
at 331 (New York). Some states wanted to limit the arising under jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court to cases arising under federal treaties. See, e.g., 4 id. at 246 (North
Carolina); 3 id. at 660 (Virginia). Several Maryland delegates sought an express
declaration that the state courts have concurrent jurisdiction in civil cases that could be
heard in the lower federal courts. 2 id. at 550.
70. See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
71. The clear exceptions were cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and
consuls, and cases to which a State was a party. These cases were within the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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C. The Judiciary Act of 1789
The first Congress convened in the Spring of 1789.72 As one
of its first acts, the new Senate appointed a committee consisting
of one senator from each state to draft a judiciary bill.73 In due
course, Congress passed "An Act to establish the Judicial Courts
of the United States," known popularly as The Judiciary Act of
1789.74 President Washington signed the Act into law on
September 24, 1789. 75
The Judiciary Act of 1789 sets forth a detailed blueprint for
the structure, jurisdiction, and procedure of the federal courts.76
Although the Act reveals what Congress did, the historical record
contains little information about why Congress did it.
77
Nonetheless, by remembering the historical context and the
debates during the Constitutional Convention and ratification, it
is possible to make some inferences about Congress's motives. In
some instances, however, those motives are a mystery, and will
likely remain so.
Many of the Act's provisions reflect political compromise.78
As in the earlier debates, some people favored creation of a fully
72. Congress was supposed to convene on March 4, 1789, in New York City. RITZ,
supra note 42, at 13. However, quorums were not present until April 1 in the House and
April 6 in the Senate. 3 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-
1791, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES JOURNAL 7 (1977) [hereinafter HOUSE JOURNAL]; 1
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791, SENATE LEGISLATIVE
JOURNAL 7 (1972) [hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL].
73. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 11.
74. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
75. Id. at 93.
76. Id. at 73-93.
77. The Senate and House Journals are barebones documents that list actions taken
in summary form. See, e.g., supra note 72. They contain no record of the debates. Senator
William Maclay of Pennsylvania kept a diary during the three sessions of the first
Congress. See Maclay, The Diary of William Maclay and Other Notes on Senate Debates,
reprinted in 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-1791
(Kenneth R. Bowling & Helen E Veit fed., 1988). W!hIle the diary makes interesting
reading, it is idiosyncratic and filled as much with observations about personalities as with
summaries of the Senate debates. The other notes of the Senate debates are quite
summary. The Senate Committee that drafted the judiciary bill kept no minutes.
78. Maeva Marcus & Natalie Wexler, The Judiciary Act of1789: Political Compromise
or Constitutional Interpretation, in ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY, ESSAYS ON THE
JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789, 13-14 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); Holt, supra note 55, at 1479-80;
RITZ, supra note 42, at 4-5, 22; Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the Federal
Judiciary Act of 1789,37 HARV. L. REV. 49, 53-54, 67-68 (1923); Chadbourn & Levin, supra
note 5, at 640-41.
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elaborated system of federal courts invested with all of the subject
matter jurisdiction permissible under Article III." Congress
compromised by creating lower federal courts and providing for an
economical staffing of those courts and the Supreme Court,'
while granting the federal courts only a portion of the arising
under jurisdiction.8
The arising under jurisdiction may be exercised in three
modes---original, removal, and appellate. A case arising under
federal law may begin in a federal court, may be removed there
from a state court, or may be heard by the Supreme Court on
appeal from a state court. Congress gave the lower federal courts
79. Opponents continued to argue that the cases in Article III, both civil and criminal,
could better be heard by the state courts in the first instance, with eventual Supreme
Court review to ensure the uniformity of national law. Warren, supra note 78, at 62. For
example, a letter from David Sewall, a Massachusetts judge, to Senator Caleb Strong,
suggested that "[s]uits properly Cognizeable at Common Law" should be brought in the
state courts, with review by the U.S. Supreme Court "in all causes of a federal kind to a
certain amount." Letter from David Sewall to Caleb Strong (Mar. 28, 1789) in Holt, supra
note 55, at 1529-30. Interestingly, Sewall also suggested that cases involving violation of
federal penal laws be brought in the state courts in the first instance:
And offences arising from Transgressions of Penal Statutes of Congress, might
be cognizable in the S.J. of the State Courts, Which by the Supposition are to
be Competently Supported by the Individual States and will always be
attended with Grand and Petit Jurors of the best quality the State affords..
Id. at 1529.
80. Except for Massachusetts and Virginia (which had two districts) and Rhode Island
and North Carolina (which had no district courts), a district court, made up of a single
judge, would sit in each state. The Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 2-3, 1 Stat. at 73-74. The
country was divided into three circuits. Circuit panels would be staffed by two Supreme
Court justices and the district judge of the state where the court was sitting. Id. § 4, 1
Stat. at 74-75. The Supreme Court was to consist of a Chief Justice and five associate
justices. Id. § 1, 1 Stat. at 73.
81. The extent of Congress's power to control the jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts has been debated throughout our history. The prevailing view has been that the
power to create the lower courts includes the power to define and limit their subject matter
jurisdiction. See Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182, 187 (1943); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8
How.) 441, 448-49 (1850). It is clear that the first Congress believed it had the power to
give the lower federal courts much less jurisdiction than the Constitution allows. See infra
notes 82-88 and accompanying text. For excellent recent treatments of this topic, compare
Akhil R. Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two Tiers of Federal
Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985), and Clinton, supra note 29, with William R.
Castro, The First Congress's Understanding of its Authority over the Federal Courts'
Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101 (1985), and Paul M. Bator, Congressional Power Over
the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 27 VILL. L. REV. 1030 (1981-82). See generally the
sources cited in Clinton, supra note 29, at 742-44, n.3. See also, Colloquy, Article III and
the Judiciary Act of 1789, in 138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990), featuring articles by
Professors Akhil R. Amar, Daniel J. Meltzer, and Martin H. Redish that discuss Professor
Amar's two-tier thesis.
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a portion of the original arising under jurisdiction but none of the
removal arising under jurisdiction. 2 In addition, it gave the
Supreme Court only a portion of the appellate arising under
jurisdiction.
Congress did not grant the lower federal courts original
jurisdiction over civil cases arising under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States. Litigants were to bring these
cases in state court.83 By contrast, Congress gave the lower
federal courts virtually all of the original criminal arising under
jurisdiction possible under Article III. Moreover, it made that
jurisdiction exclusively federal, but with an important caveat.
Congress gave the district courts exclusive jurisdiction of "all
crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority
of the United States, committed within their respective districts,"
where the punishment did not exceed a whipping of thirty stripes,
a fine of one hundred dollars, or six months imprisonment.8" It
gave the circuit courts "exclusive cognizance of all crimes and
offences cognizable under the authority of the United States"
where greater punishments were possible, but with the following
reservation: "except where this act otherwise provides, or the laws
of the United States shall otherwise direct,.. .' Thus, the first
Congress specifically recognized its power to make federal crimes
enforceable in state court.s'
While Congress sharply differentiated between the civil and
criminal original arising under jurisdiction of the lower federal
courts, it made no such distinction in the Supreme Court's
appellate arising under jurisdiction. Congress imposed significant
limits on this jurisdiction, but applied them equally to civil and
82. The 1789 Act granted removal jurisdiction in diversity cases. See The Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. at 79-80.
83. See Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 245 (1967); The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 411, 430 (1866); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 960.
84. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, § 9, 1 Stat. at 76-77.
85. Id. § 11, 1 Stat. at 78-79.
86. Finally, the circuit courts were given concurrent jurisdiction with the district
courts of crimes and offenses that could be heard in those courts. Id. at 78.
At least one contemporary commentator believes that the grant of original criminal
arising under jurisdiction approaches constitutional limits. "Making the whole together,"
he asserts, "a jurisdiction is given and distributed between these two tribunals which is
co-extensive with that which the Constitution has bestowed on the judiciary branch of the
government;..." PETER S. DuPONCEAU, A DISSERTATION ON THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF
THE JURISDICTION OF THE COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES 49 (1824).
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criminal cases. 7 Congress also limited the jurisdiction to review
of the federal issue in an appeal.'
Although the Judiciary Act shows that Congress carefully
balanced federal and state judicial power, the record contains
almost no explanation of Congress's choices. Historical sources do
not explain why Congress chose to treat the civil and criminal
arising under jurisdiction so differently in the original mode while
making no distinction between them in the appellate mode. Why
didn't Congress allow both civil and criminal cases arising under
federal law to be brought originally in federal court, or direct both
to state court?8" If they were going to split up the arising under
jurisdiction, why not give the civil cases to the federal courts and
the criminal cases to the state courts? And once having given the
criminal arising under jurisdiction to the lower federal courts,
why make it exclusively federal?
These questions cannot be answered with certainty. We do
know that many proponents of a strong federal judiciary
distrusted the state courts.' As Professor Wythe Holt has
painstakingly demonstrated, during the revolutionary and post-
revolutionary period, state courts often refused to enforce claims
of creditors from other states or from England.91 Congress
87. Section 25 of the Act gave the Supreme Court authority to review a final judgment
of "the highest court of law or equity of a State in which a decision in the suit could be
had" in three categories of cases: (1) where the validity of a federal statute or treaty was
drawn into question, and the decision was against its validity; (2) where the validity of a
state statute was drawn into question on the ground that it violated the Constitution,
treaties, or laws of the United States, and the decision upheld the state statute; and (3)
where the case involved the construction of federal law, and the decision was "against the
title, right, [or] privilege... claimed by either party.. . ." The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-86. By clear implication, Congress withheld jurisdiction in the
converse situations, namely when a state court upheld the validity of federal law,
invalidated a state statute as violating federal law, or construed federal law in favor of the
interpretation given by either party. In the third instance, if the state court decision
construed federal law in favor of the interpretation given by one party, it would often be
construing it against the interpretation given by the other, and thus the Supreme Court
presumably could hear the case.
88. The restricting language read: "But no other error shall be assigned or regarded
as a ground of reversal in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of
the record, and immediately respects the before mentioned questions of validity or
construction of the said constitution, treaties, (or] statutes...." Id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 86-87.
89. Opponents of the lower federal courts consistently argued that all cases arising
under federal law, civil and criminal, should be brought in state courts. See supra notes
27, 31, 59, 79 and accompanying text. They did not argue that one or the other was more
appropriately heard in state court.
90. See Marcus & Wexler, supra note 78, at 20-21.
91. See Holt, supra note 55, at 1425-58.
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conferred the alienage and diversity jurisdiction primarily to
provide a federal forum where these claims could be brought.92
At a time when there was very little federal law for cases to arise
under, the federalists may have given the state courts jurisdiction
of civil arising under cases in exchange for federal diversity
jurisdiction.93 As to criminal cases, proponents of a strong
national government may have felt that it was dangerous to leave
enforcement of federal criminal law to hostile state courts. As
Oliver Ellsworth, a chief architect of the Act, stated: "[I]f the
State Courts, as such, could take cognizance of . . offences
[against the United States], it might not be safe for the General
Government to put the trial and punishment of them entirely out
of its own hands."9 4 This concern does not fully explain,
however, why the criminal arising under jurisdiction should be
exclusively federal. The exclusivity is even more puzzling when
considered in light- of the many statutes Congress passed in the
1790's and early 1800's giving the state courts concurrent
jurisdiction over federal criminal cases.95
Finally, the Judiciary Act reflects another important
understanding that directly affected the scope of the criminal
arising under jurisdiction. Although the matter is not free from
doubt, Congress apparently wanted the lower federal courts to
hear cases charging common law crimes.9 If the federal courts
92. Id. at 1473-75. By imposing the $500 amount in controversy requirement,
Congress excluded the great mass of potential debt actions from federal court. Id. at 1487-
88. This may have been necessary to appease legislators whose constituents wanted the
protection of state courts and juries in debt collection actions.
93. See Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 5, at 641-42.
94. Letter from Oliver Ellsworth to Richard Law, August 4, 1789, quoted in Warren,
supra note 78, at 66. See also Marcus & Wexler, supra note 78, at 20.
95. See infra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
96. On May 13, 1789, the Senate appointed a committee to draft a bill "defining the
crimes and offences that shall be cognizable under the authority of the United States, and
their punishment." SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 72, at 44. When this committee
eventually reported a bill on July 28, it provided punishments for certain crimes, but did
not define the crimes it listed. id. at 98. Ln th. meantime, the draft of the Judbcary Act
submitted to the Senate on June 12, 1789, gave the district and circuit courts exclusive
jurisdiction of "all crimes & offences cognizable under the Authority of the United States
& defined by the laws of the same. . . ." 5 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL
CONGRESS 1789-1791, Legislative Histories 1176, 1178 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E.
Veit, eds. 1986) (emphasis added). This wording arguably limited the criminal jurisdiction
to crimes specifically defined by federal legislation. During the debates on the Act,
sometime before the Crimes Bill was reported on July 28, the Senate deleted the phrase
"& defined by the laws of the same,' in the Judiciary Act, perhaps anticipating that the
Crimes Bill would not define federal crimes, or perhaps not be enacted at all during the
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could hear such cases, their criminal jurisdiction would be greatly
enlarged.97
The Judiciary Act of 1789 launched the new federal judiciary.
Congress began implementing the arising under jurisdiction in
the years that followed.
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ARISING UNDER JURISDICTION:
1789 TO THE CIL WAR
Congress moved slowly to implement the arising under
jurisdiction in the early years of the Republic. Currents and
countercurrents reflected the continuing disagreements about the
proper balance of federal and state judicial power. Since Congress
gave the lower federal courts almost all of the original criminal
arising under jurisdiction but none of the civil, it is not surprising
that most developments in the original jurisdiction occurred on
the criminal side. Congress enacted a major crime bill in 1790.98
Because of gaps in its coverage, the federal courts started
exercising jurisdiction over common law crimes. In at least one
early case of this type, a federal court interpreted the scope of the
original criminal arising under jurisdiction very broadly.9
first session of Congress. Id. at 1176 n.34, 1178 n.46. (In fact, the Crimes bill was not
enacted until April 30, 1790. See infra notes 103-06 and accompanying text.) From this
it follows that Congress must have intended the lower federal courts to hear crimes defined
by common law, at least until a crimes bill was passed, and possibly beyond that time.
RITZ, supra note 42, at 18-19, 115; Warren, supra note 78, at 73; Holt, supra note 55, at
1505-06.
Julius Goebel, Jr., argues that deletion of the phrase "& defined by the laws of the
same" should not be interpreted to authorize a criminal common law. GOEBEL, supra note
6, at 495-96. He suggests that the deletion merely removed a redundant phrase, since
jurisdiction was sufficiently conferred by the language, "all crimes & offences that shall be
cognizable under the Authority of the United States .... " Id, As Stephen Presser points
out, however, the language that Congress left in can easily be interpreted to confer
jurisdiction over common law crimes because the phrase "all crimes and offences"
cognizable under federal authority may have included both statutory and common law
crimes. STEPHEN B. PRESSER, THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING: THE ENGLISH, THE
AMERICANS AND THE DIALECTIC OF FEDERALIST JURISPRUDENCE 85 (1991) [hereinafter THE
ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING]. Ultimately, it probably is inappropriate to draw
conclusions about the propriety of common law crimes from the deletion of a single phrase.
Id. at 85-86. Nonetheless, as subsequent history shows, federal judges assumed that they
were to enforce a common law of crimes. See infra notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
97. See infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
98. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112.
99. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1797) (No. 16,323). See
infra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
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Prosecution for common law crimes became very controversial,
however, leading the Supreme Court to withdraw the jurisdiction
in 1812. l 0° Significantly, the Court did not decide whether
jurisdiction over common law crimes violated Article III. Instead,
it merely said that Congress had not granted this power in the
Judiciary Act.
Subsequently, in a trio of cases, the Supreme Court
interpreted the scope of the Article III arising under jurisdiction
very broadly, and declared that it was coextensive in civil and
criminal cases in the original, removal, and appellate modes. 1'
These cases also confirmed Congress's power to make the
jurisdiction exclusively federal. While these decisions were of
enormous importance in defining the outer limits of Article III
power, they were of less immediate practical significance because
of the limitations on the arising under jurisdiction contained in
the Judiciary Act.
Also, throughout this period, Congress routinely enacted
legislation calling for the enforcement of federal criminal laws in
the state courts. In time, some state courts began to resent this
duty. Drawing on dicta in Supreme Court cases, they rejected
the jurisdiction. The Supreme Court struck a compromise in
Prigg v. Pennsylvania, holding that state judges could enforce
federal criminal law if they wished and if state law allowed. °2
Finally, during this period Congress gave the lower federal courts
both civil and criminal removal arising under jurisdiction in
specific classes of cases.
A. The First Crimes Bill and Jurisdiction
over Common Law Crimes
Congress began implementing the original criminal arising
under jurisdiction' by passing a comprehensive crime bill.'"
100. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7.Cranch) 32 (1812).
101. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821); Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
102. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842). Prigg is discussed infra at
notes 203-30 and accompanying text.
103. Congress gave the lower federal courts the power to hear civil cases arising under
federal law in only a few specific instances. The district courts were given limited powers
in proceedings to revoke wrongfully obtained patents. Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, § 5, 1
Stat. 109, 111. Later, they were authorized to hear some infringement suits. Act of Feb.
21, 1793, ch. 11, § 6, 1 Stat. 318, 322. In addition, the 1792 pension law imposed some
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The statute criminalized two broad categories of conduct: (1)
actions that would improperly interfere with the functioning of
federal institutions, 5 and (2) misconduct committed on federal
property or the high seas."°
As Wilfred Ritz points out, many of the crimes in the Act
were not defined but merely listed by name. Presumably, some
duties on the federal courts. Act of March 23, 1792, ch. 11, §§ 2, 3, 1 Stat. 243, 244. The
federal courts were also given jurisdiction, concurrent with the state courts, over claims
by Canadian refugees dispossessed for aiding the colonies during the Revolutionary War,
Act of April 7, 1798, ch. 26, § 3, 1 Stat. 547, 548, and over claims by aliens seeking
naturalization. Act of Jan. 29, 1795, ch. 20, § 1, 1 Stat. 414. In addition, a 1798 Act
imposed a duty on both federal and state courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to secure
release of federal soldiers arrested for nonpayment of debt or breach of contract. Act of
May 28, 1798, ch. 47, § 14, 1 Stat. 558, 560. Otherwise, civil enforcement of federal
legislation was to proceed in the state courts.
Original civil arising under jurisdiction was given to the federal courts for a short
period in 1801-02 as a part of an effort by the Federalist Party to maintain its influence
after a defeat at the polls. Act of Feb. 13, 1801, ch.4, § 11, 2 Stat. 89, 92. This Act was
repealed by an Act of March 8, 1802, ch. 8, 2 Stat. 132. For a discussion of this
controversial and highly political episode, see FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS,
THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 21-28 (1928); Charles Warren, Federal Criminal
Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARv. L. REV. 545, 556-69 (1925); Wythe Holt, The First
Federal Question Case, 3 LAW & HIST. REv. 169, 172-73 (1985); George L. Haskins &
Herbert A. Johnson, Foundations of Power: John Marshall, 1801-1815, in 2 HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 121-81 (1981).
104. Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, 1 Stat. 112. Congress did create some relatively
minor crimes during its earlier first session. A customs officer taking a bribe or making
a false entry could be fined, and a master of a ship who swore to false statements could be
fined and imprisoned. Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, § 35, 1 Stat. 29, 46-47. Another statute
punished perjury committed in the process of registering and clearing vessels. Act of Sept.
1, 1789, ch. 11, § 36, 1 Stat. 55, 65.
Congressional treatment of the April 30 crime bill is described in RITZ, supra note
42, at 120-25. See also 6 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS 1789-
1791, Legislative Histories 1741-43 (Charlene B. Bickford & Helen E. Veit, eds. 1986). The
bill also is discussed in Kathryn Preyer, Jurisdiction to Punish: Federal Authority,
Federalism and the Common Law of Crimes in the Early Republic, 4 LAw & HIST. REV.
223, 225-27 (1986); DWIGHT F. HENDERSON, CONGRESS, COURTS, AND CRIMINALS: THE
DEVELOPMENT OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW, 1801-1829 7-8 (1875).
105. This category included such crimes as treason, Act of April 30, 1790, ch.9, § 1,
1 Stat. at 112, forging or counterfeiting "any certificate, indent, or other public security of
the United States," id. § 14, 1 Stat. at 115, stealing or falsifying any process or records of
the federal courts, id. § 15, 1 Stat. at 115-16, perjury in any federal court proceedings or
in a deposition taken pursuant to federal law, id. § 18, 1 Stat. at 116, bribing a federal
judge, id. § 21, 1 Stat. at 117, and obstructing or opposing any federal officer. Id. § 22, 1
Stat. at 117.
106. This category included such wrongdoing as murder, id. § 3, 1 Stat. at 112,
concealment of felonies, id. § 6, 1 Stat. at 113, manslaughter, id. § 7, 1 Stat. at 113, piracy
or other felonies on the high seas, id. § 8, 1 Stat. at 113-14, maiming, id. § 13, 1 Stat. at
115, larceny, id. § 16, 1 Stat. at 116, and receiving stolen goods. Id. § 17, 1 Stat. at 116.
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common law of crimes was to add definitions to the names.
10 7
In addition, federal judges soon began exercising jurisdiction over
common law crimes that were not listed in the Act at all. 08
Legal historians continue to debate the legitimacy of federal
common law crimes and their significance during this period."°
It is clear, however, that by hearing cases charging common law
crimes, the federal courts tapped a potentially vast reservoir of
arising under jurisdiction.
United States v. Smith demonstrates the breadth of the
criminal arising under jurisdiction."' The defendants in Smith
were indicted for the common law crime of counterfeiting bills of
the Bank of the United States. 1 ' One of the defendants
objected that because no federal statute applied, the state courts
had exclusive jurisdiction of the cases.1 2 The court admitted
107. RITZ, supra note 42, at 124.
108. See, e.g., United States v. Henfield, 11 F. Cas. 1099, 1120-21 (C.C.D. Pa. 1793)
(No. 6360); United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714,714-15 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122a);
United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147, 1147-48 (C.C.D. Mass. 1797) (No. 16,323). See
also United States v. Villato, 28 F. Cas. 377, 378 (D. Pa. 1797) (No. 16,622); United States
v. Williams, 29 F. Cas. 1330, 1331 (C.C.D. Conn. 1799) (No. 17,708). But see United States
v. Worrall, 28 F. Cas. 774, 776-78 (C.C.D. Pa. 1798) (No. 16,766). Worrall, in which Justice
Chase denied the existence of a federal common law of crimes, is discussed at length in
Stephen B. Presser, A Tale of Two Judges: Richard Peters, Samuel Chase, and the Broken
Promise of Federalist Jurisprudence, 73 Nw. U. L. REV. 26, 58-72 (1978), and Stewart Jay,
Origins of Federal Common Law: Part One, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1067-73 (1985).
109. E.g., compare 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN U.S. HISTORY 433-37
(1926) [hereinafter THE SUPREME COURT IN U.S. HISTORY] (arguing that most federal
judges in the early years of the Republic recognized federal common law crimes), LEONARD
W. LEvY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS 273-79 (1985) (contending that the first generation
of federal judges assumed the existence of a federal common law of crimes), and MORTON
J. HoRwriz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAw, 1780-1860 9-11 (1977) (contending
that opposition to a federal common law of crimes was "[u]nheard of before 1793 and, with
one exception, uniformly rejected by American judges during the first two decades of the
Republic"), with Robert C. Palmer, The Federal Common Law of Crime, 4 LAw & HIST.
REV. 267, 272 (1986) (arguing that hearing federal common law crimes was an improper
usurpation of power), and Preyer, supra note 104, at 225-31 (arguing that evidence is not
conclusive as to whether there was a general consensus among federal judges in favor of
common law crimes and that there probably was a difference of opinion). For an excellent
overview of the issue that presents and assesses the full range of opinion, see THE
ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 96, at 67-99.
110. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1147. The case was heard by Chief Justice Ellsworth and
District Judge John Lowell. Preyer, supra note 104, at 229.
111. The Crimes Act of 1790 made it criminal to counterfeit "any certificate, indent,
or other public security of the United States....' Act of April 30, 1790, ch.9, § 14, 1 Stat.
112, 115. Since the bank bills did not fit this definition, the indictments were at common
law. See GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 630.
112. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1147.
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that the wrongdoing could have been punished in state court as
a "common-law cheat," but noted that the Constitution gave the
federal courts jurisdiction of all cases arising under the laws of
the United States. 113 The criminal cases in Smith arose under
federal law because the bank bills "were made in virtue thereof.
S114 Thus, a federal court could hear the cases, even though
no federal statute criminalized the counterfeiting.
Smith appears to define the original criminal arising under
jurisdiction particularly broadly because it empowers the federal
courts to hear criminal cases when a federal issue is only
peripherally involved. The wrongdoing in Smith was a kind of
theft, or, as the court said, a state common law cheat. The fact
that bills of a federal instrumentality were counterfeited probably
would not be a central or contested issue in the cases. Thus,
Smith seems to authorize federal jurisdiction over state criminal
cases involving a single, tangential federal issue that might not
even be raised in the proceeding.
On the other hand, Smith can be read to define the criminal
arising under jurisdiction more narrowly if the defendants' crime
had its genesis in federal rather than state law. The court said
that the cases arose under federal law because the counterfeited
bills "were made in virtue thereof," and even though there was no
federal statute prohibiting it, "to counterfeit them was a contempt
of and misdemeanor against the United States, and punishable by
them as such ... ."11' One can read this language to authorize
federal jurisdiction over a state common law cheat prosecution
because bills of the Bank of the United States were counterfeited.
Alternatively, one can read the language to authorize jurisdiction
over a federal common law crime that the court created in Smith
itself or took from an existing body of federal common law crimes.
If the latter reading is correct, federal law is much more centrally
involved in the prosecution, and Smith authorizes a less
expansive criminal arising under jurisdiction.116
113. Id. at 1147-48.
114. Id. at 1148.
115. Id.
116. It also is significant that the court evaluated jurisdiction under Article III and
did not mention Section 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 giving the circuit courts "exclusive
cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States
... ." Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 79. Perhaps the court believed that
Congress intended to make the grant ofjurisdiction in Section 11 coextensive with Article
III.
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In time, the jurisdiction envisioned by Smith was curtailed.
Prosecution for common law crimes became very
controversial." 7  Viewed from a modern perspective, this is
hardly surprising. Who among us would be comfortable if a
federal prosecutor or judge could seek to punish some actions or
words that she thought offended the peace or dignity of the
United States without notice to the defendant that such conduct
might violate federal law?1 ' Although indictments for the
common law crimes of counterfeiting" 9 or extortion 20 may not
have raised eyebrows in the 1790s, people readily saw that
common law prosecutions for seditious libel121 were brought by
those in power to silence the political opposition.12 2  In 1807, a
117. See Jay, supra note 108, at 1011, 1039.
118. Ironically, we are not particularly bothered when a court creates a new civil
cause of action and uses it to the disadvantage of an unsuspecting defendant. As the
Supreme Court remarked in Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings v. Hill: "State courts, like
this Court, may ordinarily overrule their own decisions without offending constitutional
guaranties, even though parties may have acted to their prejudice on the faith of the
earlier decisions." Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673, 681 n.8
(1930).
119. See Smith, discussed supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
120. See, e.g., United States v. Ravara, 27 F. Cas. 714 (C.C.D. Pa. 1794) (No. 16,122).
121. See, e.g., United States v. Greenleaf(case dropped) (described in LEVY, supra note
109, at 276, and GOEBEL, supra note 6, at 629). See also United States v. Cabell (case
aborted for political reasons) (described in LEVY, supra note 109, at 276-77).
122. See THE ORIGINAL MISUNDERSTANDING, supra note 96, at 67-68; Jay, supra note
108, at 1075-78. As Leonard W. Levy notes, if the executive could prosecute mere words
as common law crimes, the First Amendment's free speech clause would offer "merely the
shadow rather than the substance of protection by stipulating only a restriction upon
Congress." LEVY, supra note 109, at 274.
People criticized federal common law crimes for impinging on state jurisdiction and
for being unfair because people could be punished upon judicial whim for actions they did
not know were criminal when undertaken. For example, in 1800, the Virginia General
Assembly issued an "instruction" to the Senators from that state to oppose passing any law
recognizing the existence of a federal common law of crimes. INSTRUCTION FROM THE
GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF VIRGINIA TO THE SENATORS FROM THAT STATE IN CONGRESS,
JANUARY 11TH, 1800, reprinted in DUPONCEAU, supra note 86, at 225-26. Such a body of
law, they asserted, would open
a new tribunal for the trial of crimes never contemplated by the federal
compact. It opens a new code of sanguinary criminal law, both obsolete and
unknown, and either wholly rejected or essentially modified in almost all its
parts by State institutions. It arrests, or supersedes, State jurisdictions, and
innovates upon State laws. It subjects the citizens to punishment, according
to the judiciary will, when he is left in ignorance of what this law enjoins as
a duty, or prohibits as a crime.
Id. at 225. See also 1 Z. SWIFT, A SYSTEM OF THE LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT
365-66 (1795) (stating that punishment for a common law crime "manifestly partakes of
the odious nature of an ex post facto law, and subjects a man to an inconvenience which
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series of indictments for common law crimes were issued in
Connecticut federal court charging various federalists with
libeling President Jefferson.'" Almost all of the charges were
eventually dismissed, 24 but one case, United States v. Hudson
& Goodwin, reached the United States Supreme Court."2 The
Court seized this opportunity to withdraw jurisdiction over
common law crimes from the lower federal courts. By taking this
step, the Court greatly restricted the original criminal arising
under jursidiction.
The issue for decision, the Court began, was "whether the
Circuit Courts of the United States can exercise a common law
jurisdiction in criminal cases."'26  The Court's analysis is
straightforward and summary. The power to create lower federal
courts includes the power to define their subject matter
jurisdiction; the lower courts thus can exercise only the
jurisdiction that Congress gives them.127 Jurisdiction over
common law crimes has not been conferred by Congress. 2 '
Consequently, the lower federal courts cannot hear these
cases. 129
The Court made clear that it was not deciding whether
jurisdiction over common law crimes could be given under Article
111.130 Instead, it was deciding only that such jurisdiction had
not been conferred by the Judiciary Act of 1789:
he could not possibily foresee, or calculate upon, at the time of doing the act").
123. THE SUPREME COURT IN U.S. HISTORY, supra note 109, at 435.
124. Id. at 436.
125. United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 (1812). For
discussions of the background of this case, see Jay, supra note 108, at 1012-19; 2 WILLIAM
W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 770-82 (1953); LEONARD W. LEVY,
JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE 61-66 (1963); THE SUPREME COURT IN
U.S. HISTORY, supra note 109, at 435-37; Preyer, supra note 104, at 242-47.
126. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32. Before beginning its legal
analysis, the Court acknowledged the political realities: "Although this question is brought
up now for the first time to be decided by this Court, we consider it as having been long
since settled in public opinion." Id. And that opinion was decidedly in the negative. See
Jay, supra note 108, at 1017-18.
127. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 33.
128. Id.
129. Id. The Court specifically stated, "[tlhe legislative authority of the Union must
first make an act a crime, affix a punishment to it, and declare the Court that shall have
jurisdiction of the offence." Id. at 34. Today on the civil side, by contrast, the federal courts
can hear cases asserting common law as well as statutory causes of action.
130. Id. at 33.
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It is not necessary to inquire whether the general
Government, in any and what extent, possesses the
power of conferring on its Courts a jurisdiction in cases
similar to the present; it is enough that such jurisdiction
has not been conferred by any legislative act, if it does
not result to those Courts as a consequence of their
creation. 131
To decide the case on these grounds, the Court had to ignore the
evidence that the first Congress intended the federal courts to
hear common law crimes. 132  By declining to make a
constitutional ruling, however, the Court left undisturbed the
broad interpretation of Article III's criminal arising under
jurisdiction in United States v. Smith,1"a and left open the
possibility that Congress might grant jurisdiction over common
law crimes if future events warranted. 134
B. Martin, Cohens, and Osborn
While the Supreme Court declined to discuss the scope of the
Article III arising under jurisdiction in Hudson & Goodwin, it
seemed almost eager to expound on that subject in several
subsequent cases. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 35  Cohens v.
131. Id. The Court went on to reject the argument that the lower federal courts had
the power to hear common law criminal cases "as a consequence of their creation." Id. The
Court simply did not think it necessary for the courts to exercise this power in order to
preserve the existence and stability of the federal government. Id. at 33-34.
132. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
133. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1148. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
134. Although Hudson & Goodwin purported only to interpret the jurisdictional
provisions of the Judiciary Act of 1789, as a practical matter it extinguished the federal
common law of crimes. In a real sense federal common law crimes cease to exist if the
fedcral courts are not empowered to hear them. (Although it is at least theoretically
possible for state courts to hear federal common law crimes, it is unlikely they would wish
to do so. Presumably, state courts can create their own criminal common law to proscribe
conduct they find offensive.) Technically, however, Hudson & Goodwin appears to be only
a decision about jurisdiction conferred-or not conferred-by Congress. It thus is very
different from the decision in Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In Erie the
Court explicitly extinguished the general civil common law that had grown up during the
era of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), on the ground that the Constitution
forbade its existence. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
135. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
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Virginia,'36 and Osborn v. Bank of the United States137
together defined the general contours of the jurisdiction.
In Martin, Hunter brought an ejectment action against
Martin in a Virginia state court to recover land."3  Martin
claimed title under a royal grant made prior to the Revolution,
and argued that his title was protected by the treaty with
England.'39 Martin won in the lower court, but the Virginia
Court of Appeals reversed. 40 Martin appealed to the United
States Supreme Court and the Court ruled in his favor."" The
Virginia Court of Appeals refused to obey the Court's mandate,
claiming that the Supreme Court had no power to review its
judgments and that Section Twenty-five of the Judiciary Act of
1789 was unconstitutional. 42 Martin then returned to the
Supreme Court on a second writ of error to force execution of the
mandate.'"
Justice Story's wide-ranging opinion for the Court discussed
Article III's arising under jurisdiction in its original, removal, and
appellate modes.'" Justice Story made clear that the
jurisdiction under the three modes is coextensive, i.e., that any
case arising under federal law may be brought in a lower federal
court originally, removed there from a state court, or heard by the
Supreme Court on appeal from a state court.'" In addition,
Justice Story suggested that the arising under jurisdiction extends
equally to civil and criminal cases.'46 Finally, he asserted that
Congress can make Article III jurisdiction exclusively federal.
147
Justice Story posed the question, to which cases shall the
arising under jurisdiction apply? He stated:
The answer is found in the constitution itself. The
judicial power shall extend to all cases enumerated in the
136. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
137. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
138. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 306.
139. Id. at 307.
140. Id. at 306-07.
141. Id. at 307, 362.
142. Id. at 305-06.
143. Id. at 313.
144. Id. at 327-352.
145. Id. at 333-352.
146. Id. at 335.
147. Id. at 334-37.
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constitution. As the mode is not limited, it may extend
to all such cases, in any form, in which judicial power
may be exercised. It may, therefore, extend to them in
the shape of original or appellate jurisdiction, or both; for
there is nothing in the nature of the cases which binds to
the exercise of the one in preference to the other."8
Having said that the original and appellate arising under
jurisdiction are coextensive, Justice Story then equated the
appellate and removal jurisdiction, saying that the difference
between the two is really only a matter of timing.149 Removal
is like appellate jurisdiction, Justice Story said, because both
"presuppose[] an exercise of original jurisdiction to have attached
elsewhere." 5 ° He continued:
If, then, the right of removal be included in the appellate
jurisdiction, it is only because it is one mode of exercising
that power, and as congress is not limited by the
constitution to any particular mode, or time of exercising
it, it may authorize a removal either before or after
judgment.... And if the right of removal from state
courts exist before judgment, because it is included in the
appellate power, it must, for the same reason, exist after
judgment.... Precisely the same objections, therefore,
exist as to the right of removal before judgment, as after,
and both must stand or fall together.' 5 '
Plainly, then, if the original and appellate jurisdiction are
coextensive, and if the appellate jurisdiction and removal
jurisdiction are the same but for timing, the same arising under
case may be brought to federal court in any of the three modes,
depending on which is appropriate procedurally.
148. Id at 333. Justice Sto.r, reiterates this point later in the opinion, stating:
The judicial power is delegated by the constitution in the most general terms,
and may, therefore, be exercised by congress under every variety of form, of
appellate or original jurisdiction. And as there is nothing in the constitution
which restrains or limits this power, it must, therefore, in all other cases,
subsist in the utmost latitude of which, in its own nature, it is susceptible.
Id. at 338.
149. Id. at 349-50.
150. Id. at 349.
151. Id at 349-350.
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Martin was a civil case, but Justice Story suggested that the
broad principles stated in the opinion also apply to criminal cases.
He often used criminal cases as illustrations. In discussing the
need for the appellate jurisdiction, for example, Justice Story
stated:
Suppose an indictment for a crime in a state court, and
the defendant should allege in his defence that the
crimes was created by an ex post facto act of the state,
must not the state court, in the exercise of a jurisdiction
which has already rightfully attached, have a right to
pronounce on the validity and sufficiency of the defence
[sic]?...
It was foreseen that in the exercise of their ordinary
jurisdiction, state courts would incidentally take
cognisance of cases arising under the constitution, the
laws, and treaties of the United States.... It would
seem to follow that the appellate power of the United
States must, in such cases, extend to state tribunals...
152
Similarly, in the discussion equating removal and appellate
jurisdiction, Justice Story stated that "[t]he existence of this
power of removal is familiar in courts acting according to the
course of the common law in criminal as well as civil cases, and
it is exercised before as well as after judgment."151 Justice Story
also specifically said as to "cases arriving under the constitution,
laws, and treaties of the United States[,] ... [tihis class of cases
would embrace civil as well as criminal jurisdiction . . .,15
Thus, Justice Story did not find any difference between civil and
criminal arising under jurisdiction.
Finally, Justice Story asserted that Congress can make
Article III jurisdiction exclusively federal:
[I]t is manifest that the judicial power of the United
States is unavoidably, in some cases, exclusive of all state
authority, and in all others, may be made so at the
election of congress. . . . Congress, throughout the
152. Id. at 341-42.
153. Id. at 349.
154. Id. at 334-35.
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judicial act, and particularly in the [ninth], [eleventh],
and [thirteenth] sections, have legislated upon the
supposition that in all the cases to which the judicial
power of the United States extended, they might
rightfully vest exclusive jurisdiction in their own
courts.'55
In sum, Martin plainly is the seminal case in defining the general
contours of the arising under jurisdiction."M
Cohens v. Virginia confirmed Martin's broad reading of Article
III, as well as its suggestion that the arising under jurisdiction is
155. Id. at 336-37. After determining that Section Twenty-five of the Judiciary Act
was constitutional, Justice Story concluded by explaining why the case at bar was within
its terms. Id. at 351. Martin's title to the land was "perfect and complete" if it was
protected by the federal treaty. Id. at 356. Since the decision of the court below must have
determined that the treaty did not give Martin good title, "it was strictly a suit where was
drawn in question the construction of a treaty, and the decision was against the title
specifically set up or claimed by the defendant." Id. at 357. Thus, the case fell within the
terms of Section Twenty-five.
156. Martin also contains many statements that have not stood the test of time. For
example, Story suggests that Congress not only may, but must make the arising under
jurisdiction exclusively federal:
Congress cannot vest any portion of the judicial power of the United States,
except in courts ordained and established by itself.... [Als to cases arriving
under the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States ... the state
courts could not ordinarily possess a direct jurisdiction. The jurisdiction over
such cases could not exist in the state courts previous to the adoption of the
constitution, and it could not afterwards be directly conferred on them; for the
constitution expressly requires the judicial power to be vested in courts
ordained and established by the United States....
No part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently
with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals.
Id. at 330-31, 334-35, 337. These statements plainly are at odds with the original
understandings in the Constitutional Convention and ratification debates. They also are
in direct conflict with the assumptions underlying the Judiciary Act of 1789 and
subsequent legislation imposing a duty on the state courts to enforce federal criminal laws.
Interestingly, state courts seized upon the last sentence quoted above in resisting such
legislation. See infra notes 198-202 and accompanying text.
One may wonder why a staunch proponent of federal power such as Justice Story
would say that Congress cannot use the state courts to enforce federal law. The reason is
that Justice Story wanted to increase the size and power of the federal judiciary.
Elsewhere in Martin, he contends that Section One of Article III requires all of the judicial
power allowed by Section Two to be vested somewhere in the federal judicial system.
Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 327-40. Given the constitutional limitations on the Supreme
Court's original jurisdiction, if the state courts cannot hear cases arising under federal law,
it follows that lower federal courts must be available to hear them. Id; see MARTIN H.
REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 29-41
(2d ed. 1990). As noted above, the prevailing view has been that Congress need not vest
all of the judicial power in the federal courts. See supra note 81.
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coextensive in criminal and civil cases.117 P.J. and M.J. Cohen
were prosecuted in a Virginia state court for selling lottery tickets
in violation of state law. 5 ' They defended by asserting that
ticket sales were authorized by an act of Congress.' 59 Following
conviction they appealed directly to the United States Supreme
Court since the state trial court was the highest state court
having jurisdiction of the case.' 6°
The Court upheld its jurisdiction.'"' Chief Justice Marshall
wrote in characteristically broad terms. Although Cohens
specifically involved the criminal appellate arising under
jurisdiction, many of the Chief Justice's statements seem to apply
to both civil and criminal jurisdiction exercised in any of the three
modes. Chief Justice Marshall asserted that a case is considered
to arise under federal law even if the defendant rather than the
plaintiff raises the federal issue, so long as decision of the case
depends on the construction of federal law:
If it be to maintain that a case arising under the
constitution, or a law, must be one in which a party
comes into Court to demand something conferred on him
by the constitution or a law, we think the construction
too narrow. A case in law or equity consists of the right
of the one party, as well as of the other, and may truly be
said to arise under the constitution or a law of the United
States, whenever its correct decision depends on the
construction of either. 
162
He continued in this vein:
[Article III] does not extend the judicial power to every
violation of the constitution which may possibly take
place, but to "a case in law or equity," in which a right,
under such law, is asserted in a Court of justice.... But
if, in any controversy depending [sic] in a Court, the
cause should depend on the validity of such a law, that
157. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 264.
158. Id. at 265, 375.
159. Id. at 375.
160. Id, at 375-76.
161. Id. at 430.
162. Id. at 379.
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would be a case arising under the constitution, to which
the judicial power of the United States would extend."
Chief Justice Marshall elaborated upon the constitutional
limits of the original civil arising under jurisdiction in Osborn v.
Bank of the United States.'" In that case, the Bank of the
United States brought suit in federal circuit court to enjoin state
officials from enforcing an Ohio law taxing the Bank." The
Chief Justice first determined that the act creating the Bank gave
the circuit court jurisdiction over suits involving it." He then
considered whether this jurisdiction exceeded Article III
limits. 167  On the actual facts of the case, jurisdiction plainly
was secure. The suit arose under federal law because the Bank
was claiming that the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution'
prohibited a state from taxing the Bank, a federal
instrumentality. 6 ' However, Justice Marshall asserted in dicta
that federal question jurisdiction would also exist in litigation
involving the Bank where federal law was much less centrally
involved. "Take the case of a contract," he said, "which is put as
the strongest against the Bank."170  Such a case would arise
under federal law, he asserted, because the issue of the Bank's
right to sue would necessarily present itself at the outset of the
suit. Since the Bank's right to sue depended on federal law, the
163. Id. at 405.
164. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 738. Osborn has been much discussed in the
literature. See, e.g., Doernberg, supra note 5, at 607-11; Chadbourn & Levin, supra note
5, at 646-49; Forrester, supra note 5, at 367-74; Hirshman, supra note 5, at 22-25. For a
concise discussion of different interpretations of Osborn, see REDISH, supra note 156, at 84-
90.
165. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 739-40.
166. It seemed a close question whether Congress really intended to give such a broad
jurisdictional grant. The statute said that the Bank shall be "made able and capable in
law," "to sue and be sued, plead and be impleaded, answer and be answered, defend and
be defended, in all State Courts having competent jurisdiction, and in any Circuit Court
of the United States." Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) At 817, in the earlier cane of Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, the Court interpreted similar language to give the Bank only a
general capacity to bring or defend lawsuits, and not to create jurisdiction in the federal
courts. Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 85 (1809).
Nonetheless, Chief Justice Marshall concluded that in this instance, Congress intended to
confer such jurisdiction. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 818.
167. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 819-28.
168. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
169. Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 744-45.
170. Id. at 823.
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case would arise under that law. Moreover, Chief Justice
Marshall argued that subsequent cases involving the Bank based
on state law would also arise under federal law, even if the
Bank's right to sue was considered settled and thus was not
actually raised in the later action. 7'
Osborn may be seen as doing for the original civil arising
under jurisdiction what United States v. Smith72 did for the
original criminal arising under jurisdiction, and perhaps as going
a step further. By holding that the hypothetical breach of
contract case arises under federal law, the Osborn Court
authorized jurisdiction in civil cases when federal issues are only
peripherally involved in much the same way that Smith
authorized jurisdiction in criminal cases when federal issues are
tangential. In Osborn's hypothetical contract case, the federal
issues of the Bank's capacity to make contracts or to sue remained
in the background. Similarly, in Smith the fact that federal bank
bills were the items counterfeited was not likely to be contested,
and thus the federal issues would remain in the background.
Osborn may be seen as going a step further than Smith because
the cause of action in the breach of contract case clearly was
state-created. In Smith, by contrast, it is not clear whether the
crime charged actually had its source in state law or in federal
common law.'73
171. 1d at 824. Osborn also contains several general statements suggesting that the
scope of arising under jurisdiction is quite broad. For example, Chief Justice Marshall
asserted, "This clause enables the judicial department to receive jurisdiction to the full
extent of the constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, when any question
respecting them shall assume such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting on
it." Id. at 819 (emphasis added). Later in the opinion, the Chief Justice stated:
We think, then, that when a question to which the judicial power of the Union
is extended by the constitution, forms an ingredient of the original cause, it is
in the power of Congress to give the Circuit Courts jurisdiction of that cause,
although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it.
Id. at 823.
172. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1147. See supra notes 110-16 and accompanying text.
173. The broad reading of Article III in Osborn was presaged by the brief experience
with general civil arising under jurisdiction under the Judiciary Act of 1801. See supra
note 103. Wythe Holt describes the case of Hobby v. Day, a libel action brought in federal
court by a federal postmaster against the editors of two newspapers. See Holt, supra note
103 at 173-78. Holt identifies two possible theories supporting civil arising under
jurisdiction. First, the plaintiffs status as a federal employee injects some federal issues
into the case, at least potentially. Id. at 178-80. Second, in 1800 some people considered
the common law a part of the laws of the United States. Id. Acceptance of this latter
theory would have opened the federal courts to ordinary common law suits. Repeal of the
1801 Act ended this possibility.
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Read expansively, Martin, Cohens, and Osborn (and Smith)
together affirmed that Article III arising under jurisdiction
extends to any case, civil or criminal, heard in the original,
removal, or appellate mode, involving an issue of federal law, even
if federal issue is only peripherally involved. These cases thus
opened a vast reservoir of potential federal judicial power
reminiscent of the worst fears of Grayson, Mason, and Randolph
during the ratification debates.174 Since Congress extended only
a portion of the arising under jurisdiction to the federal courts,
the justices' expansive ruminations did not precipitate a
constitutional crisis. The chief practical consequence of the
decisions was to secure Supreme Court review of state court
judgments under Section Twenty-five of the Judiciary Act.
Moreover, as previously discussed, Smith's broad interpretation
of the original criminal arising under jurisdiction was soon
followed by the withdrawal of jurisdiction over common law
crimes in United States v. Hudson & Goodwin.75
C. State Enforcement of Federal Criminal Law
Although the first Congress made the original criminal
arising under jurisdiction exclusively federal,17 later congresses
routinely shared jurisdiction over statutory crimes with the state
courts. Congress repeatedly enlisted the state courts to help
enforce federal revenue laws. For example, in a statute imposing
duties on distillers of "spirituous liquors," all fines, penalties, and
forfeitures incurred under the act could be recovered in an action
brought by the tax collector in the name of the United States.
177
When the cause of action arose more than fifty miles from the
nearest federal district court, the law stated that "such suit and
recovery may be had before any court of the state, holden within
the said district, having jurisdiction in like cases."' Congress
passed several other statutes imposing duties on various items
and granting state court jurisdiction in virtually identical
174. See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
175. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 32. See supra notes 117-34 and
accompanying text.
176. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79.




language. 79 Congress also passed a more comprehensive law
authorizing the state courts to "take cognisance of all complaints,
suits and prosecutions for taxes, duties, fines, penalties and
forfeitures arising and payable" under any federal statutes for the
collection of any direct tax or internal duty of the United
States. 80  The statute made jurisdiction in such cases
concurrent with the federal district courts, and authorized state
courts to exercise jurisdiction even if the cause of action arose less
than fifty miles from the nearest district court.18'
Congress also called upon the state courts to enforce the law
establishing the Post Office of the United States.'82 Section
Twenty-eight of the Act read as follows:
[Aill causes of action arising under this act may be sued,
and all offenders against this act may be prosecuted,
before the justices of the peace, magistrates, and other
judicial courts of the several states, and of the several
territories of the United States, they having competent
jurisdiction by the laws of such states or territories, to
the trial of claims and demands of as great value, and of
prosecutions where the punishments are of as great
extent; and such justices, magistrates, or judiciary, shall
take cognizance thereof, and proceed to judgment and
execution as in other cases. 3
179. See, e.g., Act of July 24, 1813, ch. 26, § 10, 3 Stat. 44, 47 (imposing duties on
sales at auction); Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 39, § 5, 3 Stat. 72, 73 (taxing importers of foreign
merchandise and retailers of wines and liquor); Act of Aug. 2, 1813, ch. 53, § 13, 3 Stat. 77,
80-81 (taxing certain comercial paper); Act of Dec. 21, 1814, ch. 15, § 21, 3 Stat. 152, 157-
58 (imposing duties on spirits distilled in the United States); Act of Jan. 18, 1815, ch. 23,
§ 24, 3 Stat. 186, 191 (taxing household furniture and gold and silver watches).
180. Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 101, § 1, 3 Stat. 244.
181. Id. 8 2, at 244-45. This law appeared to expand on an earlier law that used
similar language in authorizing state court jurisdiction to enforce the revenue laws of the
United States in certain parts of New York and Pennsylvania. See Act of March 8, 1806,
ch. 14, § 1, 2 Stat. 354. Both the 1815 and the 1806 Acts also gave the state courts the
same power as federal district courts to mitigate or remit any fines, penalties, or
forfeitures imposed under the Acts. See Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 101, § 3, 3 Stat. 244, 245;
Act of March 8, 1806, ch. 14, § 2, 2 Stat. 354, 355.
182. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 28, 1 Stat. 733.
183. Id. § 28, 1 Stat. at 740-41. Later statutes regulating the post office continued
this language. See Act of April 30, 1810, ch. 37, § 35, 2 Stat. 592, 603; Act of March 3,
1825, ch. 64, 88 37-38, 4 Stat. 102, 113.
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Other sections of the Act defined crimes such as embezzlement
and robbery of the mails, and authorized fines, whipping, and
imprisonment as punishment.'
Although some statutes merely authorized the states courts
to hear federal criminal cases,'m Congress often made such
jurisdiction mandatory. For example, the 1799 Post Office Act
gave the state courts jurisdiction of criminal cases arising under
the Act and ordered that "such justices, magistrates, or judiciary,
shall take cognizance thereof, and proceed to judgment and
execution." "' The 1798 Alien Enemies Act made it "the duty of
the several courts of the United States, and of each state, having
criminal jurisdiction" to hear cases against aliens.1 7 And many
revenue statutes authorized the tax collector to bring actions for
184. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 43, §§ 14, 15, 1 Stat. 733, 736-37. Congress also called
upon the state courts to enforce federal criminal law in many other contexts. An Alien
Enemy Act made it the duty of the federal and the state courts to apprehend alien enemies
and to deport or imprison them. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 2, 1 Stat. 577-78. The
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 required state and federal judges to hear claims of slaveowners
and to send fugitive slaves back to their home states. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1
Stat. 302, 302-05. Congress also enlisted the state courts to enforce criminal sanctions in
many Embargo Acts. See, e.g., Act of Jan. 9, 1808, ch. 8, § 6, 2 Stat. 453, 454; Act of March
12, 1808, ch. 33, § 6, 2 Stat. 473, 475; Act of April 25, 1808, ch. 66, § 14, 2 Stat. 499, 502;
Act of Jan. 9, 1809, ch. 5, § 12, 2 Stat. 506, 510; Act of March 1, 1809, ch. 24, § 18, 2 Stat.
528, 532-33; Act of June 28, 1809, ch. 9, § 4, 2 Stat. 550, 551; Act of May 1, 1810, ch. 39,
§ 3, 2 Stat. 605, 606; Act of April 14, 1812, ch. 56, § 3, 2 Stat. 707, 708; Act of Dec. 17,
1813, ch. 1, § 14, 3 Stat. 88, 92. The state courts also could hear cases for violation of laws
regulating trade with the Indian tribes. See, e.g., Act of April 18, 1796, ch. 13, § 7, 1 Stat.
452, 453; Act of March 30, 1802, ch. 13, § 15, 2 Stat. 139, 144.
185. See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 49, § 9, 1 Stat. 378, 380 ("[I]t shall and may be
lawful for the judicial courts of the several states" to hear all cases arising under the laws
for collecting a revenue upon spirits distilled in the United States); Act of March 30, 1802,
ch. 13, § 15, 2 Stat. 139, 144 (state and territorial courts "are hereby invested with full
power and authority to hear and determine all crimes, offences and misdemeanors, against
this act.. . ."); Act of March 8, 1806, ch. 14, § 1, 2 Stat. 354 (state courts are "authorized
to take cognizance of all complaints and prosecutions for fines, penalties and forfeitures,.
arising under the revenue laws of the United States" in certain parts of New York and
Pennsylvania); Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 101, § 1, 3 Stat. 244 (same authorization but in
all states).
186. Act of March 2, 1799, ch. 43, § 28, 1 Stat. 733, 740-41 (emphasis added). The
1810 Act regulating the post office also contained this mandatory language. See Act of
April 30, 1810, ch. 37, § 35, 2 Stat. 592, 603.
187. Act of July 6, 1798, ch. 66, § 2, 1 Stat. 577-78. Similarly, the Fugitive Slave Act
recited that "it shall be the duty" of state or federal judges to issue a certificate allowing
removal of the slave to his or her home state. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302-
05.
Vermont Law Review
fines, penalties, and forfeitures in state court."' These laws
presumably obligated the state courts to hear the cases.
Finally, the statutes generally directed federal rather than
state officials to prosecute the criminal actions in state court. For
example, many revenue acts directed federal tax collectors to
prosecute for recovery of fines, penalties, or forfeitures.'89 The
Act of March 3, 1815, giving general authorization for state courts
to hear suits and prosecutions to enforce federal revenue laws,
authorized the district attorneys of the United States or their
designated deputies to bring actions in state court:
[T]he district attorneys of the United States are hereby
authorized and directed to appoint by warrant an
attorney as their substitute or deputy in all cases where
necessary to sue or prosecute for the United States, in
any of the said state or county courts within the sphere
of whose jurisdiction the said district attorneys do not
themselves reside or practise; and the said substitute or
deputy shall 'be sworn or affirmed to the faithful
execution of his duty.9 °
Thus, the early congresses plainly saw no barrier to federal
prosecutors appearing in state court to enforce federal criminal
law.
This routine use of the state courts to enforce federal criminal
law may seem surprising because jurisdiction over federal crimes
today is exclusively federal and has been since 1874.191 But in
the early years of the Republic, state court enforcement of federal
188. See, e.g., Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 45, § 10, 1 Stat. 373, 375 (fines, penalties, and
forfeitures under this act imposing duties upon carriages "shall and may be sued for, and
recovered, in any court of the United States, or before any magistrate, or state court,
having competent jurisdiction."); Act of June 5, 1794, ch. 48, § 5, 1 Stat. 376, 378 (penalties
under this act imposing tax on licenses for selling wines and foreign liquor may be
recovered in state court when cause of action arises more than 50 miles from nearest
district court); Act of July 6, 1797, ch. 11, § 20, 1 Stat. 527, 532 (all fines, penalties, and
forfeitures incurred by virtue of this act taxing certain commercial paper "shall be sued for
and recovered in the name of the United States... in any circuit or district court of the
United States, or in any court... of the said states ...
189. See sources cited supra note 188.
190. Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 101, § 1, 3 Stat. 244.
191. Revised Statutes of the United States, § 711 (1815) (currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3231 (1988)). See discussion infra accompanying notes 289-301.
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law seemed both natural and desirable.'92 Recall that many of
the founders argued against creation of lower federal courts on
the ground that state courts could adequately enforce federal
law. 9 3 States-rights advocates supported legislation authorizing
state courts to hear federal criminal cases. 9 4
Given this background, it is surprising that state courts began
to view their jurisdiction over federal criminal cases as an
imposition on state prerogatives! In Jackson v. Rose, for example,
the General Court of Virginia sustained a demurrer to an action
filed by a federal tax collector seeking to recover a penalty under
a United States revenue statute.195 The Court held that it was
unconstitutional for Congress to authorize state courts to hear
federal criminal cases, relying on a principle from international
law that one country will not enforce the penal laws of another:
[T]he Judiciary of one separate and distinct Sovereignty
cannot of itself assume, nor can another separate and
distinct Sovereignty either authorise, or coerce it to
exercise the Judicial powers of such other separate and
distinct Sovereignty....
[T]here is no good reason why one Nation should
authorise its Judiciary to carry the Penal Laws of
another into execution, and it is believed that no Nation
has ever done so .... 196
Other state courts agreed.
197
192. Warren, supra note 103, at 545.
193. See supra notes 26-27, 31, 59, 79 and accompanying text.
194. Warren, supra note 103, at 577.
195. Jackson v. Rose, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 124, 128 (1815). The case was originally filed
in the Superior Court of Law for Harrison County, Virginia, and the jurisdictional issues
raised by the demurrer were adjourned to the higher court. Id. at 124. The District
Attorney of the United States argued on behalf of the plaintiff tax collector in the General
Court. Id.
196. Id. at 35-36 (emphasis added). The same year, 1815, the Virginia Court of
Appeals declared that it did not have to follow the mandate of the United States Supreme
Court. See Hunter v. Martin, Devisee of Fairfax, 18 Va. (4 Munf.) 1 (1815). The Supreme
Court, of course, disagreed. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
197. See, e.g., United States v. Campbell (Ohio), reported in 6 HALL'S AM. L.J. 113
(1814); Maryland v. Rutter (Almeida's Case), 12 Niles Reg. 114, 118, 232 (April 19, 1817);
United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) 4, 8-11 (1819); Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 239, 242-43
(1828); Davison v. Champlin, 7 Conn. 244, 248 (1828); Haney v. Sharp, 1 Dana (Ky.) 442
(1833); Delafield v. Illinois, 2 Hill (N.Y.) 159, 169 (1841) (dicta); State v. Pike, 15 New
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Dicta from some federal cases lent support to this position.
In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, Justice Story opined that "No part
of the criminal jurisdiction of the United States can, consistently
with the constitution, be delegated to state tribunals."'9 s
Building on this dictum... in Houston v. Moore, Justice Story
added:
It is a general principle.., that no nation is bound to
enforce the penal laws of another within its own
dominions.... It has been expressly held by this Court,
that no part of the criminal jurisdiction of the United
States can consistently with the constitution be delegated
by Congress to State tribunals; and there is not the
slightest inclination to retract that opinion. The judicial
power of the Union clearly extends to all such cases. No
concurrent power is retained by the States .... 2 0
Several state courts seized upon this language in rejecting
jurisdiction.20 1 Thus, as Charles Warren succinctly states, "a
form of legislation enacted by Congress, out of a desire to allay
State jealousy and to reduce Federal power, became regarded by
Hamp. 83, 84-85 (1844); Ward v. Jenkins, 10 Metc. (Mass.) 583, 587 (1846) (dicta). Not all
judges agreed that a principle governing relations between truly independent sovereigns
applied in this context. See, e.g., Lathrop, 17 Johns. at 21-22 (Platt, J. dissenting). As
Judge Platt stated:
It is said to be a fundamental maxim, that the courts of one sovereign will not
take cognizance of, or enforce the penal laws of another sovereign .... But
when we consider the complex and peculiar structure and relations of our
federal government and state governments, moving, indeed, in different
spheres, but occupying the same territorial space, and operating upon, and for
the benefit of the same people, the practice of independent nations affords no
analogy sufficiently strong to guide us in the present case.
Id.
198. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 337.
199. The language clearly was dictum. Martin was an action in ejectment to recover
a large tract of land in Virginia. The defendant claimed that his title was protected by the
treaty with England. Id. at 306-07. Thus, the action did not involve state enforcement of
federal criminal law.
200. Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 69 (1820). See also United States v.
Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238, 259 (1835) (McLean, J., dissenting); Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 410, 438 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting).
201. See, e.g., Lathrop, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) at 8-9; Davison, 7 Conn. at 248; Pike, 15 N.H.
at 84-85.
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the States as an undue assumption of Federal power and an
infringement on the sovereignty of the States."2' 2
The Supreme Court again considered whether state courts
could be required to enforce federal penal statutes in the
notorious case of Prigg v. Pennsylvania."3 In Prigg, the Court
sought to ensure effective enforcement of the federal Fugitive
Slave Act.2°4  Political and social considerations affect
jurisdiction and procedure as well as substantive law,2" and
Prigg is a clear case in point.
Edward Prigg, acting on behalf of a Maryland slaveowner,
procured a warrant from a Pennsylvania magistrate directing a
state constable to apprehend an escaped slave.2°  When the
slave was brought before the magistrate, the officer refused to
take any further action. 20 7 Prigg then engaged in self-help and
returned the slave and her children to Maryland.2 8
Pennsylvania indicted him for violating state law.2' His
conviction was affirmed by the state supreme court, but the
United States Supreme Court reversed.210
In an opinion by Justice Story, the Court held that Article IV,
Section Two, of the Constitution 211 established "a positive,
unqualified right on the part of the owner of the slave, which no
state law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control,
or restrain."2 12 Consequently, the owner of a slave could legally
seize an escaped slave anywhere in the country as long as he did
not breach the peace. 213  The Fugitive Slave Act, which was
202. Warren, supra note 103, at 581.
203. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
204. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 302.
205. Warren, supra note 103, at 546.
206. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 556-57.
207. Id. at 557.
208. Id. at 608-09.
209. Id,
210. Id. at 608-09, 626.
211. The applicable portion reads:
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof,
escaping into another, shall in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein,
be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim
of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
U.S. CONST. art IV, § 2, cl. 3.
212. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 612.
213. Id. at 613.
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enacted to implement the constitutional provision,"" required
both state and federal judges to cooperate in returning slaves to
their owners.21 The Act authorized a slaveowner or his agent
to seize an escaped slave and bring the slave before either a local
or federal judge.216 Upon proof that the escaped slave "owe[d]
service" to the slaveowner, it was "the duty of such judge or
magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such claimant" which
constituted permission to return the slave to the owner.
17
The Court held the Act "clearly constitutional in all its
leading provisions"218 and overturned the Pennsylvania criminal
statute as inconsistent with federal law.219 The Court softened
its holding somewhat, however, by inserting dicta that relieved
the state courts of an obligation to enforce the Act. The Court
said that the language requiring the return of escaped slaves
is found in the national Constitution, and not in that of
any state. It does not point out any state functionaries,
or any state action to carry its provisions into effect. The
states cannot, therefore, be compelled to enforce them;
and it might well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise
of the power of interpretation, to insist that the states
are bound to provide means to carry into effect the duties
of the national government, nowhere delegated or
entrusted to them by the Constitution....
• . .As to the authority so conferred upon state
magistrates [by the Act], while a difference of opinion has
existed, and may exist still on the point, in different
states, whether state magistrates are bound to act under
it; none is entertained by this Court that state
magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority,
unless prohibited by state legislation.22 °
214. Id. at 615-16.
215. Id. at 617.
216. Id.
217. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 304-05.
218. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622.
219. Id at 617, 625-26.
220. Id. at 615-16, 622.
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By holding that state judges could enforce federal law if they
wished and if state law allowed, Justice Story retreated from his
statements in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and Houston v. Moore
explicitly denying this authority.221 But this compromise suited
the Court's purpose of ensuring enforcement of the Fugitive Slave
Act. A decision requiring enforcement of the federal law by state
courts would doubtless have been ignored or resisted in many
states.222 A decision denying state courts any authority to
enforce the Fugitive Slave Act would have made the Act
ineffective in jurisdictions where the state judges were willing to
enforce it.
Prigg plainly lent important new support to the principle that
Congress cannot require the state courts to enforce federal
criminal laws. But Prigg, like the earlier federal and state
decisions discussed above, simply announced a limitation on
congressional power without any real explanation as to why the
limitation exists or where it is expressed in the Constitution. Nor
did any of the courts satisfactorily explain why the maxim of
international law that no nation will enforce the penal laws of
another should be applicable in our federal system.223  And, of
221. See supra notes 198-200 and accompanying text.
222. Chief Justice Taney stated in a concurring opinion that both the Constitution and
the Fugitive Slave Act impose an affirmative obligation upon state authorities to cooperate
in apprehending escaped slaves and returning them to their owners. He expressed concern
about language in the majority opinion that appeared to preempt all state laws on the
subject-laws protecting slaveowners' rights as well as laws interfering with those rights.
Charles Warren lists Taney as being in agreement with Justice Story that the "state
officers mentioned in the [Fugitive Slave Act] are not bound to execute the duties imposed
upon them by Congress, unless they choose to do so, or are required to do so by a law of
the state." Warren, supra note 103, at 583 (quoting Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 630 (Taney,
C.J., concurring)). Warren, however, clearly misreads Taney's position by taking the
quoted language out of context. Later in his opinion, Taney says:
But it is manifest from the face of the law, that an effectual remedy was
intended to be given by the act of 1793.... [Congress] legislated with express
reference to state support.... And the reliance obviously placed upon state
authority for the purpose of executing this law, proves that the construction
now given to the Constitution by the Court had not entered into their minds.
Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 631 (Taney, C.J., concurring). Taney concludes:
I dissent therefore, upon these grounds, from that part of the opinion of the
Court which denies the obligation and the right of the state authorities to
protect the master, when he is endeavouring to seize a fugitive from his
service, in pursuance of the right given to him by the Constitution of the
United States ....
Id. at 633.
223. Charles Warren attributes this to "the desire of the Federal Courts to avoid
friction with the States at a particularly nervous period." Warren, supra note 103, at 584.
Vermont Law Review
course, both the federal and state decisions plainly conflicted with
the understandings of Congress expressed in all of the federal
legislation calling for the state enforcement of federal penal
laws.22
The cases also are inconsistent in their treatment of criminal
and civil arising under jurisdiction. Some of the state court
decisions denying Congress the power to require or authorize
state courts to enforce federal penal laws were careful to allow the
state courts to continue to hear civil cases arising under federal
law.2" The United States Supreme Court also affirmed that
state courts could hear such cases.226  Why is concurrent
jurisdiction over federal criminal cases a major intrusion into
state sovereignty if concurrent jurisdiction over civil cases is a
legitimate part of the federal system? State courts do not face
greater practical problems or more complex choice of law issues
in criminal arising under cases than they face on the civil
side,227 and the cases in the Prigg line make no such claim. The
courts simply failed to address these issues.
Perhaps the courts recognized that it would be wholly
impractical to decree that federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction over civil cases arising under federal law. At this
time, Congress had not given the lower federal courts original
jurisdiction of civil arising under cases. If state courts could not
hear these cases, then no court could hear them. On the criminal
side, by contrast, Congress had given the lower federal courts
almost all of the original criminal arising under jurisdiction in
1789.22' Thus, the jurisdiction could be declared exclusively
federal without making federal criminal law unenforceable.
Despite these puzzles and inconsistencies, the Prigg line of
cases carried the day. The first codification of federal statutes,
undertaken in the 1860's and early 1870's, added a new provision
making jurisdiction of "all crimes and offenses cognizable under
the authority of the United States... exclusive of the courts of
224. See supra notes 176-90 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Lathrop, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) at 5; Davison, 7 Conn. at 249-50.
226. See, e.g., Teal v. Felton, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 284, 292 (1851); Postmaster General
v. Early, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 136, 146 (1827).
227. See infra notes 441, 472-82 and accompanying text.
228. See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
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the several States."229  The revisers explicitly relied upon the
cases in the Prigg line in their explanatory notes."0
D. Implementation of the Removal Arising Under Jurisdiction
During the time that the state courts were decreeing that
criminal cases arising under federal law were solely the province
of the federal courts, Congress was authorizing removal of certain
civil and criminal cases from state to federal court. This new
removal jurisdiction significantly expanded the arising under
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts.
Congress enacted the first arising under removal statute in
1815. Many New England states opposed the War of 1812 and
resisted enforcement of federal embargo and non-intercourse
statutes." 1 When federal customs officials searched ships and
carriages and seized property, local citizens retaliated by bringing
damage suits and initiating criminal prosecutions in state
courts. 2 Congress responded by passing legislation specifically
prohibiting any economic transactions with the enemy and
authorizing federal officials, upon probable cause and after
obtaining a warrant, to inspect premises and seize any goods held
in violation of the Act.233 Congress also provided for removal to
federal circuit court of "any suit or prosecution... commenced in
any state court, against any collector.., or any other officer, civil
229. Revised Statutes of the United States, § 711 (1875).
230. 1 REVISION OF THE UNITED STATES STATUTES AS DRAFTED BY THE
CoMMISSIONERS APPOINTED FOR THAT PURPOSE, Title XIII, ch. 12, at 116-17 (1872)
[hereinafter COMMISSIONERs' REVISED STATUTES]. This codification is discussed infra at
notes 289-301 and accompanying text.
231. Warren, supra note 103, at 584; HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 1057-58;
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil
Rights: Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113
U. PA. L. REV. 793, 806 (1965); Wiliingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405 (1969).
232. Warren, supra note 103, at 584.
233. Act of February 4, 1815, ch. 31, § 1-4, 3 Stat. 195, 195-197. Interestingly, and
perhaps unrealistically, Congress tried to enlist the aid of the state courts in enforcing the
Act. If a federal official had probable cause to believe that goods intended for the enemy
were concealed in a dwelling house or building, the official was authorized to apply to any
judge or justice of the peace" for a warrant. Id. § 4, 3 Stat. at 196. The Act further
provided "[t]hat the forfeitures and penalties mentioned in this act, shall be sued for,
prosecuted, and recovered, or inflicted by action of debt, or by information or indictment,
in any court competent to take cognisance thereof.. . ." Id. § 7, 3 Stat. at 197-98.
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or military... for any thing done by virtue of this act or under
colour thereof .... ,234
In 1833, Congress passed another removal statute,23 5 this
time in response to the nullification movement in South
Carolina. 6 The Act authorized the President to use military
force to ensure that federal import duties were collected. 7 In
addition, it allowed removal of state civil or criminal cases filed
against federal officials for "any act done under the revenue laws
of the United States.
238
The removal statutes are significant in several ways. They
expanded the arising under jurisdiction of the lower federal courts
234. Id. § 8, 3 Stat. at 198. The federal official was to file the removal petition in the
state court, and after sufficient surety was given, it was "the duty of the state court to
accept the surety, and proceed no further in the cause." Id. The Act directed that once
papers were filed in federal court, "the cause shall there proceed in the same manner as
if it had been brought there by original process." Id.
The Act also allowed removal after final judgment. At that point, either party could
remove the case to a federal court by appeal. Moreover, either party could remove the case
by writ of error within six months of judgment, and the circuit court would then try the
case de novo. Id. at 199. The Act did not allow posttrial removal of a criminal case if the
defendant was victorious in state court. Id.
One might ask why Congress allowed two trials in the same case. A partial
explanation stems from the different jurisprudential norms of that time. As Wilfred Ritz
points out, in the eighteenth century, successive trials, and even successive jury trials,
were common. RITZ, supra note 42, at 27-28. In an era when judges sought to "find" the
law rather than "make" it, successive trials increased the likelihood of finally achieving a
correct and just result. See generally id. at 27-52.
Congress enacted a statute similar to the February 14 removal statute several weeks
later. Act of March 3, 1815, ch. 94, 3 Stat. 231. Both laws were of limited duration. They
were continued for four more years by the Act of March 3, 1817, ch. 109, § 6, 3 Stat. 396,
397. The 1817 Act also withdrew the right to post-judgment removal. Id. §§ 1-2, 3 Stat.
at 396.
235. Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, 4 Stat. 632.
236. Warren, supra note 103, at 585; Amsterdam, supra note 231, at 806;
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 103, at 11, n.22.
237. Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57, §§ 1, 5, 4 Stat. 632, 634.
238. Id. § 3, 4 Stat. at 632, 633. The removal procedures were somewhat different
than those of the 1815 Act. The removal petition was to be filed in the federal circuit court
rather than in the state court. Id. The Act required the defendant to file affidavits by
himself and by an attorney attesting to the propriety of removal. Id. Once the case was
docketed in federal court, the court clerk was to issue a writ ofcertiorari to the state court,
requiring it to transmit the record to the federal court. The federal court then was to
proceed as if the case had been originally filed there, and the state court was to stay any
further proceedings. Id. If the state court proceeded further, any trial or judgment was
.wholly null and void." Id.
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substantially."9 Although the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized
removal of diversity actions,24 it did not allow removal of any
federal question cases. The new removal statutes granted federal
question removal jurisdiction for the first time. Moreover, the
statutes extended removal equally to civil and criminal arising
under cases. In addition, by directing that the removed case
proceed in federal court as if commenced there originally,241 the
acts clearly contemplated that the private plaintiff or state
prosecutor proceed in federal court. As discussed above, during
this period Congress directed federal tax collectors and district
attorneys to enforce federal statutes in state court.242 Congress
appeared equally comfortable requiring state prosecutors to
litigate in federal court.
Finally, the removal statutes are flatly inconsistent with the
maxim of international law that the courts of one state will not
enforce the penal laws of another. It was this maxim that formed
the basis of the statements in Martin, Houston, and the state
cases in the Prigg line that state courts could not enforce federal
criminal laws. 2 3  The constitutionality of the removal of state
criminal cases under the 1833 Act was upheld by the Supreme
Court in 1879 in Tennessee v. Davis.2' As Charles Warren
remarked, "if there is no inherent impossibility in a Federal
Court's conducting a trial for violation of a State criminal law,
there is equally no such impossibility in a State Court's trying a
man for violation of a Federal criminal law.
245
239. The 1833 Act also expanded the original civil arising under jurisdiction of the
federal courts in two ways. First, it provided that "the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of
the United States shall extend to all cases, in law or equity, arising under the revenue
laws of the United States, for which other provisions are not already made by law .... "
Id. § 2, 4 Stat. 632. The Act also created a cause of action for damages on behalf of
revenue officers injured in enforcing federal revenue laws. Id. § 2, 4 Stat. at 632-33.
Second, the Act gave the federal courts greater power to issue writs of habeas corpus. A
writ could be granted for a prisoner confined "for any act done, or omitted to be done, in
pursuance of a law of the United States, or any order, process, or decree, of any judge or
court thereof.. . ." id. § 7, 4 Stat. 632, 634.
240. Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 12, 1 Stat. 73, 79-80.
241. See supra note 234.
242. See supra notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
243. See supra notes 195-201 and accompanying text.
244. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879). See infra notes 320-26 and
accompanying text.
245. Warren, supra note 103, at 546.
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I do not mean to overstate the significance of the removal
acts. They did not grant general arising under removal
jurisdiction. Only state court cases brought against federal
officials for actions taken in enforcing the Acts themselves or
other revenue statutes could be removed to federal court. Thus,
the Acts can be viewed as limited grants of arising under
jurisdiction. In addition, the statutes did not approach the outer
limits of Article III as defined in United States v. Smith246 and
Osborn v. Bank of the United States. 247 The federal issues
generally would be central in cases removed under the acts,
rather than peripheral or collateral. Typically, when a federal
officer was being sued or prosecuted in state court, he would
contend that he acted pursuant to federal law. Although the
propriety of the officer's conduct would come up only as a defense,
the issue would likely determine the outcome of the case. Despite
these caveats, the removal statutes were an important step in the
development of the arising under removal jurisdiction.
The national trauma of the Civil War and Reconstruction
substantially altered the arising under jurisdiction, and it is to
those developments that we now turn.
III. EXPANSION OF THE ARISING UNDER JURISDICTION:
THE RECONSTRUCTION ERA
The Civil War and Reconstruction transformed relations
between the federal government and the States. The Nation won
the War, and in the years following, the federal government
moved to consolidate its power and to expand national
authority.24  The federal government actively encouraged
growth in transportation, education, and commerce. It also
guaranteed federal rights against state authority by passing the
246. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1797) (No. 16,323).
247. Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
248. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 103, at 57-58, 65; Felix Frankfurter,
Distribution of Judicial Power between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q.
499, 507-11 (1928); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 246-47 (1972).
249. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 103, at 57-58; JAMES G. RANDALL & DAVID
DONALD, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUCTION 535-42 (1961).
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Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, and by
enacting wave upon wave of enforcement legislation.'
Congress turned to the federal courts to enforce the
constitutional amendments and the new federal laws. To achieve
its goals, Congress greatly expanded the civil and criminal arising
under jurisdiction in its original, removal, and appellate modes.
Congress generally made the original criminal jurisdiction
exclusively federal and the original civil jurisdiction concurrent
with the state courts. Removal statutes generally allowed equal
removal of civil and criminal cases, 251 and the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction continued to extend equally to both civil and
criminal cases.
The legislative history of Reconstruction shows that Congress
was particularly concerned with the continuing violence and
maladministration of justice in the South. 2  Congress sought
systemic reform of southern criminal and civil justice systems to
ensure an even-handed enforcement of federal rights.'
Congress authorized far-reaching federal court intervention into
the day-to-day workings of southern justice systems.' A
substantial expansion of the civil and criminal arising under
jurisdiction formed the essential underpinnings of this massive
effort.
While Congress greatly expanded the arising under
jurisdiction during Reconstruction, the Supreme Court worked
methodically to curtail the congressional grants by restrictive
interpretation. Although Congress gave more jurisdiction, the
Court often refused to accept it. Depending on one's point of view,
the Court's actions may be seen as seriously undermining
legitimate congressional efforts to enforce important new rights,
or as wisely restraining the arising under jurisdiction within
reasonable and workable bounds. In interpreting Article III, on
250. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 103, at 65; Patsy v. Board of Regents, 457
U.S. 496,502 (1982); Zwickler, 389 U.S. at 246-48; Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225,238-39
(1972). See generally, Donald H. Zeigler, A Reassessment of the Younger Doctrine in Light
of the Legislative History of Reconstruction, 1983 DUKE L.J. 987, 992-1020; William M.
Wiecek, The Reconstruction of Federal Judicial Power, 13 AM. J. LEG. HIST. 333, 336-52
(1969); Amsterdam, supra note 231, at 828-30.
251. An important exception to this pattern occurred in 1875 when Congress enacted
a general federal question removal provision, but limited it to civil cases. Act of Mar. 3,
1875, ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470,471. See discussion infra accompanying notes 306,310-11.
252. Zeigler, supra note 250, at 989.
253. Id.
254. Id. at 1020.
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the other hand, the Court continued to construe the arising under
jurisdiction very broadly. Finally, as Reconstruction continued,
Congress itself acted to withdraw some of its grants of arising
under jurisdiction.
Congress began its enforcement effort in 1863 with enactment
of the Habeas Corpus and Removal Act.255 The Act was directed
at problems with the administration of justice in the South.
Section Five of the Act authorized persons subjected to state
criminal or civil proceedings for acts done "under color of any
authority derived from ... the President of the United States" to
file in state court a petition for removal to federal court.256 This
provision combatted vexatious state criminal and civil actions
against northern soliders charging them with false arrest,
trespass, and other injuries.257
The 1866 Civil Rights Act also expanded both civil and
criminal arising under jurisdiction. 2" The Act sought to ensure
255. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, 12 Stat. 755 (entitled "An Act relating to Habeas
Corpus, and regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases").
256. Id. § 5, 12 Stat. at 756.
257. See HAROLD M. HYMAN, A MORE PERFECT UNION 451-53 (1973); HAROLD M.
HYMAN & WILLIAM M. WIECEK, EQUAL JUSTICE UNDER LAW 259 (1982); Amsterdam, supra
note 231, at 808-09. The removal procedures tracked those in the 1815 Removal Act
almost exactly, see Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. 247, 254 (1867), thus allowing pretrial
removal by the defendant, and posttrial removal by either party with a trial de novo in
federal court. Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756-57. The 1863 Act also
required the plaintiff or state prosecutor to pursue the action in federal court. Id. § 5, 12
Stat. at 757. No postjudgment removal was permitted in a criminal case if the defendant
won. Id.
The 1863 Act was amended in 1866 to make removal easier and to circumvent
impediments to removal that had been imposed by the state courts. Act of May 11, 1866,
ch. 80, 14 Stat. 46. For a detailed review of this Act, see Zeigler, supra note 250, at 1002-
04. In 1869 the 1863 Act was expanded to allow removal of any state action, civil or
criminal, brought against a common carrier for loss or damage to any goods caused by
rebel or United States troops. Act of Jan. 22, 1869, ch. 13, 15 Stat. 267.
Congress also amended the 1833 Removal Act several times during this period. By
the Act of Mar. 7, 1864, ch. 20, § 9, 13 Stat. 14, 17, the provisions of the 1833 Act allowing
removal of suits against federal officials for acts done pursuant to the revenue laws were
extended to cover all internal duties. Interestingly, this Act also gave state courts
concurrent jurisdiction with the lower federal courts in forfeiture proceedings brought by
revenue officers to enforce the tax laws. Id. § 2, 13 Stat. at 14-15. Once again, then,
Congress made federal criminal or quasi-criminal laws enforceable in state court. See
discussion supra accompanying notes 176-88. Portions of the March 7 Act were repealed
by the Act of June 30, 1864, ch. 173, § 50, 13 Stat. 241, but then reinstated in somewhat
revised form by the Act of July 13, 1866, ch. 184, § 67, 14 Stat. 98, 171. See FRANKFURTER
& LANDIS, supra note 103, at 61-62, n.22.
258. Act of April 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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equal civil rights for the newly-freed slaves. Section One declared
that citizens
of every race and color ... shall have the same right to
make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, and give
evidence, .. . and to full and equal benefit of all laws,
and proceedings for the security of person and property,
and shall be subject to like punishments, pains and
penalties.2' 9
Section Two provided criminal penalties against anyone acting
under color of state law who denied another any right secured by
the bill.2 ° Section Three set forth three distinct jurisdictional
grants: (1) the district courts were given, "exclusively of the courts
of the several States, cognizance of all crimes and offences
committed against the provisions of this act;" (2) the district
courts were also given cognizance, "concurrently with the circuit
courts of the United States, of all causes, civil and criminal,
affecting persons who are denied or cannot enforce in the courts
or judicial tribunals of the State... any of the rights secured to
them by the first section of this act;" and (3) the district and
circuit courts were given power to hear on removal any state suit,
civil or criminal, commenced against any such person, or against
any officials carrying out either this Act or other civil rights
laws.26' Section Three of the Act also incorporated by reference
the liberal removal procedures of the 1863 Habeas Corpus and
Removal Act. 26 2 The 1866 Civil Rights Act thus authorized the
federal courts to hear significant new categories of civil and
criminal cases arising under federal law.26
Despite the broad sweep of the jurisdictional language, the
Supreme Court and Congress soon greatly reduced its scope. The
second of the three jurisdictional grants contained in Section
Three of the Act, the so-called "affecting jurisdiction," was the
259. Id. (Section One is currently codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981-1982 (1988)).
260. Id. § 2 (Section Two is currently codified at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1988)).
261. Id. § 3.
262. Id.
263. The statute contemplated substantial intervention in the criminal and civil
justice systems of the South to achieve its ends. Congress essentially told officials that "all
causes, civil and criminal" would be taken away from them by the federal courts if parties
were denied fundamental rights in state proceedings, and that they themselves could be
subject to criminal penalties. See Zeigler, supra note 250, at 999-1001.
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first to be restrictively interpreted by the Court, and was
subsequently eliminated by Congress. A number of cases
invoking the affecting jurisdiction were brought in Kentucky
shortly after the 1866 Act was passed. Federal officials filed both
civil and criminal cases in Kentucky federal court against state
law enforcement officers and private citizens who committed
violent acts against blacks. Such cases, they argued, were causes,
civil and criminal, affecting persons who are denied or cannot
enforce in state court any of the rights secured to them by Section
One of the Act, and thus could be brought in federal court, even
though state crimes or tort claims formed the basis of the
suits.264  A state statute prohibiting blacks from testifying
against whites supported this jurisdictional theory. 2' Arguably,
cases in which black witnesses would be denied the right to give
evidence under Section One of the Act were causes affecting those
witnesses.26
The Supreme Court reviewed a federal criminal case from
Kentucky based on the affecting jurisdiction in 1872, and it
rejected the prosecutor's jurisdictional theory.2 7 The Court did
not discuss whether the affecting jurisdiction as construed by the
264. See Robert D. Goldstein, Blyew: Variations on a Jurisdictional Theme, 41 STAN.
L. REV. 469, 482, 485-86 n.58 (1989) and sources cited therein.
265. The statute declared that "negroes and mulattoes shall [only] be competent
witnesses... in all criminal proceedings where a negro or mulatto is a defendant" or in
civil cases where they are the only parties. Act of Feb. 14, 1866, ch. 563, 1865 Ky. Act 38.
266. Thus construed, the affecting jurisdiction neared constitutional limits. It
probably did not exceed them because issues of federal law were involved in the Kentucky
federal actions, even though the crimes and causes of action were state-created. Blacks,
whether as parties or witnesses, would be denied rights guaranteed by a federal statute
unless the cases were heard in federal court. Although the federal statutory rights to
testify and to be treated fairly would'not be directly in issue in the federal proceeding, the
federal statute provided the necessary foundation for enforcement of these rights.
Analytically, the Kentucky cases seem quite similar to Chief Justice Marshall's breach of
contract hypothetical in Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824), and to Smith, 27 F. Cas.
1147 (C.C.D. Mass. 1797) (No. 16,323). In Osborn, the federal statute creating the Bank
of the United States and giving it the right to sue provided the necessary foundation for
a breach of contract suit involving the Bank in much the same way that the 1866 Civil
Rights Act formed the necessary foundation for black citizens to get a fair court hearing
in cases against whites. Similarly, in Smith the fact that federal law authorized issuance
of the bank bills that were counterfeited formed a necessary part of the background of the
prosecution for theft in much the same way the 1866 Civil Rights Act formed a necessary
part of the background of a proceeding in which black victims or witnesses could bring
state criminal charges against whites. Thus, the broad construction of the affecting
jurisdiction adopted in the Kentucky federal courts approaches but does not appear to
exceed Article III limits.
267. Blyew v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872).
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prosecutor was within Article III limits. Instead, it held that
Congress had intended to confer federal jurisdiction only over
criminal and civil causes in which blacks were parties, and not
over cases in which blacks might be called as witnesses or were
the victims of a crime.268
Professor Robert D. Goldstein argues that the Court
misconstrued congressional intent as expressed in the 1866 Civil
Rights Act and deprived the federal government and minority
citizens of an important remedy for combatting racial
injustice. 269  But Congress did not overrule the Court; instead,
it quietly acquiesced in the elimination of the affecting jurisdiction
from the United States Code.2
The civil rights removal jurisdiction conferred by Section
Three of the 1866 Act fared only slightly better than the affecting
jurisdiction. Although the jurisdiction remained on the books,271
an important legislative amendment and extremely narrow
Supreme Court construction rendered the provision a virtual dead
letter.272  The 1866 Act incorporated the liberal removal
268. The Court reasoned that persons called as witnesses in a case are "no more
affected by it than is every other person, for anyone may be called as a witness." Id. at 591-
92. If black witnesses were considered persons "affected," then federal jurisdiction would
attach in any suit between whites "whenever it was alleged that a citizen of the African
race was or might be an important witness." Id. at 592. Similarly, the Court held that a
black crime victim was not a person "affected by the cause." Id. at 593.
269. See Goldstein, supra note 264, at 476-83, 507-13.
270. The affecting jurisdiction was dropped as a part of the first codification of the
federal statutes. Congress began the codification process in 1866 by authorizing the
President to appoint several Commissioners to rearrange and consolidate the laws. Act
of June 27, 1866, ch. 140, 14 Stat. 74. The Commissioners finally completed their task in
1872. See COMMISSIONERS' REVISED STATUTES (Vol. I, II), supra note 230. Congress,
however, was unhappy with their report because it made many substantive changes and
contained numerous errors. The codification was not approved until it was revised by a
new reporter, Thomas J. Durant, and reviewed by both a joint subcommittee of the
Congress and the full Congress. See REVISED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES (1875)
(published version of revision enacted June 22, 1874). For reviews of the codification
process, see generally J. Myron Jacobstein & Roy M. Mersky, Introduction, in 1
COMMISSIONERS' REVISED STATUTES, supra note 230; Cass Sunstein, Section 1983 and the
Private Erforcement of Feud-ral Law, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 394, 396-409 (1982); Goldstein,
supra note 264, at 513-22; Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 608-12
(Opinion of the Court), 624-40 (Powell, J., concurring). Professor Goldstein contends that
because of the complexity and confusion of the codification process, it is difficult to
determine whether Congress affirmatively approved elimination of the affecting jurisdiction
or simply did not notice it. See Goldstein, supra note 264, at 521.
271. The civil rights removal jurisdiction is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1443
(1988).
272. REDISH, supra note 156, at 398.
Vermont Law Review [Vol. 19:673
provisions of the 1815 and 1863 removal acts that allowed
removal both before and after judgment. 1 3  But postjudgment
removal of civil rights cases was eliminated in the first
codification of federal statutes of 1874,274 despite the fact that
Congress considered it an important means of enforcing the 1866
Act." 5 This amendment set the stage for the Supreme Court
decisions in Strauder v. West Virginia276  and Virginia v.
Rives.2" These cases held that pretrial removal was available
only when a state statute affirmatively denied rights conferred by
Section One of the 1866 Civil Rights Act, not when state justice
officials denied civil rights by practice or custom. 2 78  Since few
racially discriminatory state statutes remained in force after
273. See supra note 234, 257.
274. See 1 COMMISSIONERS' REVISED STATUTES, supra note 230, Title XIII, ch. 7, § 111,
at 71. This change appeared in the final version of the codification. See REVISED STATUTES
OF THE UNITED STATES, § 641 (1875).
275. See Baines v. City of Danville, 357 F.2d 756, 761 (4th Cir. 1966), affdpercuriam,
384 U.S. 890 (1966) and sources cited therein. The Commissioners did not explain this
change. They may have been overly influenced by The Justices v. Murray, which held that
the Seventh Amendment forbade a federal officer from removing a civil case to federal
court when a state jury had decided against the officer. The Justices v. Murray, 76 U.S.
(9 Wall.) 274 (1870). In Murray, one Patrie sued a federal marshall and his deputy for
assault and battery in state court. The defendants asserted that they had taken Patrie
into custody pursuant to a presidential order, but the jury decided for the plaintiff. The
defendants then removed the case to federal court pursuant to section 5 of the 1863
Removal Act. Id. at 274-76. The Seventh Amendment states that "no fact tried by jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the
rules of the common law." U.S. CONST., amend. 7. The Court reasoned that this provision
applied to jury verdicts in state as well as lower federal courts, and held the removal
improper. Murray, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) at 278-82. See also McKee v. Rains, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
22 (1869). Murray plainly does not forbid postjudgment removal in criminal actions, equity
cases, or common law cases tried by the court because the Seventh Amendment does not
apply in those proceedings. See Goldstein, supra note 264, at 514 and sources cited therein.
Consequently, the Commissioner's total elimination of postjudgment removal seems
unjustified.
276. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
277. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
278. Id. at 321-22. The Supreme Court subsequently reaffirmed Strauder and Rives.
See Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370, 386-87 (1880); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110, 116
(1882); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 582-83 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
592, 600 (1896); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101, 105-06 (1896); Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U.S. 213, 219-20 (1898); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 30-32 (1906). The modem
Supreme Court has continued this restrictive interpretation of civil rights removal. See
Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966), and City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808
(1966). For scholarly commentary critical of this line of cases, see generally, Amsterdam,
supra note 231, at 843-50; REDISH, supra note 156, at 375-99; Martin H. Redish,
Revitalizing Civil Rights Removal Jurisdiction, 64 MINN. L. REV. 523 (1980); and Note,
Federal Jurisdiction: The Civil Rights Removal Statute Revisited, 1967 DUKE L.J. 136.
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enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, very few cases could be
removed before trial.279 With posttrial removal also unavailable,
blacks were unable to come to federal court after judgment and
demonstrate that discrimination had occurred in their case. Civil
rights removal thus was effectively eliminated.
In 1867, Congress expanded the Supreme Court's civil and
criminal appellate arising under jurisdiction.' Section Twenty-
five of the Judiciary Act of 1789 limited jurisdiction to review of
the federal issues in a case, thus denying the Court power to
review any non-federal issues."' The 1867 Act eliminated the
language imposing this restriction. 2 As Charles Alan Wright
argues, "it seems entirely plausible that Congress intended by
eliminating the proviso to open the whole case for review by the
Supreme Court, if there is a federal question in the case sufficient
to take the case to the Supreme Court."' Professor Wright is
plainly correct that "[siuch a course seems wholly consistent with
the temper of the times. "2 4 Given Congress's pervasive distrust
of the state courts, legislators probably did not want the presence
of a questionable independent state ground for a decision to block
federal rights. But the Supreme Court balked once again, holding
in Murdock v. Memphis that the amendment worked no change.rI
279. As Professor Edward A. Purcell notes, the Supreme Court "reduced civil rights
removal to a trivial remedy." EDWARD A. PURCELL, LITIGATION AND INEQUALITY 144 (1992).
After 1879, "the civil rights removal statute offered no remedy for blacks against extralegal
local prejudice, no matter how virulent and oppressive or how effective that prejudice was
in denying their legal rights." Id. By the end of the 1870s, of course, Reconstruction was
effectively over. Professor Purcell suggests that the Justices may simply have been
reflecting the major shift in the country's political attitudes. Id. at 145.
280. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, 14 Stat. 385.
281. The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 86-87. See supra note 88 and
accompanying text.
282. Act of Feb. 5, 1867, ch. 28, § 2, 14 Stat. 385, 387.
283. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAw OF FEDERAL COURTS 788-89 (1994).
284. Id. at 789.
285. Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875). Anthony Amsterdam has
commented on the Murdock holding:
I have serIous doubt (as did the Justices) whether the result in that case was
purposed by Congress; and this very doubt whether Congress might not have
meant to turn Supreme Court review into a sort of post hoc removal suggests
the extreme disfavor in which the Thirty-Ninth Congress held the state courts.
Amsterdam, supra note 231, at 819 n.111.
Murdock declined to consider whether Congress could constitutionally extend
jurisdiction to all issues raised in an appeal. Murdock, 87 U.S. at 633. One can make a
very strong affirmative argument. The Supreme Court says that the arising under
jurisdiction is coextensive in the original, removal, and appellate modes. See supra Part
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As Reconstruction continued, Congress enacted additional
legislation to protect the newly-freed slaves, Union Army officers,
II.B. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, the Court said that the difference between removal and
appellate jurisdiction was merely one of timing. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 349. When
an action is removed to a lower federal court, the court adjudicates the entire case, not just
the federal issue involved. If all issues can be adjudicated in a removed case, and removal
and appellate jurisdiction are coextensive, then the Supreme Court should be able to hear
all issues in cases on appeal.
Moreover, in discussing the arising under jurisdiction, the Court refers uniformly to
.cases," rather than to "issues" or "claims." This suggests that once jurisdiction over a case
attaches, the federal courts have authority to decide the entire case, and not just the
federal issues therein. The Court made this inference explicit in Osborn v. Bank of United
States and Tennessee v. Davis. In discussing the original jurisdiction, the Osborn Court
asserted that once federal jurisdiction attached, "then all the other questions must be
decided as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction." Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at
257. The Court reasoned that because so few cases involve only federal issues, to hold
otherwise would effectively cripple the original jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. Id.
In discussing the removal jurisdiction, the Davis Court stated: "Nor is it any objection that
questions are involved which are not at all of a Federal character. If one of the latter exist,
if there be a single such ingredient in the mass, it is sufficient." Davis, 100 U.S. at 270.
The modern Supreme Court cases and the federal statute authorizing supplemental
jurisdiction also support the argument that Congress can authorize the Supreme Court to
hear all issues in cases appealed from state court. In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, the
Supreme Court held that Article III allows the federal courts to hear a state claim along
with a federal claim when the two claims "derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,"
thus "permit[ting] the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one
constitutional 'case.' United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). Congress
codified Gibbs, and further extended supplemental jurisdiction to state claims involving
additional parties so long as the claims form part "of the same case or controversy." 28
U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1993). The authority to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state claims supports the argument here in two ways. First, if the lower federal courts
have the power to hear state claims in a case arising under federal law, it is difficult to see
why the Supreme Court should not have the same power in a case coming to it from a
state court. In addition, Article III's grant of appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme Court
in cases arising under federal law applies both to cases reaching it from the lower federal
courts and from state courts. Since the Supreme Court has the power to adjudicate
pendent state claims in a case that reaches it from a lower federal court, it is difficult to
see why the Court could not adjudicate the state claims if the same case came up on appeal
from a state court.
In sum, one can make a very strong argument that Congress could constitutionally
extend jurisdiction to all issues in an appeal. One counterargument has some merit,
however. The states' highest courts are supposed to have the final word on the meaning
of state law. If the Supreme Court takes a case on appeal from a state's high court and
reverses based on a different interpretation of state law, state authority plainly is
compromised. Of course, the federal courts (including the Supreme Court) decide issues
of state law when exercising supplemental jurisdiction and in diversity cases, and they
sometimes decide wrongly. The state courts are not bound in later cases by these
misreadings of state law. Presumably, the state courts also could ignore
misinterpretations by the Supreme Court in cases heard on appeal from the state courts.
Nonetheless, the federal-state conflict seems potentially more acute in an appeal, because
the Supreme Court might tell a state's highest court that it is misinterpreting state law
in the very case both courts are hearing.
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and northern government officials supervising Reconstruction.
These enforcement acts followed a similar pattern. They created
new substantive rights, imposed criminal sanctions and provided
private civil remedies for violation of the rights, and gave the
federal courts original or removal jurisdiction or both over cases
arising under the acts.' Congress did not appear to favor one
branch of the arising under jurisdiction over the other; instead, it
used both to achieve its purposes. In accord with prevailing
practice after Prigg v. Pennsylvania,2  7 Congress usually made
286. For example, Congress passed a major civil rights bill in 1870 to enforce blacks'
right to vote under the fifteenth amendment. Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140.
The Act required state election officials to register voters impartially and prohibited any
person from obstructing registration or voting. Id. §§ 1-6, 16 Stat. at 140-41. Violators
could be sued for up to $500, plus costs and counsel fees, and could be charged with a
misdemeanor. Id. §§ 1-5, 16 Stat. at 140-41. A section of the Act aimed specifically at Klan
violence imposed stiffer criminal sanctions for conspiring and going in disguise with the
intent to deny federal rights. Id. § 6, 16 Stat. at 141. Congress gave the federal courts
jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases arising under the Act. Id. § 8, 16 Stat. at 142.
Congress amended the Act in 1871 to give the federal courts an even greater enforcement
role. Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433. Congress empowered the federal courts to
appoint election supervisors who received broad powers to regulate election procedures, id,
§§ 1-6, 16 Stat. at 433-35, and provided criminal sanctions for interference with supervisors
or federal marshals. Id § 10, 16 Stat. at 436-37. Offenders were to be tried in federal
court. Id § 9, 16 Stat. at 436. If federal officials or private persons were sued or
prosecuted in state court for enforcing the provisions of the Act or exercising their rights
under it, the cases could be removed to federal court. Id § 16, 16 Stat. at 438-39.
In 1871, Congress also passed what is probably the best-known civil rights act in the
nation's history. The statute, entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes," gave the
federal courts jurisdiction to hear civil and criminal cases arising under its provisions. Act
of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13. The statute was primarily aimed at Klan violence.
Zeigler, supra note 250, at 1011-13. It provided damage remedies and criminal sanctions
against persons conspiring to deprive another person of constitutional rights, and gave the
district and circuit courts jurisdiction over such actions. Act of April 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 2,
17 Stat. at 13-14. The Act also created the private right of action currently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (1988) for damages or equitable relief against persons acting under color of
state law who deprived someone of rights secured by federal law, and gave 'the several
district or circuit courts of the United States" jurisdiction to hear such cases. Id. § 1, 17
Stat. at 13. The jurisdictional prov;sion is currently codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1343 (1988).
Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1875 to ensure equal access to public
accomodations. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 1, 18 Stat. 335. The Act created criminal
sanctions for violation of its provisions, and also created a private right of action for
damages on behalf of an aggrieved person. Id. § 2, 18 Stat. at 336. It gave the district and
circuit courts jurisdiction to hear cases arising under the Act. Id. § 3, 18 Stat. at 336. The
Supreme Court subsequently held sections one and two of the Act unconstitutional because
they sought to regulate purely private conduct. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3
(1883).
287. See supra notes 203-24 and accompanying text.
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the original criminal jurisdiction exclusively federal and the
original civil jurisdiction concurrent with the state courts.2"
The Commissioners' Revised Statutes289  codifying federal
law added a general provision making the criminal arising under
jurisdiction exclusively federal. The new section read: "The
jurisdiction vested in the courts of the United States, in the cases
and proceedings hereinafter mentioned, shall be exclusive of the
courts of the several States. 1. Of all crimes and offenses
cognizable under the authority of the United States."29°  This
288. The 1870 Voting Rights Act conferred jurisdiction on the district courts,
"exclusively of the courts of the several States .... of all crimes and offences committed
against the provisions of this act, and also, concurrently with the circuit courts of the
United States, of all causes, civil and criminal, arising under this act.. . ." Act of May 31,
1870, ch. 114, § 8, 16 Stat. 140, 142. This provision gave the federal courts exclusive
jurisdiction over criminal cases arising under the Act and concurrent jurisdiction with the
state courts over civil cases. The phrasing is awkward, however, and could be read to also
grant exclusive jurisdiction over civil cases. Of course, if that was Congress's intent, it
could simply have said: "The federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all cases,
civil and criminal, arising under this act." The language Congress did use, or slight
variations on it, had been used since the Judiciary Act of 1789 to confer jurisdiction on the
federal courts. See, e.g., Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 73, 76-79; Act of April
9, 1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27. Then, as now, a grant of civil arising under jurisdiction
generally was considered concurrent with the state courts unless Congress specifically said
otherwise. See THE FEDERALIST, No. 82, supra note 62, at 492-93; Cohens v. Virginia, 19
U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 396-97 (1821); Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 635-37 (1884); Tafflin
v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990). Thus, since the criminal arising under jurisdiction in
the two Acts was specifically made exclusive of the state courts while the civil arising
under jurisdiction was not, the civil jurisdiction was concurrent.
The 1875 Public Accomodations Act also made the criminal jurisdiction exclusively
federal. Act of Mar. 1, 1875, ch. 114, § 3, 18 Stat. 335, 336.
289. See supra note 230.
290. 1 COMMISSIoNERS' REVISED STATUTES, supra note 230, Title XIII, ch. 12, § 117,
at 114. This provision fit awkwardly with other provisions governing the jurisdiction of
the lower federal courts in criminal cases. The new section appeared in chapter 12,
entitled "Provisions Common to More than one Court or Judge." Chapter Three defined
the jurisdiction of the district courts, and contained the following provision: "The district
courts shall have jurisdiction as follows: First. Of all crimes and offenses cognizable under
the authority of the United States, committed within their respective districts, or upon the
high seas, the punishment of which is not capital.. . ." Id. § 563 at 94. This provision is
inconsistent with the language from Chapter Twelve because it does not make the
jurisdiction exclusively federal.
Chapter Seven, by contrast, made the criminal jurisdiction of the circuit courts
exclusively federal: "The circuit courts shall have original jurisdiction as follows: ...
Twentieth. Exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority
of the United States, except where it is or may be otherwise provided by law, and
concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of crimes and offense cognizable therein."
Id. § 629 at 112. This provision is still inconsistent with the new language in Chapter
Twelve, however, because it contains the reservation "except where it is or may be
otherwise provided by law . .. ." Id. A marginal note indicates that the language of
732
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provision was accompanied by an extraordinary textual note in
which the Commissioners asserted that the Constitution requires
exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases and that all statutes
authorizing the state courts to enforce federal criminal law are
void.2 91 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, which stated in dictum that
Congress may authorize, but not require, state courts to enforce
federal criminal law,292 was swept aside:
There is no conflict between the doctrine . . . laid down
[in Prigg] and that asserted by the court in Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee. Whatever power Congress may have
had in the matter of fugitive slaves was substantive. It
was claimed under a specific provision of the Constitution
relating to that subject, and was not an incidental
exercise of "the judicial power of the United States."
293
The Commissioners confidently concluded:
It appears, then, that the jurisdiction of penalties and
forfeitures, and the criminal jurisdiction offered to the
State courts by several acts of Congress, have been
declined by almost every State in which such suits have
been attempted; and that the power of Congress to
Subsection Twenty is drawn from Section Eleven of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Id. Section
Eleven gave the circuit courts "exclusive cognizance of all crimes and offences cognizable
under the authority of the United States.... except where this act otherwise provides, or
the laws of the United States shall otherwise direct .... ." The Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.
20, § 11, 1 Stat 73, 79. The phrase in subsection 20, "except where it is or may be
otherwise provided by law" appears to be merely a stylistic rewording of the similar
language in the 1789 Act.
291. 1 COMMISSIONERS' REVISED STATUTES, supra note 230, Title X1II, ch. 12, at 116-
17. 'It is assumed in this statement of exclusive jurisdiction," said the Commissioners,
"that all enactments authorizing the State courts to exercise jurisdiction of crimes and
offenses and penalties under the laws of the United States are nugatory." Id. at 116. They
cited Jackson v. Rose, 4 Va. (2 Va. Cas.) 124 (1815); United States v. Lathrop, 17 Johns.
(N.Y.) 4 (1819); Ely v. Peck, 7 Conn. 244 (1818); and other state court cases firom the early
part of the century discussed at supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text for the
proposition that "it was not within the power of Congress to extend to any court not
established by the United States any part of 'the judicial power' of the United States." 1
COMMISSIONERS' REVISED STATUTES, supra note 230, at 116. They also quoted Justice
Story's dictum in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee that "[n]o part of the criminal jurisdiction of
the United States can, consistently with the Constitution, be delegated to state tribunals."
Id. (quoting Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 337).
292. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615-16, 622 (1842).
293. 1 CoMMISsIONERS' REVISED STATUTES, supra note 230, Title XIII, ch. 12, at 117.
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extend such jurisdiction to any courts, except those
established by the United States, has been denied not
only by those courts, but by the Supreme Court of the
United States. The grant of such jurisdiction is therefore
nugatory.'
The Commissioners' assertions suffer from the same shortcomings
as the assertions in the cases they cite. 5 The Commissioners
simply announced a limitation on congressional power without
any real explanation as to why it should be so. They neither
explained why the rules should be different for criminal and civil
cases nor addressed how federal courts can hear state criminal
cases removed to federal court if state courts cannot hear federal
criminal charges. Finally, the attempt to reconcile Prigg's
statement that Congress can authorize state courts to enforce
federal criminal sanctions with Martin's statement that Congress
cannot seems strained at best. Congress has "substantive" power
over many specific matters in the Constitution. For example,
Article One, Section Eight, gives Congress the power to establish
post offices, and the Fourteenth Amendment gives Congress the
power to enforce due process and equal protection against state
official action. If Congress imposes criminal sanctions for mail
theft or deprivation of civil rights by state officials and gives both
federal and state courts jurisdiction over these crimes, why is
such legislation merely an "incidental exercise" of federal judicial
power and not every bit as "substantive" as the Fugitive Slave
Act? The criminal provisions of such legislation should be as
enforceable in state court as the Fugitive Slave Act.
Despite these difficulties, Congress enacted the new general
provision and made the criminal arising under jurisdiction
exclusively federal.2  Since the Commissioners' textual notes
were not included in the revised report that was considered by a
joint committee of Congress and the full Congress,297 there is
little reason to conclude that Congress agreed with their
reasoning on the constitutional point. Moreover, Congress could
have adopted the new provision without considering the
constitutional issue because Congress clearly has the power to
294. ld.
295. See discussion at supra part II.C.
296. See Revised Statutes of the United States, § 711 (1875).
297. See Goldstein, supra note 264, at 518.
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make the criminal arising under jurisdiction exclusively federal
even if it is not obliged to do so.298 Given the tenor of the times,
the new provision probably was not very controversial. Congress
was consolidating its power and expanding national authority.
Legislators had spent nearly a decade trying to make the
southern states truly provide justice for all. To help accomplish
this, Congress greatly expanded the arising under jurisdiction in
both civil and criminal cases. The movement was all one
way-from state court to federal court. In this climate, it seems
unlikely that the new statutory provision, which was consistent
with then-existing practice,2  would receive much attention. In
any event, the deed was done, and the criminal arising under
jurisdiction was exclusively federal.300 The provision has
remained on the books ever since, and is currently codified at 18
U.S.C. § 3231, which reads: "The district courts of the United
States shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts of
the States, of all offenses against the laws of the United
States. 3 o'
The jurisdictional enactments of Reconstruction culminated
in the Act of March 3, 1875.302 This Act is best known for
conferring general original civil arising under jurisdiction on the
lower federal courts. By focusing on this part of the statute,
298. See supra notes 65-66, 155 and accompanying text, and infra note 424.
299. See the discussion supra of the jurisdictional provisions of the enforcement acts
accompanying notes 255-88.
300. One lower federal court recognized the significance of the new provision shortly
after its enactment. In Ex parte Houghton, Judge Wheeler remarked:
This provision was not in the statutes of the United States anywhere before.
It was framed ex industria, and placed there for some purpose. It was not
merely the provision of the judiciary act relating to the jurisdiction of the
circuit courts brought forward and placed here, as well as in the chapter
relating to those courts, to express the same thing again in another connection;
but it -is a differeit thing. That provision made the jurisdiction of the circuit
courts exclusive of all other courts, federal as well as state, except as otherwise
provided. This applies to all the courts of the United States, and expressly
excludes, and seems to be made expressly to exclude, the jurisdiction of the
courts of the states.
Ex parte Houghton, 8 F. 897, 900 (D. Vt. 1881).
301. 18 U.S.C. § 3231 (1988).
302. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, 18 Stat. 470. The Act was entitled "An act to
determine the jurisdiction of the circuit courts of the United States, and to regulate the
removal of causes from the State courts, and for other purposes." Id.
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commentators have characterized the 1875 Act as very
expansive. 03  The Act appears somewhat less expansive,
however, when one examines all of its arising under provisions.
Specifically, the Act contains three grants of arising under
jurisdiction. First, it gives the circuit courts general original civil
arising under jurisdiction:
[Tihe circuit courts of the United States shall have
original cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, of all suits of a civil nature at common
law or in equity, where the matter in dispute exceeds,
exclusive of costs, the sum or value of five hundred
dollars, and arising under the Constitution or laws of the
United States, or treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority .... 304
Next, the Act continues the general original criminal arising
under jurisdiction first granted in Sections Nine and Eleven of the
Judiciary Act of 1789:
[The circuit courts] shall have exclusive cognizance of all
crimes and offenses cognizable under the authority of the
United States, except as otherwise provided by law, and
concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the
crimes and offenses cognizable therein.0 5
Finally, the Act granted general removal jurisdiction in civil cases
arising under federal law:
[In] any suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, now
pending or hereafter brought in any State court where
the matter in dispute exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum
or value of five hundred dollars, and arising under the
303. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 103, at 65 (The Act "gave the
federal courts the vast range of power which had lain dormant in the Constitution since
1789. These courts ceased to be restricted tribunals of fair dealing between citizens of
different states and became the primary and powerful reliance for vindicating every right
given by the Constitution, the law, and treaties of the United States."); Collins, supra note
5, at 719 (examining "the great expansion of federal jurisdiction resulting from the passage
of the Judiciary Act of 1875").
304. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
305. Id.
736 [Vol. 19:673
Twins: Criminal & Civil Jurisdiction
Constitution or laws of the United States, or treaties
made, or which shall be made, under their authority[,] .
. . either party may remove said suit into the circuit court
of the United States for the proper district.3"
These provisions are striking for several reasons. The grant of
original civil arising under jurisdiction was undeniably broad,
extending to any case arising under federal law so long as the
amount in controversy exceeds five hundred dollars. The limited
legislative history of this provision indicates that Congress meant
to extend jurisdiction to Article III limits.
30 7
The language Congress used in continuing the original
criminal arising under jurisdiction suggests that Congress
believed it had the power to make jurisdiction concurrent with the
state courts. The language tracked the language of Section Eleven
of the Judiciary Act of 1789 almost exactly.308 Although the
jurisdiction in both Acts was exclusively federal, both made an
exception for instances where Congress directed otherwise. This
reaffirmation of Section Eleven only one year after enactment of
the Revised Statutes suggests that Congress gave little, if any,
weight to the Commissioners' assertion that state courts could not
hear federal criminal charges.3"
306. Id. § 2, 18 Stat. at 470-71.
307. Congress tracked the constitutional language almost exactly. Senator Carpenter,
a member of the Judiciary Committee, was primarily responsible for the final draft of the
Act. 2 CONG. REC. 4984 (1874). He reminded his colleagues of Justice Story's argument
that Congress was required to vest the lower federal courts with the full scope of federal
judicial power. He then said, "This bill gives precisely the power which the Constitution
confers-nothing more, nothing less." Id. at 4986-87. Most commentators have confirmed
this understanding. See, e.g., Doernberg, supra note 5, at 603; Collins, supra note 5, at 723;
Patti Alleva, Prerogative Lost: The Trouble with Statutory Federal Question Doctrine After
Merrell Dow, 52 OHIO ST. L.J. 1477, 1492-93 (1991); Forrester, supra note 5, at 374-77 ("No
indication has been found either in the proceedings in-Congress or in the available legal
periodicals of the day that the statutory clause should have a different meaning and effect
than the Constitutional clause. They were, and it would seem reasonably so, considered
synonymous."). But see Chadbourn & Levin, supra note 5, at 642-45 (suggesting that most
members of Congress probably were unaware of the potential scope of the arising under
language in the Act).
308. Section Eleven of the 1789 Act gave the circuit courts "exclusive cognizance of
all crimes and offences cognizable under the authority of the United States .... except
where this act otherwise provides, or the laws of the United States shall otherwise direct,
and concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts of the crimes and offences cognizable
therein." The Judiciary Act 1789, ch. 19, § 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78-79.
309. See supra notes 289-294 and accompanying text.
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The grant of removal jurisdiction was expansive in some
ways, but restrictive in others. As with the original civil arising
under jurisdiction in Section One of the Act, Congress tracked the
language of Article III and allowed removal of any civil case
"arising under the Constitution or laws of the United States."
This suggests that Congress meant to extend the civil removal
jurisdiction out to constitutional limits.310  On the other hand,
by limiting the general removal arising under jurisdiction to civil
cases, Congress broke sharply with its past practice of making
civil and criminal removal jurisdiction coextensive. The removal
provisions in the Acts of 1815, 1833, 1863, and 1866 all allowed
removal of both civil and criminal cases brought against persons
exercising their rights or authority under the acts or other federal
laws. 31' By forbidding general federal question removal in
criminal cases, Congress significantly restricted the removal
jurisdiction. The legislative history does not indicate why
Congress chose to break with tradition. Congress may have felt
that existing criminal removal provisions were adequate to deal
with the immmediate problems in the South, and that a general
grant of criminal removal jurisdiction was unnecessary.3" 2
Congress also may not have anticipated that federal issues would
arise in routine state criminal cases. Today, of course, federal
constitutional issues arise in vast numbers of state criminal
actions, but in 1875 the Bill of Rights applied only to federal
officials.313 Thus, federal issues were much less likely to arise
in state criminal cases than they are today. Congress may have
felt that the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction would protect
federal rights in the occasional state criminal case that involved
an issue of federal law.
On the other hand, criminal removal jurisdiction would have
helped corporations doing business interstate. Historians have
310. Collins, supra note 5, at 726-27.
311. Act of Feb. 14, 1815, ch. 31, § 8, 3 Stat. 195, 198; Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 57,
§ 3, 4 Stat. 632, 633; Act of March 3, 1863, ch. 81, § 5, 12 Stat. 755, 756; Act of April 9,
1866, ch. 31, § 3, 14 Stat. 27.
312. In addition, although the Revised Statutes eliminated post trial removal in civil
rights cases, see supra note 274 and accompanying text, the Supreme Court did not restrict
pretrial removal until 1879, when it decided Virginia v. Rives. Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1879); see supra note 277 and accompanying text. Thus, Congress may have believed
that existing removal provisions were sufficient to remedy unfairness in state criminal
cases.
313. See Minneapolis & St. Louis R.R. Co. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211,217 (1916), and
cases cited therein.
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argued that Congress granted civil removal jurisdiction in the
1875 Act primarily to protect corporations from unfriendly state
regulation.31' State regulatory legislation often imposed penal
sanctions, and corporations could be expected to fight criminal
prosecutions with federal defenses.315  Since corporations
presumably needed as much protection from criminal prosecutions
as from civil suits, it is puzzling that the general removal
jurisdiction was limited to civil cases.
Perhaps Congress simply believed that it was inappropriate
to interfere with the state criminal process by allowing a general
removal of state criminal cases to federal court in the absence of
a compelling threat to federal interests. As Justice Brewer stated
in State of Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q Railroad:
While it may be within the power of congress to transfer
to the federal court all actions to enforce the penal laws
of the state in which questions of a federal nature may
arise, yet a due regard for the dignity of the state, and a
proper harmony between the state and federal
governments, doubtless prompted congress to leave to the
state courts the primary decision of all such actions,
preferring that if a party thought any such rights were
denied in the state courts he should seek relief through
the appellate jurisdiction of the supreme court of the
United States.
316
314. See, e.g., FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 103, at 64-65,91-93; HYMAN, supra
note 257, at 536-41; Wiecek, supra note 250, at 341-42; Collins, supra note 5, at 727-29.
315. In the years that followed, many states enacted laws regulating interstate
commerce. With removal unavailable, corporations often invoked the federal courts'
original jurisdiction seeking injunctions to restrain state officials from enforcing the
criminal sanctions contained in such legislation. See generally Congressional Research
Service, THE CONSrIUTIoN OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 770-77 (1973);
Developments in the Law-Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV. 994, 1024 (1965). One focal point
of the struggle between the states and corporations concerned the attempt by state
governments to fix maximum railroad rates. Donald H. Zeigler, An Accommodation of the
Younger Doctrine and the Duty of the Federal Courts to Enfurce Consitutional Safeguards
in the State Criminal Process, 125 U. PA. L. REV. 266, 271 (1976). In a series of decisions
beginning with Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v. Minnesota, 134 U.S. 418 (1890), and
culminating in Exparte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme Court held that the rate
statutes in question deprived the railroads of property without due process of law, and
enjoined the prospective enforcement of those laws. Zeigler, supra, at 271-72.
316. State of Iowa v. Chicago B. & Q.R. Co., 37 F. 497, 502 (C.C.S.D. Iowa 1889)
(sitting as a Circuit Court judge). In the years following the 1875 Act, the Supreme Court
refused to use the original civil arising under jurisdiction to grant injunctions against
pending state criminal proceedings. Instead, only threatened state prosecutions were
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In summary, the 1875 Act reshuffled the civil and criminal
arising under jurisdiction in the original and removal modes. In
the 1789 Act, general original criminal arising under jurisdiction
was granted but the civil counterpart was not. Neither criminal
nor civil removal arising under jurisdiction was granted in 1789,
but over the years both sorts of removal jurisdiction were given
coextensively in specific federal statutes. In the 1875 Act, the
original criminal and civil arising under jurisdiction were made
more nearly equal. The circuit courts were empowered to hear
civil cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States, as well as all crimes and offenses cognizable under the
authority of the United States. But the civil and criminal removal
jurisdiction, which had been granted equally over the years, was
suddenly split in a manner reminiscent of the original jurisdiction
in the 1789 Act. One branch of removal jurisdiction, the civil, was
given generally. The other branch, the criminal, was not given
generally but was limited to specific grants under particular
federal statutes.
Although the Supreme Court often interpreted jurisdictional
grants in Reconstruction statutes quite narrowly,317 the Court
continued to interpret Article III's arising under jurisdiction very
broadly, reaffirming that it was coextensive in civil and criminal
cases in the original, removal, and appellate modes. In Mayor v.
Cooper, the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1863 and
1866 removal statutes,31' and stated:
The power here under consideration is given in
general terms. No limitation is imposed. The broadest
language is used. "All cases" so arising are embraced.
None are excluded....
enjoined if they were based on state laws that violated federal rights. See Zeigler, supra
note 315, at 281.
317. See supra notes 267-85 and accompanying text.
318. Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1867). Cooper sued the mayor and
aldermen of Nashville, Tennessee, in state court, alleging trespass and conversion. Id. at
248. The defendants sought to remove the case to federal circuit court under the 1863 and
1866 removal acts, saying they had acted under federal military authority. Id. at 248. The
circuit court held that the removal acts were unconstitutional, and ordered the case
remanded to state court. Id. at 249. An appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, and it
reversed. Id. at 254.
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[NIor is there any restriction as to the tribunals--State
or Federal-in which they may arise. Wherever found,
they are within the reach of this authority ....
Jurisdiction, original or appellate, alike comprehensive in
either case, may be given. The constitutional boundary
line of both is the same. Every variety and form of
appellate jurisdiction within the sphere of the power,
extending as well to the courts of the States as to those
of the nation, is permitted. There is no distinction in this
respect between civil and criminal causes. Both are
within its scope.319
The Court returned to these themes in Tennessee v. Davis in
upholding the constitutionality of the 1833 Removal Act.
320
James M. Davis was indicted for murder in a Tennessee state
court. 321  He filed a removal petition in federal circuit court,
alleging that he acted in self-defense while engaged in his duties
as a federal revenue collector.322
The Court asserted that the power to remove such a case is
necessary to vindicate federal authority, for otherwise, "the
operations of the general government may at any time be arrested
at the will of one of its members."3" The Court cited Cohens for
the propositions that the arising under jurisdiction extends
equally to criminal and civil cases, and that a case arises under
federal law when a federal issue is raised by the plaintiff or the
defendant:
319. Id at 251-52. Not surprisingly, the Court cited Martin, Cohens, and Osborn. Id.
at 253. The Court also explicitly stated that the removal jurisdiction conferred by the
Reconstruction statutes had the same basis as the appellate jurisdiction. 'The jurisdiction
here in question involves the same principle, and rests upon the same foundation with that
conferred by the twenty-fifth section of the Judiciary Act of 1789." Id. at 253. Since the
constitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction had been uniformly sustained, the Court
concluded that the removal statutes were constitutional as well. Id. at 254.
320. Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1879).
321. Id. at 258.
322. Id. at 258-59.
323. Id. at 263. Nor did the Court think eventual Supreme Court appellate review
of state proceedings would be sufficient to protect federal interests because "the officer is
withdrawn from the discharge of his duty during the pendency of the prosecution, and the
exercise of acknowledged Federal power arrested." Id.
7411995]
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[The arising under jurisdiction] embraces alike civil and
criminal cases arising under the Constitution and laws.
Both are equally within the domain of the judicial powers
of the United States, and there is nothing in the grant to
justify an assertion that whatever power may be
exercised over a civil case may not be exerted as fully
over a criminal one .... What constitutes a case thus
arising was early defined in [Cohens]. It is not merely
one where a party comes into court to demand something
conferred upon him by the Constitution or by a law or
treaty. A case consists of the right of one party as well
as the other, and may truly be said to arise under the
Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States
whenever its correct decision depends upon the
construction of either.324
The Court also specifically rejected the argument that
removal of a state criminal action raising a federal defense
violates state sovereignty. This argument, the Court stated,
ignores entirely the dual character of our government. It
assumes that the States are completely and in all
respects sovereign. But when the national government
was formed, some of the attributes of State sovereignty
were partially, and others wholly, surrendered and vested
in the United States. . . . Now the execution and
enforcement of the laws of the United States, and the
judicial determination of questions arising under them,
are confided to another sovereign, and to that extent the
sovereignty of the State is restricted. The removal of
cases arising under those laws, from State into Federal
courts, is, therefore, no invasion of State domain.32
324. Id. at 264. The Court also cited Osborn for the proposition that a case arises
under federal law when a federal issue "forms an ingredient of the original cause ...
although other questions of fact or of law may be involved in it." Id.
325. Id at 266-67. This reasoning also implicitly rejects for our federal system the
maxim that one sovereign will not enforce the laws of another. See 8upra notes 196-200
and accompanying text.
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Finally, the Court downplayed the practical problems that a
federal court might face when adjudicating a state criminal
prosecution:
[T]he mode of trial is sufficiently obvious. The circuit
courts of the United States have all the appliances which
are needed for the trial of any criminal case. They adopt
and apply the laws of the State in civil cases, and there
is no more difficulty in administering the State's criminal
law. They are not foreign courts. The Constitution has
made them courts within the States to administer the
laws of the States in certain cases; and, so long as they
keep within the jurisdiction assigned to them, their
general powers are adequate to the trial of any case.326
IV. RECONSTRUCTION TO THE PRESENT
The modern framework for the exercise of the arising under
jurisdiction was in place by the end of Reconstruction. While
there have been important changes since then, such changes have
been adjustments within an established structure rather than
modifications of the structure itself. In the intervening years, of
course, Congress enacted an enormous volume of legislation, both
civil and criminal, and looked to the courts to enforce the new
laws.327 This expanded the arising under jurisdiction in the
sense that there is much more federal law for cases to arise
under. The general jurisdiction statutes have not changed
326. Id. at 271-72. The Court continued on this point as follows:
The supposed anomaly of prosecuting offenders against the peace and dignity
of a State, in tribunals of the general government, grows entirely out of the
division of powers between that government and the government of a State;
that is, a division of sovereignty over certain matters. When this is understood
(and it is time it should be), it will not appear strange that, even in cases of
criminal prosecutions for alleged offenses against a State, in which arises a
defence under United States law, the general government should take
cognizance of the case and try it in its own courts, according to its own forms
of proceeding.
Id.
327. See Judge Henry J. Friendly, Federalism: A Foreword, 86 YALE L.J. 1019, 1021-
27 (1977) (in which Judge Friendly provides an overview of the major pieces of this
legislation).
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markedly,32 however, and the constitutional contours of the
arising under jurisdiction have not changed at all.s
Developments in three areas are important to our discussion.
First, the Supreme Court interpreted the 1875 jurisdictional
statute quite narrowly, confining the original and removal civil
arising under jurisdiction to only a fraction of their possible scope.
Second, the Court reaffirmed Congress's authority to require the
state courts to enforce federal law, both civil and criminal.
328. As to the appellate jurisdiction, Congress in stages extended discretionary review
and restricted review as of right. Congress continues to treat civil and criminal cases
equally. Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, as amended in 1867, see supra notes 280-
85 and accompanying text, was re-enacted without significant change in Section 709 of the
Revised Statutes of the United States (1875) and Section 237 of the Judicial Code (1911).
The Judiciary Act of 1914 enlarged the jurisdiction by allowing discretionary review in
cases that were the counterparts of the cases where Congress had authorized an appeal
as of right. Thus, review by certiorari could be sought when the decision of the state court
upheld the validity of federal law, overturned state law as being in conflict with federal
law, or was in favor of the interpetation of federal law claimed by either party. Act of Dec.
23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790. The Judiciary Act of 1916 made review discretionary whether
the state court decision was in favor or against the interpretation claimed by either party.
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, ch. 448, § 2, 39 Stat. 726. The 1948 revision of the Judicial Code left
these provisions basically unchanged. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 503. In 1988,
Congress eliminated the remaining appeals as of right, thus making all review
discretionary. Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662. The current
grant of appellate arising under jurisdiction reads as follows:
Final judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which
a decision could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ of
certiorari, where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is
drawn in question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in
question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or
laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is
specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes
of, or any commission held or authority exercised under, the United States.
28 U.S.C. § 1257(a) (1988).
329. The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed the broad scope of the Article III arising
under jurisdiction in Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983).
Verlinden, a Dutch corporation, and the Federal Republic of Nigeria entered an agreement
for Nigeria to purchase cement. When Nigeria failed to comply with certain terms of the
agreement, Verlinden brought suit in federal court in New York under 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a),
which gives the district courts jurisdiction "of any non-jury civil action against a foreign
state ... as to any claim ... with respect to which the foreign state is not entitled to
immunity" under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1605-07. Id. at 483. Nigeria contended that § 1330(a)
violated Article III, and moved to dismiss. The Supreme Court upheld jurisdiction, relying
upon Osborn. That case, said the Court, "reflects a broad conception of 'arising under'
jurisdiction, according to which Congress may confer on the federal courts jurisdiction over
any case or controversy that might call for the application of federal law." Id. at 492. The
Court held that a federal issue would arise in suits brought under § 1330(a) because the
court must consider whether the foreign state is immune from suit under federal law. Id.
at 493-94.
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Finally, on the civil side, the Court developed the doctrines of
pendent and ancillary jurisdiction.
A Construction of the 1875 Jurisdictional Statute
The Supreme Court's restrictive reading of the 1875 Act is a
story that has been told often and well,330 so I will give only a
brief summary. As noted above, the limited legislative history of
the 1875 Act indicates that Congress meant to extend both the
original and removal civil arising under jurisdiction to Article III
limits. 331 The Supreme Court clearly read the Act this way in
several removal cases.332  In cases involving the original
jurisdiction, however, the Court began moving toward the rule
330. The best recent treatments of the subject are Doernberg, supra note 5, and
Collins, supra note 5. For other excellent articles, see Forrester, supra note 5; Chadbourn
& Levin, supra note 5; Paul J. Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53
COLUM L. REv. 157 (1953); Ernest J. London, "Federal Question" Jurisdiction-A Snare
and a Delusion, 57 MICH. L. REV. 835 (1959); William Cohen, The Broken Compass: The
Requirement that a Case Arise "Directly" under Federal Law, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 890 (1967);
and Alan D. Hornstein, Federalism, Judicial Power and the 'Arising Under" Jurisdiction
of the Federal Courts: A Hierarchical Analysis, 56 IND. L.J. 563 (1981).
331. See supra notes 307, 310 and accompanying text.
332. The Court discussed the constitutional scope of the arising under jurisdiction and
then applied those standards to removal under the 1875 Act. For example, in Railroad
Company v. Mississippi, the state brought a mandamus action in state court to compel the
railroad to remove a bridge it had built over a stream along the Mississippi-Louisiana
border. Railroad Co. v. Mississippi, 102 U.S. 135 (1880). The railroad contended that a
federal statute authorized construction of the bridge. The Court said that Cohens, Osborn,
Mayor v. Cooper, and Tennessee v. Davis "firmly established" that a case arises under
federal law when its decision depends on a federal right asserted by either plaintiff or
defendant. Id. at 140-41. Speaking of the case before it, the Court asked rhetorically =[i]s
it not, then, plainly a case which, in the sense of the Constitution, and of the statute of
1875, arises under the laws of the United States?" Id. at 140. See also Ames v. Kansas ex
rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 462, 471 (1884) (equating the scope of the constitutional and
statutory arising under provisions).
he Court gave its most expansive interpretation of the removal jurisdiction under
the 1875 Act in the Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885). All of the cases
looked remarkably like Chief Justice Marshall's breach of contract hypothetical in Osborn.
See supra notes 169-73 and accompanying text. Each case asserted a state-created cause
of action against the defendant railroad. The railroads sought to remove the cases to
federal court based on their status as federal corporations. Id. at 3-10. The Court quoted
extensively from Osborn in support of its conclusion that any case by or against a federally-
chartered corporation arises under federal law. The Court once again equated the removal
jurisdiction under the 1875 Act with Article III arising under jurisdiction, and held that
the cases were properly removed. Id. at 11, 17.
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that a case arises under federal law only if the federal issue
appears on the face of the plaintiff's well-pleaded complaint.
333
The Court adopted this rule in Tennessee v. Union & Planters'
Bank,3 34 and, for good measure, also applied it to cases invoking
the civil removal arising under jurisdiction.135  The Court may
have taken these steps in response to the avalanche of cases that
fell on the federal courts after 1875. Congress had been slow to
help relieve the congestion, and the Court probably felt that it
had to take some action on its own. 36
As every student of the federal courts knows, Tennessee v.
Union and Planters' Bank marked merely the beginning of the
long struggle to define the scope of the statutory original and
removal civil arising under jurisdiction. In American Well Works
333. See Metcalfv. Watertown, 128 U.S. 586 (1888) (holding that a case does not arise
under federal law when the federal issue first appears in plaintiffs reply to defendant's
answer and the plaintiff did not raise the issue in the complaint); Shreveport v. Cole, 129
U.S. 36 (1889) (deciding that a case does not arise under federal law when plaintiffs
complaint contains a federally-based response to an anticipated defense in the answer
which, when filed, substantially undercuts the need to reach the federal issue).
334. Tennessee v. Union & Planters' Bank, 152 U.S. 454 (1894).
335. As to the original jurisdiction, the Court simply asserted that the 1875 Act
required the federal issue to appear on the face of the plaintiffs complaint, citing the
Metcalf case. Id. at 460; see supra note 333. The Court could not make such an assertion
about removal jurisdiction, however, because of the substantial precedent holding that
cases could be removed if the federal issue appeared in the defendant's answer. See supra
note 332. Instead, the Court pointed to some amendments to the Act in 1887. The 1875
Act simply authorized removal of civil cases arising under federal law, Act of Mar. 3, 1875,
ch. 137, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, but the 1887 Act allowed removal of cases arising under federal
law "of which the circuit courts of the United States are given original jurisdiction by
[Section One of the 1887 Act]." Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 373, § 2, 24 Stat. 552, 553. Because
a case could be brought in federal court originally only if the federal issue appeared on the
face of the plaintiffs complaint, the Court concluded that this condition should apply to the
removal jurisdiction as well. Union & Planter's Bank, 152 U.S. at 461-62.
Scholars have vigorously contested this interpretation of the 1887 Act. See, e.g.,
Doernberg, supra note 5, at 605-06 (arguing that "Congress' failure, in the 1887 Act, to
change the language conferring original jurisdiction cannot reasonably be interpreted as
altering the requirements for asserting it," and that consequently, the reference back to
the original jurisdiction in the removal section should not be read as imposing any new
restrictions on the removal jurisdiction); Collins, supra note 5, at 738-56 (arguing that
diversity rather than federal question jurisdiction was the target of reform in the 1887
Act).
336. For a review of the slow course of reform legislation in Congress, see
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 103, at 69-102. Professor Purcell notes that the
Court's restriction of the civil removal arising under jurisdiction stands in stark contrast
to the Court's expansion of the diversity removal jurisdiction during the same period.
PURCELL, supra note 279, at 268-72. Professor Purcell contends that the latter jurisdiction
was expanded to strengthen the litigation position of corporations defending against tort
claims. Id. at 271.
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v. Layne & Bowler, Justice Holmes, writing for the Court,
asserted that "[a] suit arises under the law that creates the cause
of action," 337 only to see the Court take jurisdiction five years
later over a suit asserting a state-created cause of action because
federal law was centrally involved. 33' And, in Skelly Oil v.
Phillips Petroleum,339 the Court introduced a new level of
complexity by holding that in a case brought under the federal
declaratory judgment statute,340 a court must recast the action
as a coercive suit and then determine whether that case would
arise under federal law. 341
All of the cases in this line are civil cases. It is intriguing to
ponder why a similar line of cases did not develop on the criminal
side. The 1875 Act, after all, gave the lower federal courts
jurisdiction over "all crimes and offenses cognizable under the
authority of the United States .... .342 This broad language
might be read to encompass any criminal case involving an issue
of federal law. Why have the federal courts not had to struggle
in criminal cases as they have in civil cases to keep from being
inundated by litigation in which federal law is only peripherally
involved?
The answer, I think, lies in our history of exclusive
jurisdiction, federal and state, in criminal cases. On the civil side,
the courts have struggled most in cases where the plaintiff asserts
a state-created cause of action, but the case also involves
significant federal issues. 343  A state prosecutor could try to
337. American Well Works v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
338. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921). But see Moore v.
Chesapeake & Ohio Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1934); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986). For an interesting discussion of Moore, see PURCELL,
supra note 279, at 375-76 n.147.
339. Skelly Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum, 339 U.S. 667 (1950).
340. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (1988).
341. The Court reaffirmed this standard. See Franchise Tax Bd. of California v.
Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983). Professors Doernberg and
Mushlin have argued that the Court misinterpreted the declaratryju.,dgment statute and
that Skelly and Franchise Tax are wrongly decided. Donald L. Doernberg & Michael
Mushlin, The Trojan Horse: How the Declaratory Judgment Act Created a Cause of Action
and Expanded Federal Jurisdiction While the Supreme Court Wasn't Looking, 36 UCLA L.
REV. 529 (1989).
342. Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
343. One reason the courts struggle is because the well-pleaded complaint rule forces
them to dismiss cases in which federal law will determine the outcome. It is hard to accept
that such a case does not arise under federal law. Consider Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v.
Graham, 489 U.S. 838 (1989). In Graham, the tenth circuit misapplied the rule twice in
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bring the criminal counterpart. A state prosecutor might try to
file state criminal charges in federal court if significant federal
issues were raised by the defendant or were otherwise present,
contending that the action was "cognizable under the authority of
the United States" and thus within the original criminal
jurisdiction of the federal courts. I have not found any cases on
point, however. 34' This is not surprising. The habit of exclusive
original jurisdiction in criminal cases is so ingrained that it would
not occur to a state prosecutor to try this gambit. Consequently,
all of the criminal cases filed originally in federal court are
brought by federal prosecutors and allege violations of federal
criminal statutes. To use the parlance of the civil side, a federal
statute "creates the cause of action." Thus, under the Holmes test
or the face of the complaint test, federal criminal cases plainly
arise under federal law.
The Court probably has not restricted the criminal removal
jurisdiction because Congress has never granted general criminal
removal arising under jurisdiction. Thus, a run-of-the-mill state
criminal case is not a candidate for removal to federal court, even
a very straightforward case. The facts were as follows. The Chickasaw Nation owns and
operates a Motor Inn in Sulphur, Oklahoma. Id. at 839. Oklahoma brought an action in
state court against the Chickasaw Nation for unpaid state taxes on the sale of cigarettes
and bingo receipts from the Inn. Id. Because the case raised a federal question concerning
tribal immunity to state taxes, the Indians removed the case to federal court. Id.
Oklahoma moved to remand, arguing that the immunity issue came up only as a defense
and did not appear on the face of its complaint. Id. The district court denied the motion,
holding that the tribal immunity issue was "implicitly raised" by the complaint. Id. at 839.
The tenth circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court vacated and remanded for
reconsideration in light of the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id. at 839-40. The circuit
adhered to its previous decision, holding that while "nothing within the literal language
of the pleading even suggests implication of a federal question, such a question is inherent
within the complaint because of the parties subject to the action." Id. at 840. The Supreme
Court reversed again based on the well-pleaded complaint rule. Id.
344. Cf Gwin v. Breedlove, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 29 (1844). Breedlove recovered a money
judgment in federal circuit court. The money was given to the federal marshall, Gwin. Id.
at 29. Gwin did not pay all of the money to Breedlove, so Breedlove moved for judgment
against Gwin under a Mississippi statute that made a sheriffliable for the money collected
plus a 25 percent penalty. Id. at 30. The circuit court granted judgment for Breedlove, but
the Supreme Court reversed the part of the judgment requiring Gwin to pay the penalty
because the penalty was criminal in nature, and "the courts of the United States hav[e] no
power to execute the penal laws of the individual states .. . ." Id. at 37. See also Gwin
v. Barton, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 7 (1848).
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if the defendant raises an issue of federal law.' The civil
rights and federal officer removal statutes are still on the
books,34 but civil rights removal was virtually eliminated by
1879,347 and federal officer removal is invoked infrequently.
Thus, the Supreme Court has not had to struggle on the criminal
side as it has in civil cases to define the scope of the statutory
arising under jurisdiction. 48
Interestingly, the recent decision in Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals v. Thompson may have made the statutory
arising under standards for original and removal civil cases more
like the statutory standards for original criminal cases.
349
Merrell Dow appears to re-adopt the American Well Works
standard for civil actions .3 ' American Well Works held that a
345. The lower federal courts so held in several cases decided in the late 1800's. See,
e.g., Dey v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry., 45 F. 82 (C.C.N.D. Iowa 1891); Texas v. Day Land &
Cattle Co., 41 F. 228 (C.C.W.D. Tex. 1890); Iowa v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 37 F. 497
(C.C.S.D. Iowa 1889). In all of these cases, the defendants were charged with violating a
state criminal law. They asserted defenses based on federal law, and sought to remove the
cases to federal court under the 1875, 1887, and 1888 jurisdiction acts. The federal courts
denied removal on the ground that the general arising under removal jurisdiction applied
only to civil cases.
346. See supra notes 233-38 (federal officer), 255-57, 263 (civil rights) and
accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 271-79 and accompanying text.
348. The Court has not had to face the problems presented by Skelly Oil and
Franchise Tax on the criminal side because there is no criminal equivalent of a declaratory
judgment.
349. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
350. Merrell Dow rejected a case in which plaintiffs asserted several state common
law causes of action, including negligence, and claimed that misbranding a drug in
violation of a federal statute was evidence of that negligence. Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805.
Based on the parties' stipulation that a private right of action could not be implied from
the federal statute, the Court assumed that Congress affirmatively did not intend to create
a private remedy. The Court then concluded that it would flout, or at least undermine,
congressional intent to exercise federal question jurisdiction to provide a private remedy
by use of a state cause of action. Id. at 814.
Several commentators suggest that Merrell Dow works a de facto return to the
American Well Works standard. See, e.g., Alleva, supra note 307, at 1524 (Merrell Dow
.significantly recasts the federal question notion of substantiality in the restrictive
American Well vein."); Doernberg, supra note 5, at 638 ("[N]o cause of action not created
by Congress will be able to be heard in the federal courts pursuant to section 1331.");
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 240 (1989) (Under Merrell Dow, "federal
question jurisdiction exists only if the federal law itself creates a cause of action, albeit one
not relied on by the plaintiff."). A case cannot proceed unless the plaintiff asserts a cause
of action that the court has power to hear. If a federal court lacks jurisdiction to enforce
a federal right by means of a state cause of action, a case can proceed only if federal law
creates the cause of action. If federal law does not, then the plaintiff is out of court.
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case arises under the law that creates the cause of action.35
Thus, if state law creates the cause of action, a civil case cannot
be brought in federal court, even though significant issues of
federal law will arise. If federal law creates the cause of action,
then the case may be brought in federal court. These rules are
similar to the standards on the criminal side. Cases for violation
of state criminal laws are brought in state court, even though
important issues of federal law may be present; cases for violation
of federal criminal law are brought in federal court. Two
important differences remain. First, jurisdiction of civil cases
arising under federal law generally is concurrent with the state
courts, while jurisdiction of criminal arising under cases is
exclusively federal. Second, a federal (or state) court can hear a
civil case asserting a federal common law cause of action,
352
while this is not possible on the criminal side. Given the current
restrictive standards for implying private rights of action from
federal statutes, however, there are relatively few new federal
common law causes of action being created.353 Therefore, as a
practical matter, only those civil cases that assert a
congressionally created cause of action and only those criminal
cases that charge a defendant with a statutorily created federal
crime arise under federal law for purposes of 28 U.S.C. § 1331
and 18 U.S.C. § 3231.
Most lower federal court decisions after Merrell Dow have applied theAmerican Well
Works test. See, e.g., Rogers v. Platt, 814 F.2d 683, 688 (D.C. Cir. 1987); Oliver v.
Trunkline Gas. Co., 796 F.2d 86, 88-89 (5th Cir. 1986); Utley v. Varian Assoc., Inc., 811
F.2d 1279, 1283-86 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 824 (1987); Nashoba Comm. v. Town
of Danvers, 893 F.2d 435, 438-39 (1990). For an extensive discussion of these and similar
cases, see Alleva, supra note 307, at 1532-38.
351. American Well Works, 241 U.S. at 260 (1916).
352. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
353. See Karahalios v. National Fed'n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S. 527, 536 (1989);
Texas Indus. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639 (1981); Transamerica Mortgage
Advisors v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 15-16 (1979); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S.
560, 575 (1979). See generally, Donald H. Zeigler, Rights Require Remedies: A New
Approach to the Enforcement of Rights in the Federal Courts, 38 HASTINGS L. J. 665, 708-26
(1987); Robert HA. Ashford, Implied Causes of Action Under Federal Laws: Calling the
Court Back to Borak, 79 Nw. U. L. REV. 227 (1984); George D. Brown, Of Activism and
Erie-The Implication Doctrine's Implications for the Nature and Role of the Federal
Courts, 69 IOWA L. REV. 617 (1984).
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B. Congressional Power to Require State Courts
to Enforce Federal Law
Following Reconstruction, the Supreme Court made clear that
Congress can require the state courts to hear both civil and
criminal cases arising under federal law. In 1876, Claflin v.
Houseman reaffirmed Congress's power.3" Julius Houseman,
as assignee in bankruptcy of Comstock and Young, sued Horace
Claflin in New York state court under the Bankruptcy Act of
1867.ass Houseman claimed that the bankrupts had willingly
suffered a default judgment in a suit by Claflin just before they
became insolvent, fraudulently intending to give Claflin a
preference over other creditors.358 The defendant demurred,
arguing that the state court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.357 The state court disagreed and subsequently
entered judgment for the plaintiff.3' The appellate courts
affirmed, and the case reached the United States Supreme Court
by writ of error.359
The Court first held that the Bankruptcy Act did not make
the action exclusively federal.3 ° Consequently, the state courts
had concurrent jurisdiction. 361  The Court then discussed the
correct rules of dual sovereignty:
The laws of the United States are laws in the several
States, and just as much binding on the citizens and
courts thereof as the State laws are. The United States
is not a foreign sovereignty as regards the several States,
but is a concurrent, and, within its jurisdiction,
paramount sovereignty. . . [Federal and state law]
together form one system of jurisprudence, which
constitutes the law of the land for the State; and the
courts of the two jurisdictions are not foreign to each
other, nor to be treated by each other as such, but as
354. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
355. Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 35, 14 Stat. 517.




360. Id. at 135-36.
361. Id. at 136.
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courts of the same country, having jurisdiction partly
different and partly concurrent. The disposition to
regard the laws of the United States as emanating from
a foreign jurisdiction is founded on erroneous views of the
nature and relations of the State and Federal
governments.... 62
The Court next affirmed that the state courts have a duty to hear
federal claims when Congress does not make jurisdiction
exclusively federal:
[R]ights, whether legal or equitable, acquired under the
laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in the
United States courts, or in the State courts, competent to
decide rights of the like character and class .... If an
act of Congress gives a penalty to a party aggrieved,
without specifying a remedy for its enforcement, there is
no reason why it should not be enforced, if not provided
otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in
a State court. The fact that a State court derives its
existence and functions from the State laws is no reason
why it should not afford relief; because it is subject also
to the laws of the United States, and is just as much
bound to recognize these as operative within the State as
it is to recognize the State laws....
It is true, the sovereignties are distinct, and neither
can interfere with the proper jurisdiction of the other..
. But this is no reason why the State courts should not
be open for the prosecution of rights growing out of the
laws of the United States, to which their jurisdiction is
competent, and not denied.
36 3
362. Id. at 136-37.
363. Id. Some commentators assert that Ciaflin merely stated Congress may
authorize the state courts to exercise jurisdiction over federal claims, not that Congress can
require this result. See PAUL M. BATOR ET AL., THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM 436 (2d ed. 1973) ("Note that... the Court... [was] concerned with whether the
state courts may take jurisdiction, not with whether they must do so."); PETER W. LOW &
JOHN CALVIN JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS
235 (2d ed. 1989) ("[Tlhe issue of an obligation to hear federal cases was not before the
Court and was not mentioned."). Nonetheless, I do not think the language quoted in the
text sounds like "they can if they want to.' At the very least, Nicole Gordon and Douglas
Gross are correct when they say: "The Court did stress that state courts were just as bound
to recognize federal law as state law, thereby implying a duty to exercise jurisdiction."
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Although Claflin involved enforcement of a civil claim arising
under federal law, the Court also indicated that state courts have
a duty to enforce federal criminal law. As a part of its review of
precedent, the Court referred explicitly to several statutes passed
by early congresses giving the state courts jurisdiction over
federal criminal cases,3"' and then stated:
These instances show the prevalent opinion which
existed, that the State courts were competent to have
jurisdiction in cases arising wholly under the laws of the
United States; and whether they possessed it or not, in
a particular case, was a matter of construction of the acts
relating thereto. It is true that the States courts have, in
certain instances, declined to exercise the jurisdiction
conferred upon them; but this does not militate against
the weight of the general argument. See United States
v. Lathrop, 17 Johns 4. See especially, the able
dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Platt, id. 1 .3
Although the Court is being diplomatic, it clearly implies that
state courts wrongly refused to exercise the criminal arising under
jurisdiction conferred upon them by Congress.35
Several cases brought under the Federal Employer's Liability
Act ("FELA") dispelled any lingering doubts about Congress's
authority to require state courts to enforce civil claims arising
under federal law. In Mondou v. New York, New Haven &
Hartford Railroad,367 the Connecticut Supreme Court of Errors
held that the plaintiff could not bring a FELA suit for personal
injuries as of right in a Connecticut court. The court said that
state policy differed from federal policy, and that it would confuse
Nicole A. Gordon and Douglas Gross, Justiciability of Federal Claims in State Court, 59
NoTRE DAME L. REV. 1145, 1160 n.64 (1984).
364. Claflin, 93 U.S. at 140.
365. Id.
366. Lathrop was a New York case holding that Congress could not authorize the
state courts to hear federal criminal cases. See supra note 197. Justice Platt's "able
dissenting opinion" contended that the state court could hear these cases. United States
v. Lathrop, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) 4, 11-23 (1819).
367. Mondou v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912). Mondou was one of




state courts to apply different standards to cases of the same
general class.3
The United States Supreme Court rejected both arguments.
As to the first, the Court stated:
The suggestion that the act of Congress is not in
harmony with the policy of the State, and therefore that
the courts of the State are free to decline jurisdiction, is
quite inadmissibile, because it presupposes what in legal
contemplation does not exist. When Congress, in the
exertion of the power confided to it by the Constitution,
adopted that act, it spoke for all the people and all the
States, and thereby established a policy for all. That
policy is as much the policy of Connecticut as if the act
had emanated from its own legislature, and should be
respected accordingly in the courts of the State.3 9
As to the second argument, the Court did not believe the state
courts would be confused. Even if they were, this was not a good
excuse: "The existence of the jurisdiction creates an implication of
duty to exercise it, and that its exercise may be onerous does not
militate against that implication."37 Accordingly, the Court
held that FELA claims could be enforced as of right in state court.
71
368. Id. at 55-56.
369. Id. at 57.
370. Id. at 58.
371. Id. at 59. Later FELA cases affirmed Mondou, but with some exceptions and
reservations. For example, in Douglas v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, the
Court upheld the New York courts' dismissal of a FELA suit on grounds similar to forum
non conveniens. Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H. R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929). Speaking for
the Court, Justice Holmes stated:
It may very well be that if the Supreme Court of New York were given no
discretion [to dismiss], being otherwise competent, it would be subject to a
duty. But there is nothing in the Act of Congress that purports to force a duty
upon such Courts as against an otherwise valid excuse.
Id. at 387-88. In McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Railway, the Court compelled
Alabama to hear a FELA claim in circumstances where it would hear the claim if it arose
under the law of a sister state. McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). The
Court said:
While Congress has not attempted to compel states to provide courts for the
enforcement of Federal Employers' Liability Act, the Federal Constitution
prohibits state courts of general jurisdiction from refusing to do so solely
because the suit is brought under a federal law. The denial of jurisdiction by
the Alabama court is based solely upon the source of law sought to be enforced.
The plaintiff is cast out because he is suing to enforce a federal act. A state
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Subsequently, Testa v. Katt explicitly held that the principles
of Claflin and Mondou applied fully to cases arising under federal
criminal law.37 2 Justice Black's opinion for a unanimous court
was extraordinary. It was sweeping, forceful, and laced with brief
but frequent references to the history canvassed in this article.
To the question "Can state courts be required to enforce properly
enacted federal criminal laws?" Justice Black responded with a
resounding "Yes!"
In that case, Testa sued Katt, an automobile dealer, in a
Rhode Island State Court.373 Testa claimed that Katt had
overcharged for a car in violation of the federal Emergency Price
Control Act.374 The Act gave buyers of goods a private right of
action for three times the overcharge plus costs and attorneys'
fees, and stated that the case could be brought "in any court of
competent jurisdiction."375 The Act also gave federal and state
courts concurrent jurisdiction.376 Although Testa won a partial
judgment in the lower courts, the Rhode Island Supreme Court
ruled for Katt.3" It reasoned that the section of the Act
creating the private right of action was "a penal statute in the
international sense" and thus the case could not be brought in the
Rhode Island courts.37
Justice Black assumed for purposes of argument that the
statute was penal.379 Rhode Island had to enforce it nonetheless
because of the Supremacy Clause:
[W]e cannot accept the basic premise on which the Rhode
Island Supreme Court held that it has no more obligation
to enforce a valid penal law of the United States than it
has to enforce a penal law of another state or a foreign
may not discriminate against rights arising under federal laws.
Id. at 233-34 (citation omitted). In Herb v. Pitcairn, the Court allowed an Illinois city court
having only city-wide jurisdiction to dismiss a FELA claim that arose outside city limits.
Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). Finally, in Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield,
the Court affirmed dismissal of a FELA suit on forum non conveniens grounds. Missouri
ex re/. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield. 340 U.S. 1 (1950).
372. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
373. Id, at 388.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 387.
376. 1&
377. Id. at 388.
378. Id
379. Id at 389.
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country. Such a broad assumption flies in the face of the
fact that the States of the Union constitute a nation. It
disregards the purpose and effect of Article VI of the
Constitution .... 3
Justice Black specifically relied upon some of the early federal
statutes giving the state courts jurisdiction over federal crimes
and actions for penalties and forfeitures. 3s' He conceded that
prior to the Civil War, both federal and state courts had
sometimes questioned the power and duty of state courts to
enforce federal penal statutes,382 but he asserted that Claflin
had set matters aright in 1876 "after the fundamental issues over
the extent of federal supremacy had been resolved by the war..
." According to Justice Black, Claflin
repudiated the assumption that federal laws can be
considered by the states as though they were laws
emanating from a foreign sovereign. Its teaching is that
the Constitution and the laws passed pursuant to it are
the supreme laws of the land, binding alike upon states,
courts, and the people, "any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
ation omitted] It asserted that the obligation of states to
enforce these federal laws is not lessened by reason of the
form in which they are cast or the remedy which they
provide.3
Because the Rhode Island courts, being courts of general
jurisdiction, have subject matter jurisdiction to hear these kinds
of claims, Justice Black concluded that "[u]nder these




381. Id. at 390.
382. Id. Justice Black cited, inter alia, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); and United States v.
Lathrop, 17 Johns. (N.Y.) 4 (1819).
383. Id. Unfortunately, Justice Black completely forgot about the Civil War sometime
after writing this opinion. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
384. Id. at 390-91.
385. Id. at 394.
756 [Vol. 19:673
1995] Twins: Criminal & Civil Jurisdiction 757
The Supreme Court has not retreated from the standards of
Claflin, Mondou, and Testa in the years since Testa was
decided. 3' Indeed, it recently reaffirmed these standards in
Howlett v. Rose, holding that the Florida state courts were
required to hear a section 1983 action against a local school
board.387
C. Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction
The federal courts use pendent and ancillary jurisdiction (now
sometimes referred to jointly as "supplemental" jurisdiction) to
expand their subject matter jurisdiction. Under both doctrines,
the federal courts hear claims that standing alone would not be
within their competence. Interestingly, supplemental jurisdiction
developed entirely on the civil side. The federal courts have never
used it in a criminal case. Supplemental jurisdiction developed
comparatively recently.3 8  Two cases established the modern
386. Often Congress does not specifically state whether jurisdiction over particular
claims or crimes is exclusive or concurrent with the state courts. In such instances, the
Court employs opposite presumptions in criminal and civil cases. The Court presumes that
jurisdiction over new federal crimes is exclusively federal unless Congress specifically says
otherwise. Pettibone v. United States, 148 U.S. 197, 209 (1893). The presumption is based
on the general criminal arising under provision that gives the district courts original and
exclusive jurisdiction over "all offenses against the laws of the United States." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3231 (1988). On the civil side, however, jurisdiction is presumed to be concurrent unless
Congress specifically says otherwise, or unless concurrent jurisdiction would seriously
compromise federal interests. As the Court said in Gulf Offshore v. Mobil Oil:
In considering the propriety of state-court jurisdiction over any particular
federal claim, the Court begins with the presumption that state courts enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction. Congress, however, may confine jurisdiction to the
federal courts either explicitly or implicitly. Thus, the presumption of
concurrent jurisdiction can be rebutted by an explicit statutory directive, by
unmistakable implication from legislative history, or by a clear incompatibility
between state-court jurisdiction and federal interests.
Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 478 (1981) (citation omitted). See also,
Tafflin v. Levit, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502,
507-08 (1962); Claflin, 93 U.S. at 136-37.
387. Howettv. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990).
388. Most of the major doctrinal developments occurred in this century. Interestingly,
however, the seminal case is Osborn v. Bank of the United States. Osborn v. Bank of
United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). The defendants argued that the case did not
arise under federal law because several issues of general, or state, law would also arise in
it. Id. at 819. Chief Justice Marshall held that those issues may be decided as incidental
to the federal questions. Id. at 822. Osborn does not, however, authorize federal courts to
hear non-federal causes of action. Moreover, strictly construed, it authorizes decision only
of state issues that must necessarily be determined in order to resolve the federal issues.
John C. Minahan, Jr., Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction of United States Federal District
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doctrine: Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange389 and United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs.3 90
Moore held that a court may exercise ancillary jurisdiction
over a state claim if it is transactionally related to the federal
claim. 91 The New York Cotton Exchange contracted with
Western Union to distribute price quotations.392 When the Odd-
Lot Cotton Exchange applied for the service, Western Union
refused because the New York Cotton Exchange had declined to
give its consent, believing that the Odd-Lot Exchange was
involved in an unlawful "bucket shop" operation.393 Moore, the
president of the Odd-Lot Exchange, sued in federal court, alleging
that the refusal to give Odd-Lot ticker service violated the federal
anti-trust laws.394 The New York Exchange counterclaimed,
alleging that Odd-Lot was stealing quotations and giving them to
its members who were distributing them to bucket shops.395
The lower courts ruled against the plaintiff on the anti-trust
claim, and in favor of the defendants on the counterclaim.3" As
to jurisdiction over the counterclaim, the Supreme Court held that
since the counterclaim arose "out of the transaction which is the
Courts, 10 CREIGHTON L. REV. 279, 289 (1976).
Later diversity cases authorized ancillary jurisdiction over separate claims by non-
diverse parties, first when it seemed necessary, see, e.g., Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 450 (1860); Krippendorf v. Hyde, 110 U.S. 276 (1884), and then when ancillary
jurisdiction provided a convenient way to enforce an earlier judgment. See, e.g., Root v.
Woolworth, 150 U.S. 401 (1893); Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921)
(plaintiff class in a federal class action included unnamed, non-diverse class members by
exercise of ancillary jurisdiction, and the court thus could enjoin those members from
relitigating in state court the questions decided in the federal suit).
For detailed reviews of the development of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction, see
Minahan, supra, and Richard A. Matasar, A Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction Primer:
The Scope and Limits of Supplemental Jurisdiction, 17 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 103, 114-28
(1983); Richard D. Freer, A Principled Approach to Supplemental Jurisdiction, 1987 DUKE
L.J. 34, 39-54.
389. Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
390. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
391. Moore, 270 U.S. at 607-10.
392. Id. at 601.
393. Id. at 601-02. A bucket shop uses price quotations from a legitimate commodities
exchange to make a sham market. It sells futures contracts and settles them for cash, but
with no possibility of delivery of the commodities in question. Conversation with Emily M.
Zeigler, partner and chief commodities counsel of the law firm of Willkie Farr & Gallagher
(July 9, 1993) (notes on file with author).
394. Moore, 270 U.S. at 602-03.
395. Id.
396. Id. at 603.
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subject matter of suit," no independent ground of federal
jurisdiction was necessary.397  The Court gave a classic
definition of transactionally-related claims that is used for
supplemental jurisdiction and for the joinder provisions of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
"Transaction" is a word of flexible meaning. It may
comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not
so much upon the immediateness of their connection as
upon their logical relationship. The refusal to furnish the
quotations is one of the links in the chain which
constitutes the transaction upon which [Odd-Lot] bases
its cause of action. It is an important part of the
transaction constituting the subject-matter of the
counterclaim. It is the one circumstance without which
neither party would have found it necessary to seek
relief. Essential facts alleged by [Odd-Lot] enter into and
constitute in part the cause of action set forth in the
counterclaim. That they are not precisely identical, or
that the counterclaim embraces additional allegations, as,
for example, that [Odd-Lot] is unlawfully getting the
quotations, does not matter....
So close is the connection between the case sought to
be stated in the bill and that set up in the counterclaim,
that it only needs the failure of the former to establish a
foundation for the latter ....
United Mine Workers v. Gibbs announced a test for the
exercise of pendent jurisdiction that is consistent with the
ancillary jurisdiction standards of Moore and its progeny. Gibbs
397. Id. at 609.
398. Id. at 610. Following adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1938,
the courts extended Moore's rationale to permit ancillary jurisdiction over many of the
transactinnally related claims permitted under he Fd ules. , e.g., Bossard v.
McGwinn, 27 F. Supp. 412 (W.D. Pa. 1939); Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959)
(both exercising ancillary jurisdiction over a third-party claim); Revere Copper & Brass,
Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 426 F.2d 709, 715-17 (5th Cir. 1970) (approving ancillary
jurisdiction over claim by a third-party defendant against the plaintiff); Babcock & Wilcox
Co. v. Parsons, 430 F.2d 531 (8th Cir. 1970); Lenz v. Wagner, 240 F.2d 666 (5th Cir. 1957)
(both approving ancillary jurisdiction over claim by person intervening as of right); Scott
v. Fancher, 369 F.2d 842 (5th Cir. 1966) (ancillary jurisdiction exercised over a cross-
claim). See generally, Minahan, supra note 388, at 297-302; Carole E. Goldberg, The
Influence of Procedural Rules on Federal Jurisdiction, 28 STAN. L. REV. 397 (1976).
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filed suit in federal court asserting that the United Mine Workers
violated his rights under a federal labor statute and state tort
law. 99 The Supreme Court held that the lower court correctly
exercised pendent jurisdiction over the state claim.4°° The
Court asserted that judicial power to hear a state claim exists
under Article III whenever there is a claim arising under federal
law "and the relationship between that claim and the state claim
permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court
comprises but one constitutional 'case.'"4"' The action comprises
one case when the state and federal claims "derive from a
common nucleus of operative fact" and "are such that [the
plaintiff] would ordinarily be expected to try them all in one
judicial proceeding ... 4o2 If these conditions are satisfied, a
court must then decide whether to exercise its power to hear the
state claim. The Court identified several factors that should be
assessed: (1) whether exercising jurisdiction over the state claim
will foster judicial economy, convenience, and fairness to the
litigants; (2) whether the federal claim is dismissed before trial;
(3) whether the state claim predominates; (4) whether the state
claim is closely tied to issues of federal policy; and (5) whether the
jury will be confused by considering the two claims together.03
A district court has broad discretion in making the decision since
none of these factors is easily quantifiable.4°
399. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 720.
400. Id. at 729.
401. Id. at 725.
402. Id.
403. Id. at 726-27.
404. Id. at 728. The Court held that Gibbs satisfied the test for pendent jurisdiction.
Id. at 728-29. Because Gibbs's federal and state claims arose from the same incidents in
the Tennessee coal fields, judicial power existed to hear the claims together. Id. at 728.
In addition, the Court found no abuse of discretion by the lower court. Id. at 729. The
Court felt the federal claim was substantial and not brought merely as a ploy to secure
federal jurisdiction, even though it ultimately failed. Id. at 728. The allowable scope of the
state claim involved federal pre-emption. Id. at 729. Although the Court did not say so
directly, it implied that this favored the exercise of pendent jurisdiction because federal
judges might be more solicitous of congressional intent to pre-empt state law than state
judges, or at least more consistent in deciding preemption issues. Id. at 727-28. Finally,
the district court lessened the possibility of jury confusion by using a special verdict form.
Id. at 729.
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Courts often used ancillary jurisdiction to hear state claims
by or against new parties to a lawsuit.40 5  Shortly after Gibbs
was decided, many lower federal courts asserted so-called pendent
party jurisdiction over state claims by or against new parties.'4 6
The Supreme Court, however, soon signaled that it had
reservations about pendent party jurisdiction. In Aldinger v.
Howard, the Court refused to allow a pendent state respondeat
superior claim against a county in a Section 1983 action against
officials of the county.407 In Finley v. United States, the Court
refused to hear pendent state claims against additional
defendants in a suit against the United States under the Federal
Tort Claims Act ("FTCA). 40 8 Jurisdiction over the FTCA claim
was exclusively federal, so all the claims could be brought
together only in federal court.409 Although the Court recognized
that its decision was inefficient and wasteful,410 it nonetheless
refused to hear the state claims.41 1
Aldinger and Finley threatened well-established forms of
ancillary jurisdiction over claims adding parties, such as claims
405. This happened, for example, in cases involving impleader and intervention. See
supra note 398. See also 1 FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE SUBCOMMITrEE
ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP TO THE STATES 546 (1990)
[hereinafter SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT].
406. See, e.g., Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 944 (1972); Hatridge v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 415 F.2d 809 (8th Cir. 1969); Stone v.
Stone, 405 F.2d 94 (4th Cir. 1968); Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Crafton, 405 F.2d 41
(5th Cir. 1968). Some courts, however, rejected pendent party jurisdiction. See, e.g.,
Patrum v. City of Greensburg, 419 F.2d 1300 (6th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 990
(1970); Hymer v. Chai, 407 F.2d 136 (9th Cir. 1969).
407. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). The Court declined to make a broad
pronouncement about pendent party jurisdiction, and instead disposed of the jurisdictional
issue on relatively narrow grounds. Id. at 13. The Court explained that "it [was] quite
unnecessary to formulate any general, all-encompassing jurisdictional rule." Id. However,
it suggested that [o]ther statutory grants and other alignments of parties and claims
might call for a different result." Id. at 18. When Aldinger was decided, counties could not
be sued under section 1983, and the Court concluded that permitting the same result
indirectly by the use of pendent party jurisdiction would undermine congressional intent.
Id. at 16-17.
408. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
409. Id. at 555.
410. Id.
411. The Court stated that "with respect to the addition of parties, as opposed to the
addition of only claims, we will not assume that the full constitutional power has been
congressionally authorized, and will not read jurisdictional statutes broadly." Id. at 549.
And while the FTCA's jurisdictional provisions did not specifically preclude the exercise
of pendent party jurisdiction, the Court did not believe the provisions invited it either. Id.
at 554.
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against third-party defendants or by intervenors.4 12 In Finley,
Justice Scalia appeared to invite Congress to legislate in this
area,413 and Congress accepted the invitation in the Judicial
Improvements Act of 1990.414  Congress specifically authorized
pendent party jurisdiction in federal question cases.415 Thus, a
plaintiff can join a related state claim against a new defendant,
or a new plaintiff can join a state claim to a related federal claim
asserted against the same (or an additional) defendant.416  The
lower federal courts have routinely exercised pendent party
defendant and pendent party plaintiff jurisdiction since 1990.417
Supplemental jurisdiction avoids piecemeal litigation and
helps resolve disputes fairly and efficiently. Although
supplemental jurisdiction could reap similar benefits in criminal
cases, it has never been used on the criminal side. An important
first question is whether this would be constitutional. The case
for an affirmative answer is very strong.
412. Thomas M. Mengler et al., Congress Accepts Supreme Court's Invitation to Codify
Supplemental Jurisdiction, 74 JUDICATURE 213, 213-14 (1991); Wendy Collins Perdue,
Unstringing Pendent Jurisdiction, 76 VA. L. REV. 539,556-66 (1990). For other discussions
of the implications of Finley, see Frank G. Avellone, Revisiting the Past and Rethinking the
Future of Incidental Jurisdiction, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 65 (1990); Thomas M. Mengler, The
Demise of Pendent and Ancillary Jurisdiction, 1990 B.Y.U. L. REV. 247.
413. Finley, 490 U.S. at 556 ("Whatever we say regarding the scope of jurisdiction
conferred by a particular statute can of course be changed by Congress.").
414. Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-650, § 310 (a), 104 Stat. 5089, 5113 (codified
at 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1990)). Section 1367 occasioned much scholarly commentary. The
Emory Law Journal published two symposia on supplemental jurisdiction. See 40 EMORY
L.J. 943-1014 (1991); 41 EMORY L.J. 1-112 (1992). See also, John B. Oakley, Recent
Statutory Changes in the Law of Federal Jurisdiction and Venue: The Judicial
Improvements Acts of 1988 and 1990, 24 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 735 (1991).
415. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) (1990). Indeed, the primary purpose of section 1367 was
to restore the law as it existed before Finley was decided. See SUBCOMMITTEE REPORT,
supra note 405, at 559-61; Mengler et al., supra note 412, at 215; Richard D. Freer,
Compounding Confusion and Hampering Diversity: Life after Finley and the Supplemental
Jurisdiction Statute, 40 EMORY L. J. 445, 473 (1991).
416. Steven H. Steinglass, Pendent Jurisdiction and Sec. 1983 Litigation, in
SIGNIFICANT DEVELOPMENTS IN FEDERAL CIVIL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 527, 531 (ALI-
ABA 1991). Section 1367(b) attempts to codify existing law on pendent and ancillary
jurisdiction in diversity cases, and thus imposes significant restrictions. Id. at 527.
417. See, e.g., Roe v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 800 F. Supp. 620, 622-25 (N.D. Ill.
1992); Leith v. Lufthansa German Airlines, 793 F. Supp. 808, 812 (N.D. Iln. 1992); Rosen
v. Chang, 758 F. Supp. 799, 802-03 (D. R.I. 1991) (all exercising pendent party defendant
jurisdiction); Broussard v. Graham, 798 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. La. 1992); Godfrey v.
Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179, 1183-85 (D. N.H. 1992); McCray v. Holt, 777 F.
Supp. 945, 947-48 (S.D. Fla. 1991); Arnold v. Kimberly Quality Care Nursing Serv., 762
F. Supp. 1182, 1184-87 (M.D. Pa. 1991) (all exercising pendent party plaintiffjurisdiction).
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The supplemental jurisdiction cases on the civil side provide
the basic support. The federal courts have power to exercise
supplemental jurisdiction if the federal and state claims derive
from a common nucleus of operative fact and thus constitute one
constitutional case.418 If a person commits acts that violate both
federal and state criminal laws, the federal and state charges
plainly satisfy the common nucleus test. If related federal and
state civil claims make one constitutional case, it is difficult to see
why the same is not true for related federal and state criminal
charges. If the federal and state criminal charges constitute one
case, then the federal courts should have the power to hear the
state charges.
One might respond that the scope of an Article III case should
be different in civil and criminal actions, and that while a civil
case may contain both federal and state claims, a criminal case
may not. However, this response is at odds with the many
Supreme Court cases holding that the arising under jurisdiction
extends equally to criminal and civil cases.419 As the Supreme
Court stated in Tennessee v. Davis:
[The arising under jurisdiction] embraces alike civil and
criminal cases arising under the Constitution and laws.
Both are equally within the domain of the judicial powers
of the United States, and there is nothing in the grant to
justify an assertion that whatever power may be exerted
over a civil case may not be exerted as fully over a
criminal one.42
Thus, if supplemental jurisdiction is constitutional in civil cases,
it is constitutional in criminal cases.42 1
The criminal removal cases also support this conclusion. In
Tennessee v. Davis, the Supreme Court held that a state criminal
case arises under federal law and can be removed to federal court
418. Gibbs, 383 U.S. at 725; Finley 490 U.S. at 549.
419. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 334-35, 341-42, 349
(1816); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379, 391-92, 405, 423 (1821); Mayor v.
Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 251-52 (1867); Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 264 (1879).
420. Davis, 100 U.S. at 264 (citation omitted).
421. One might also argue that the exercise of supplemental jurisdiction in criminal
cases would violate the maxim that one sovereign will not enforce the penal laws of
another. But the maxim has only limited applicability in our federal system. See supra
notes 223-224, 325, 379-85 and accompanying text.
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if the defendant asserts a federal defense.422 If a federal court
can adjudicate a state criminal charge in these circumstances, it
follows that a court can also adjudicate a state criminal charge
appended to a factually related federal criminal charge.
One might argue that the two situations are distinguishable
because the federal issue appears in a different position. With
removal, the federal issue appears as a defense, while with
supplemental jurisdiction, the federal charge appears in the
original indictment. However, jurisdiction seems at least as
secure in the latter case because the federal issue is even more
centrally involved than in the former case. Using the well-
pleaded complaint rule from the civil side, with supplemental
jurisdiction the federal charge appears on the face of the
prosecutor's well-pleaded indictment, while with removal the
federal issue is first raised by the defendant.
Somewhat more persuasively, one might argue that federal
and state issues are more inextricably linked in a removed case
than in a supplemental jurisdiction case. In a removed case, the
defendant's guilt or innocence often depends on the merits of the
federal defense. Moreover, without removal, the states might
threaten the federal government by forcing federal officials to
defend protracted state criminal proceedings.423  With
supplemental jurisdiction, by contrast, the federal and state
criminal charges are technically separate and can be fully
adjudicated in separate federal and state proceedings. In
addition, federal interests can be fully vindicated in the federal
proceedings.
While these arguments have some force, they do not support
the conclusion that supplemental jurisdiction is unconstitutional
in criminal cases. They merely establish that the case for the
constitutionality of criminal removal jurisdiction is particularly
strong. Gibbs, and the cases making civil and criminal arising
under jurisdiction coextensive, provide very strong support for the
constitutionality of supplemental jurisdiction in criminal cases.
Despite the elegant simplicity of the constitutional arising
under standards, the statutory framework is a complex patchwork
that reflects political compromise and historical accident.
422. Davis, 100 U.S. at 264.
423. Both factors seemed significant to the Supreme Court in upholding the
constitutionality ofthe criminal removal statute in Tennessee v. Davis. See Davis, 100 U.S.
at 262-63, and discussion supra at notes 320, 323 and accompanying text.
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Congress has almost unbounded discretion in assigning arising
under cases to the federal and state courts.42 The current
jurisdictional assignments are not anchored in constitutional
cement, no matter how used to them we have become. The
balance can be changed, as it has been in the past. Part V
suggests some modifications.
V. PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE ARISING UNDER JURISDICTION
Congress and the courts have the power to make the civil and
criminal arising under jurisdiction more similar. The rules of
exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction for the two branches are
very different. The general original civil jurisdiction has been
concurrent with the state courts since 1875. In addition, the
federal courts regularly exercise supplemental jurisdiction over
state claims. Consequently, in most civil cases litigants can bring
related federal and state claims together in either federal or state
court. The general original criminal jurisdiction, by contrast, has
been exclusively federal since 1874. In addition, the federal
courts do not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state
criminal charges. Consequently, prosecutors cannot bring related
federal and state criminal charges together in either system.
Instead, each system hears only its own. I propose changing the
424. One might argue that it is simply too late for Congress or the courts to make
major changes in the jurisdiction rules. Long and persistent usage have modified the
meaning of the Constitution, notwithstanding the intent of the framers or early
interpretations of the scope of Article III. The general original civil arising under
jurisdiction has been concurrent with the state courts since 1875; the criminal counterpart
has been exclusive of the states since 1874. See supra notes 300-01,304 and accompanying
text. And the federal courts have never exercised supplemental jurisdiction in a criminal
case.
While this sort of argument might have some force in construing other parts of the
Constitution, courts are not likely to accept it in construing Article III. Throughout our
history, the basic framework of federal jurisdiction has remained the same. The
Madisonian Compromise, see supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text, underlies that
framework. The Supreme Court has been conifortable construing Article iii very broadly
because the federal courts can exercise only the portion of Article III power that is
conferred on them by Congress. This arrangement has allowed Congress flexibility in
altering jurisdictional rules to meet current needs. As the Supreme Court said in 1966,
"We may assume that Congress has constitutional power to provide that all federal issues
be tried in the federal courts, that all be tried in the courts of the states, or that
jurisdiction of such issues be shared." City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833
(1966). Thus, just because some of the jurisdictional rules have not been changed for a
long time, or because some parts of the jurisdiction have never been used, does not mean
that Congress cannot change the rules or confer unused parts of the jurisdiction.
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exclusivity rules on the criminal side to make the original
criminal arising under jurisdiction more like the civil.
Specifically, I propose that Congress make jurisdiction over some
federal crimes concurrent with the state courts4' and that
Congress, or the federal courts themselves, authorize
supplemental jurisdiction over state criminal charges.
These changes would make the American criminal justice
system more efficient and more just. The present exclusivity
rules cause inefficiency and exacerbate federal-state tensions.
Duplicative, piecemeal litigation obviously is inefficient. Federal
and state prosecutors lack real incentive to cooperate because
each must eventually try their own charges alone. In addition,
the exclusivity rules are at least partly responsible for the
increasing federalization of American criminal law. Because
federal and state charges cannot be combined, Congress has felt
compelled to incorporate state crimes into federal statutes so that
federal prosecutors can fully prosecute the wrongdoing arising
from a criminal transaction. While changing the exclusivity rules
is hardly a panacea for all of these problems, it would help
ameliorate them. If all the charges from a criminal incident could
be brought together in either state or federal court, duplicative
and piecemeal litigation would be reduced. This change would
encourage cooperation between federal and state prosecutors, and
Congress would feel less pressure to create so many new federal
crimes.
Finally, I suggest two additional changes to enhance the
protection for defendants and to give prosecutors an extra
incentive to bring all charges together in one federal or state
proceeding. First, abandon the dual sovereignty rule, which
currently allows successive federal and state prosecutions for the
same misconduct, in cases where all charges could be brought
together in either state or federal court. Second, adopt the "same
transaction or occurrence" standard from the civil side to define
a criminal "offense" for double jeopardy purposes. If these
changes were made, prosecutors would be required to bring all
425. As this article was going to press, a committee of the Judicial Conference
recommended that Congress authorize concurrent jurisdiction over some federal crimes.
See COMMITTEE ON LONG RANGE PLANNING, JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES,
PROPOSED LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FEDERAL COURTS 22-23 (Draft 1994) [hereinafter
LONG RANGE PLANNING REPORT].
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charges that they wished to bring against a defendant together in
one proceeding.
A. The Case for Change
Historically, the states administered the criminal law.
4 26
Congress enacted criminal statutes only to protect clear federal
interests.42 v  In the late 1800's, however, Congress began
criminalizing wrongdoing that did not directly injure the federal
government.428  Congress enacted these laws under the
commerce, taxing, and postal powers, and the Necessary and
Proper Clause.42 Congress continued the practice in the early
426. William Van Alstyne, Dual Sovereignty, Federalism and National Criminal Law:
Modernist Constitutional Doctrine and the Nonrole of the Supreme Court, 26 AM. CRIM. L.
REV. 1737, 1742 (1989); Richard S. Frase, The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges:
A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47 U. CHI. L. REv. 246, 284 (1980). The
states still have this responsibility. See Arizona v. Maypenny, 451 U.S. 232, 243 (1981) (It
"goes without saying that preventing and dealing with crime is much more the business
of the States than it is of the Federal Government.") (quoting Patterson v. New York, 432
U.S. 197, 201 (1977)). Justice Stewart once suggested that 't]he definition and
prosecution of local, intrastate crime are reserved to the States under the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments." Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 158 (1971) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
427. Louis B. Schwartz, Federal Criminal Jurisdiction and Prosecutors' Discretion, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBs. 64, 64-65 (1948). The first federal criminal statute, enacted in
1790, criminalized actions that improperly interfered with federal functions and
misconduct committed on federal property or on the high seas. Act of April 30, 1790, ch.
9, 1 Stat. 112. See supra notes 103-05 and accompanying text. An 1804 Act created
additional punishments for piracy on the high seas and for violating federal revenue laws.
Act of March 26, 1804, ch. 40, 2 Stat. 290. The 1825 Crime Bill addressed several matters
of federal concern, including crimes on the high seas or in coastal areas within federal
maritime jurisdiction, crimes by federal officials, and forgery of United States coins or
commercial paper. Act of March 3, 1825, ch. 65, 4 Stat. 115.
428. Schwartz, supra note 427, at 65. The Post Office Act of 1872 is commonly cited
as one of the first such statutes. See, e.g., id.; NORMAN ABRAMS & SARA S. BEALE, FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAw AND ITs ENFORCEMENT 43-44 (2d ed. 1993); James L. Buckley, Introduction
to Van Alstyne, supra note 426, at 1738. The Post Office Act criminalized the use of the
mails to commit fraud, disseminate obscene materials, and conduct lotteries. See Act of
June 8, 1872, ch. 335, §§ 145-149, 302, 17 Stat 283, 301, 302, 323.
429. ABR-AMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 16; WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT,
CRIMINAL LAw 123 (1986). As Justice Field explained in United States v. Fox:
There is no doubt of the competency of Congress to provide, by suitable
penalties, for the enforcement of all legislation necessary or proper to the
execution of powers with which it is intrusted .... Any act committed with
a view to evading the legislation of Congress passed in the execution of any of
its powers ... may properly be made an offence against the United States.
But an act committed within a State ... cannot be made an offence against the
United States, unless it have some relation to the execution of a power of
Congress, or to some matter within the jurisdiction of the United States. An
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years of this century,43° and it has accelerated the pace in recent
years.431 Proponents justify the expansion of federal criminal
law on the grounds that state and local officials need federal
help,432  and that federal officials can more conveniently
investigate and prosecute large-scale criminal activity that
act not having any such relation is one in respect to which the State can alone
legislate.
United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1877). For a review of the cases establishing and
defining Congress's power to enact criminal laws, see ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428,
at 16-43.
430. See, e.g., Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 395, 36 Stat. 825 (current version at 18 U.S.C.
§§ 2421-2424 (1988)) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of women for immoral
purposes); Act of January 17, 1914, ch. 9, 38 Stat. 275 (criminalizing the importation of
opium); Act of Oct. 29, 1919, ch. 89, 41 Stat. 324 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2311-2313
(1988)) (prohibiting the interstate transportation of stolen motor vehicles). In the 1930's,
Congress added many new criminal statutes. See, e.g., Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, 48
Stat. 979 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988)) (protecting trade against
racketeering); Act of May 18, 1934, ch. 304, 48 Stat. 783 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§
2113 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1994)) (criminalizing bank robbery); Act of May 18, 1934, ch.
302, 48 Stat. 782 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1073 (1988)) (making it unlawful to travel
interstate to avoid prosecution). As early as 1925, Charles Warren complained of "[t]he
present congested condition of the dockets of the federal courts and the small prospect of
any relief to the heavily burdened federal judiciary, so long as Congress continues, every
year, to expand the scope of the body of federal crimes." Warren, supra note 78, at 545.
431. Daniel A. Braun, Praying to False Sovereigns: The Rule of Successive Prosecutions
in an Age of Cooperative Federalism, 20 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1, 5 (1992). See, e.g., Act of Sept.
14, 1959, Pub. L. No. 86-257, 73 Stat. 519, 535-36 (current version at 29 U.S.C. § 501
(1988)) (making embezzlement of labor union funds a crime); Act of September 13, 1961,
Pub. L. No. 87-228, 75 Stat. 498 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988)) (criminalizing
travel in interstate commerce with intent to carry on unlawful activity or commit a crime
of violence in furtherance of such activity); Act of Mar. 20, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-420, 76
Stat. 35, 41-42 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 664 (1988)) (prohibiting embezzlement from
employee benefit plans); Act of June 19, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-351, 82 Stat. 197, 226-35
(current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-928 (1988 & Supp.V. 1994)) (regulating the interstate
transportation of illegal firearms); Act of April 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 73,
75-77 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2102 (1988)) (making it a crime to travel across
a state line for the purpose of inciting a riot); Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84
Stat. 922, 941-48 (current version at 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961 et seq. (1988 & Supp. V 1994))
(criminalizing racketeering and corrupt practices); Act of October 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
452, 84 Stat. 922, 937-38 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988)) (criminalizing
gambling); Act of Nov. 2, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-575, 92 Stat. 2463 (current version at 18
U.S.C. §§ 2341-2346 (1988) (criminalizing interstate traffic in contraband cigarettes).
432. John L. McClellan, Codification, Reform, and Revision: 12he Challenge of a
Modern Federal Criminal Code, 1971 DUKE L.J. 663, 680-82; Note, Double Prosecution by
State and Federal Governments: Another Exercise in Federalism, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1538,
1550 (1967).
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spreads interstate. 33  The result, however, is that the federal
government regularly criminalizes conduct that was traditionally
prosecuted at the state and local levels. 4  Because federal
criminal law rarely preempts state law,435 America has two
overlapping systems of criminal justice.436
The jurisdictional exclusivity rules exacerbate the
inefficiencies, inequities, and federal-state tensions inherent in
this system. The exclusivity rules make it more difficult for
federal and state courts to balance their workloads or to assist
each other in disposing of cases. In recent years, for example, the
federal courts have been inundated with drug prosecutions.437
Because jurisdiction over federal drug charges is exclusively
federal, none of these charges can be diverted to state court to
help relieve the pressure."8
433. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 44; LONG RANGE PLANNING REPORT, supra
note 426, at 21 ("(S]ignificant interstate activity by actors engaged in a massive enterprise,
such as a multistate drug operation or a multistate fraud scheme, should normally call for
the resources and reach of the federal government.").
434. WILLIAM W. SCHWARZER & RUSSELL R. WHEELER, ON THE FEDERALIZATION OF
THE ADMINISTRATION OF CIVIL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 1-3 (1994); ABRAMS & BEALE, supra
note 428, at 44-45; Buckley, supra note 428 at 1738; Braun, supra note 431, at 5.
435. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 778-81. But see Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956). The general rule is that the federal and state governments may
criminalize the same wrongdoing as violating their separate sovereignties. Louis B.
Schwartz, Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws: Issues, Tactics, and Prospects, 41 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 17 (1977).
436. Schwartz, supra note 435, at 17, 18; Frase, supra note 426, at 284; Buckley,
supra note 428, at 1738.
437. Between 1980 and 1990, the number of new federal criminal filings rose from
28,932 to 48,904, an increase of well over 50%. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 10 (1990). Drug cases rose from 3,245 to 12,810
during the same period, an increase of several hundred percent. Id; see also,
SUBCOMMITEE REPORT, supra note 405, at 34-45. In addition, federal criminal cases,
including drug cases, have become even more complex, thus using even more resources.
The Committee on Long Range Planning reports that the number of multi-defendant cases
has grown by 70% since 1980, and the number of multi-defendant drug cases has grown
30% in the last four years. LONG RANGE PLANNING REPORT, supra note 425, at 8. Criminal
jury trials last longer as well. Id.
438. In 1990, the Federal Courts Study Committee strongly urged federal prosecutors
to bring fewer drug cases and to refer more cases to state and local authorities for
prosecution under state law. REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMMITTEE, PART
1, at 35-37 (1990), reprinted in ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 291-93. But there is
no indication that they have heeded the call. See Stanley Marcus, Erosion of Public
Confidence in Criminal Justice System Is Source of Increased Federalization of Crime,
STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER 2 (Dec. 1993) (criticizing the growing volume of federal
drug prosecutions since 1990). Apparently, as many as 50 or 60 senior federal judges
refuse to hear drug cases. Joseph B. Treaster, 2 Judges Decline Drug Cases, Protesting
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The exclusivity rules, along with current double jeopardy law,
also encourage multiple prosecutions. The Double Jeopardy
Clause of the Fifth Amendment does not prohibit federal and
state prosecutions for the same misconduct.43  Successive
prosecutions commonly occur."' This duplication of effort and
expense obviously is wasteful. And a second prosecution certainly
Sentencing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 1993, at 1, col. 1. Some district judges dismiss
federal drug charges in favor of state prosecutions, but appeals courts have reversed,
relying on the maxim that the prosecutor has complete discretion in deciding whether to
prosecute. See, e.g., United States v. Ucciferri, 960 F.2d 953 (11th Cir. 1992); United States
v. Mann, 517 F.2d 259 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1087 (1976).
439. Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959). Suggested changes in the double jeopardy rules are discussed in part V.B infra.
440. See, e.g., Bartkus, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (defendant was tried and acquitted of bank
robbery in federal court and then tried and convicted of the same robbery in state court);
Abbate, 359 U.S. 187 (1959) (defendants were convicted in state court of conspiring to
destroy property and then convicted in federal court for the same acts); United States v.
Frumento, 563 F.2d 1083 (3d Cir. 1977) (defendants were tried and acquitted in state court
on charges of bribery and conspiracy to avoid payment of the Pennsylvania cigarette tax
and subsequently convicted in federal court of criminal charges based on the same
activity); Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d 840 (8th Cir. 1977) (per curiam) (defendant was tried
and acquitted of bank robbery in federal court and then convicted in state court for the
same robbery); United States v. Cordova, 537 F.2d 1073, 1075 (9th Cir. 1976) (per curiam),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 960 (1976); United States v. James, 532 F.2d 1161, 1164-65 (7th Cir.
1976); United States v. Jackson, 470 F.2d 684, 689 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied 412 U.S.
951 (1973); Ferina v. United States, 340 F.2d 837, 839 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 902
(1965); People v. Adamchesky, 184 Misc. 769, 55 N.Y.S.2d 90 (1945) (defendant convicted
in federal court of illegal transportation of stolen cigarettes in interstate commerce and
subsequently convicted of grand larceny in state court); People v. Candelaria, 315 P.2d 386
(Cal. 1957) (defendant convicted first for bank robbery under federal law and then for
burglary in state court incident).
Many states have constitutional or statutory provisions prohibiting prosecution when
another jurisdiction has already prosecuted a person for the same crime. For a listing of
these provisions, see Brown, supra note 431, at 5 n.15; Michael A. Dawson, Popular
Sovereignty, Double Jeopardy, and the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, 102 YALE L.J. 281, 294
n.94 (1992); James E. King, Note, The Problem of Double Jeopardy in Successive Federal-
State Prosecutions: A Fifth Amendment Solution, 31 STAN. L. REV. 477, 494 n.94 (1979).
Commentators report, however, that these provisions are either little used or interpreted
so restrictively that they do not effectively bar a second prosecution. See Dawson, supra,
at 294, and Harlan R. Harrison, Federalism and Double Jeopardy: A Study in the
Frustration of Human Rights, 17 U. MIAMI L. REV. 306, 342-44 (1963). Shortly after the
decisions in Abbate and Bartkus, the Attorney General adopted a policy known as the
Petite Policy that directs federal prosecutors not to initiate a federal prosecution after a
person has been prosecuted in state court for substantially the same act of acts unless
there is a compelling federal interest in proceeding. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at
756-57. Again, however, observers have concluded that the policy is haphazardly and
inconsistently administered, and that many prosecutions are undertaken in apparent
disregard of the policy. See Joseph S. Allerhand, Note, The Petite Policy: An Example of
Enlightened Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 GEO. L. J. 1137, 1138, 1143-45 (1978); ABRAMS &
BEALE, supra note 428, at 757-76; King, supra, at 491-93.
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feels like double jeopardy to a defendant who is subjected to two
trials and two possible punishments for the same wrongdoing." 1
The jurisdictional exclusivity rules also make it more difficult
for federal and state law enforcement officials to coordinate their
crime-fighting efforts. While federal and state investigators
sometimes collaborate, 42 federal and state prosecutors often do
not." Federal and state prosecutors have little incentive to
build a case together because they cannot prosecute it together.
Eventually, either the state or federal prosecutor (or both) must
go forward alone in her own court pressing only her own charges.
Moreover, in notorious cases federal and state prosecutors
sometimes end up competing for the media attention and the
credit." Thus, the exclusivity rules encourage competitive
rather than cooperative federalism.
441. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 155 (Black, J., dissenting). As Justice Black stated:
The Court apparently takes the position that a second trial for the same act is
somehow less offensive if one of the trials is conducted by the Federal
Government and the other by a State. Looked at from the standpoint of the
individual who is being prosecuted, this notion is too subtle for me to grasp.
If double punishment is what is feared, it hurts no less for two 'Sovereigns' to
inflict it than for one.
Id; see also Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187 (1957) (successive prosecutions
subject a defendant "to embarassment, expense, and ordeal and (compel] him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity. ").
442. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 724; Dawson, supra note 440, at 296-99;
Braun, supra note 431, at 7-8.
443. Frase, supra note 426, at 256-89; ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 103-04;
King, supra note 440, at 497. United States v. Burt provides a classic example of lack of
coordination between state and federal authorities. United States v. Burt, 619 F.2d 831
(9th Cir. 1980). In Burt, state officials discovered a large-scale drug operation, and they
filed state charges in two state courts. Id. at 833. Subsequently, the narcotics agent in
charge of the state investigation met with federal drug agents and prosecutors to discuss
possible federal prosecution. Id. State officials decided to defer based on assurances by
federal prosecutors that they could move more quickly and devote more resources to the
case than could state prosecutors, and that federal penalties were greater. Id. at 833-34.
Unfortunately, however, no one conferred with the state prosecutor who was pursuing the
second of the state cases. Id. at 834. Subsequently, the court in that case granted a motion
to suppress some evidence. Id. In addition, since the defendants also were not told about
the decision to defer to federal prosecution, they filed suppressiOn motionz in the first case.
Id. The prosecutor in that proceeding then moved to have the complaint dismissed because
the "prosecution was unable to proceed." Id. When the defendants were subsequently
indicted on even more serious federal charges, they filed a motion to dismiss that made a
colorable claim of vindictive prosecution. Id. This motion set off a flurry of appeals to the
Ninth Circuit on the eve of trial. Id. at 834-35.
444. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 724. In more routine cases, by contrast,
sometimes neither the federal nor the state prosecutor wants to proceed, or each leaves a
case for the other and it falls through the cracks. Id. at 710-11; Frase, supra note 426, at
272-75, 279.
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The jurisdictional exclusivity rules also give prosecutors
opportunities for abuse. Prosecutors can harass a defendant with
successive state and federal prosecutions, or treat the first case as
a dry run."5  Prosecutors can also pick the jurisdiction which
provides the greater legal advantage in offense definition,
evidence admissibility, or severity of penalties."' Finally, the
exclusivity rules are at least partially responsible for Congress's
growing practice of incorporating state crimes into federal
statutes."7  This practice is extremely controversial. Critics
charge that it invades the province of the states,448 involves the
federal government in crimes of scant federal concern, " 9 and
overburdens the federal courts.45 The United States does not
445. Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,447 (1970); Van Alstyne, supra note 426, at 1747;
King, supra note 440, at 480; Levenson, supra note 18, at 530-32 (explaining how federal
prosecutors learned from the state trial of the police officers charged with beating Rodney
King). Cf Edwards v. Oklahoma, 815 P.2d 670, 673 (Ct. Crim. App. 1991) ("We are deeply
concerned with the number of cases which come before us in which the appellant has been
charged with the wrong crime.... [T]his Court will not grant ... the State carte blanche
to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense .. .
446. ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 725-27.
447. The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. §§
1961-68 (1988 & Supp. V 1994), provides a good example of this practice. The Act defines
racketeering activity as, inter alia, "any act or threat involving murder, kidnapping,
gambling, arson, robbery, bribery, extortion, dealing in obscene matter, or dealing in
narcotic or other dangerous drugs, which is chargeable under State law and punishable by
imprisonment for more than one year. .. ." Id. § 1961. The Act makes it unlawful for a
person associated with an enterprise, whose activities affect interstate commerce, to
participate in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering
activity. Thus, if a person commits murder, kidnapping, or one of the other acts defined
as racketeering activity, and in the process affects interstate commerce, he can be punished
under the statute. Id. § 1962(c).
448. Buckley, supra note 428, at 1738; ABRAMS & BEALE, supra note 428, at 44;
Schwartz, supra note 427, at 70; Marcus, supra note 438, at 2.
449. NORMAN ABRAMS, FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ENFORCEMENT 117 (1986);
United States v. Cortner, 834 F. Supp. 242, 244 (M.D. Tenn. 1993) rev'd sub nom 30 F.3d
135 (1994) (lamenting that the federalization of state criminal law is distorting "(tihe
historically unique and discrete jurisdiction of the Federal Courts"). Professor Frase, in
his study of federal prosecutorial discretion, found that federal prosecutors did not
concentrate primarily on cases involving a direct injury to federal interests, but instead
gave as much or more attention to cases prosecutable at the state or local level. Frase,
supra note 426, at 285.
450. Maryanne Trump Barry, Don't Make a Federal Case of It, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11,
1994, at A31; Justice Sandra D. O'Connor, Address at the U.S. Ninth Circuit Conference,
in STATE-FEDERAL JUDICIAL OBSERVER, Dec. 1993, at 2.
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have a comprehensive national criminal code. 4 ' Instead,
federal criminal law has grown piecemeal over the years, as
Congress responds to political pressure to address a particular
crime problem.4 "2 As a result, federal criminal statutes often
are frustratingly incomplete, and criminalize only a portion of the
wrongdoing involved in a criminal incident.4 3 Congress in turn
has broadened federal criminal statutes to include state law
crimes, such as murder or extortion, so that federal prosecutors
may undertake more complete prosecutions.4 4
451. Schwartz, supra note 435, at 15; Reform of the Federal Criminal Laws, Hearings
Before the Subcomm. on Crim. Law and Proc. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. pt. 1, 11 (1971) (memorandum from Malcolm Hawk) [hereinafter 1971
Hearings]; Note, Piggyback Jurisdiction in the Proposed Federal Criminal Code, 81 YALE
L.J. 1209, 1210 (1972) ("Unlike the states, the federal government does not have plenary
criminal jurisdiction. Rather, it is limited to regulating criminal behavior that is in some
way related to one of the constitutionally delegated federal powers.").
452. 1971 Hearings, supra note 451, at 16 (Statement of Attorney General John N.
Mitchell); Id. at 102 (Testimony of Richard H. Poff); Robert Drinan et al., The Federal
Criminal Code: The Houses are Divided, 18 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 509, 509 (1981). As one
federal judge recently complained, "[tihe Congress has had a recent penchant for passing
a federal criminal statute on any well-publicized criminal activity." Cortner, 834 F. Supp.
at 244.
453. Edmund G. Brown & Louis B. Schwartz, New Federal Criminal Code is
Submitted, 56 A.B.A. J. 844, 847 (1970) (complaining that a person could be prosecuted
federally for impersonating a federal official but not for a kidnapping perpetrated by that
means, and that a person could be prosecuted federally for retaliating against a federal
juror but that only the state could prosecute if the juror was murdered); Drinan et al.,
supra note 452, at 514 ("Current law provides for the exercise of jurisdiction over the
robbery of a local gas station where the robbery affects interstate or foreign commerce.
Under current law, however, there would be no federal jurisdiction over a murder that
occurred during the robbery."); 1971 Hearings, supra note 451, at 11 (Memorandum from
Malcolm Hawk); John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion-A Comment, 60 Nw. U. L.
REV. 174, 188 (1965) (noting that federal law is "not nearly as well supplied as local law
with lesser included offenses of varying degrees of seriousness, to which a guilty plea might
be negotiated").
454. Attempts to incorporate state crimes into federal law reached their zenith in the
Proposed Federal Criminal Code submitted to Congress in 1971. The text of the Code is
set forth in NATIONAL COMM'N ON REFORM OF FED. CRIMINAL LAWS, FINAL REPORT (1971)
[hereinafter FINAL REPORT]. The Code made a laudable attempt to give standard
definitions to the many crimes against the person and against -p-pey scattered
throughout existing law. See id. at 326-93. Section 201 (b) of the Code provided for so-
called "piggyback" jurisdiction, whereby these offenses could be piggybacked onto other
Code offenses. Thus, for example, ifa federal prisoner was attempting to escape and killed
a person in the course of that attempt, § 201 (b) would allow prosecution for the murder
as well as the escape. Piggyback jurisdiction was harshly criticized as interfering with
states' rights. See, e.g., Resolution by National Association of Attorneys General, FINAL
REPORT at 6-7; George W. Liebmann, Chartering a National Police Force, 56 A.B.A. J. 1070,
1071, 1073-74 (1970); Drinan et al., supra note 452, at 515-16, and was not approved by
Congress. Id. at 515.
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The changes I suggest in the jurisdictional exclusivity rules
would help make the American criminal justice system more
efficient and would lessen federal-state tensions. The courts could
better balance their work loads and help each other dispose of
cases if all charges arising from one incident could be brought
together in either federal or state court. For example, if
jurisdiction over federal drug charges was concurrent with the
state courts, federal prosecutors could file a portion of the drug
cases there, thus helping to solve the federal court caseload
crisis.455 State criminal justice systems could absorb the new
cases relatively easily, because those systems are vastly larger
than the federal system.45 Similarly, if the federal judges in a
particular district had relatively few cases and state judges were
overburdened, the federal judges might help by exercising
supplemental jurisdiction over state charges in cases requiring a
lengthy trial. In addition, duplicative proceedings could be almost
entirely eliminated if all charges arising from an incident could be
brought together. This obviously would be more efficient, and it
would save defendants trauma and expense.
If federal and state prosecutors could build and prosecute
important cases together, they would have more opportunity and
incentive to cooperate and they would be less likely to work at
cross-purposes. Assume, for example, that a defendant smuggled
illegal drugs into a state in violation of both federal and state
drug laws. Federal and state prosecutors would have enormous
flexibility. Prosecutors could file federal charges, state charges,
Piggyback jurisdiction is conceptually very different than supplemental jurisdiction.
Under the piggyback proposal, state crimes were literally federalized; they were
incorporated into and became a part of federal law. With supplemental jurisdiction, by
contrast, state crimes remain state crimes. Their meaning and content are defined and
controlled by the states.
455. Federal prosecutors might not cooperate, preferring to remain in more
comfortable and familiar surroundings. See Schwartz, supra note 427, at 86 (suggesting
that federal prosecutors would not want to prosecute federal offenses in state court). If
this happened, the federal courts might abstain in some cases, thus forcing federal
prosecutors into state court. Under the current exclusivity rules, federal charges cannot
be brought in state court if a federal court refuses to hear them. This may partly explain
why federal appeals courts have prohibited dismissal of federal criminal cases in favor of
prosecution on state charges. See supra note 438. The federal courts might consider
changing this policy if federal charges would not be lost but could be brought in state court,
either alone or together with state charges.
456. New federal drug cases numbered 12,810 in 1990, see supra note 437, while
reports from 35 states indicate that over one million felony cases were filed that year.
ABRAMS AND BEALE, supra note 428, at 12-13.
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or some combination of the two, in either state or federal court.
They could prosecute the charges jointly, or make a reasoned
decision that one or the other would prosecute.457
Prosecutors might, of course, decide not to use the new
jurisdictional rules, and one or the other might pursue only their
own charges in their own court.458 In many instances, however,
some combination of charges would be appropriate because federal
or state law might provide a better fit. Since state criminal law
is more complete than federal law, prosecutors might use state
law contemporaneously to charge all related crimes and lesser
included offenses.459
Federal prosecutors could appear in state court without any
additional authorization by Congress," although the states
might have to give permission for the federal prosecutor also to
prosecute the related state charges.46' Congress probably would
have to authorize state officials to prosecute federal crimes in
state court.4 62
Using supplemental jurisdiction, federal prosecutors could
prosecute state charges in federal court that were related to an
underlying federal offense, or federal and state prosecutors could
457. Prosecutors would also have to satisfy federal or state joinder rules. But these
rules are quite liberal, and generally allow joinder of all crimes arising from a criminal
transaction. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(a) (allowing joinder of offenses if they are "of the
same or similar character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more
acts or transactions connected together or constituting parts of a common scheme or plan").
458. Under my proposals, however, double jeopardy (or claim preclusion) would
prohibit prosecution for any additional charges in either federal or state court arising out
of the same criminal incident. See infra note 483 and accompanying text. This result is
not unfair. Presently, most cases that might be prosecuted in both systems are in fact
prosecuted in only one. In addition, prosecutors could avoid claim preclusion by
cooperating and filing all charges together in one proceeding.
459. See supra notes 451-54, and accompanying text.
460. 28 U.S.C. § 517 (1988) permits the Attorney General to send any officer of the
Department of Justice to "attend to the interests of the United States in a suit pending.
. in a court of a State .... " In addition, recall that early Congresses routinely authorized
federal prosecutors to appear in state conirt to enforce federa! crminal laws. See supra
notes 189-90 and accompanying text.
461. Federal law currently authorizes a federal prosecutor to receive, a special
temporary appointment as a state prosecutor to pursue a case in state court. 5 U.S.C. §§
3371-3373 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
462. 28 U.S.C. § 516 (1988) provides that "[e]xcept as otherwise authorized by law, the
conduct of litigation in which the United States... is interested... is reserved to officers
of the Department ofJustice.. . ."(emphasis added). Presumably, Congress can authorize
state officials to prosecute federal criminal charges in state court either alone or together
with a federal prosecutor.
Vermont Law Review
both pursue the state charges in federal court.4  Prosecutors
would probably use supplemental jurisdiction in one of three
ways. The first is simple pendent claim jurisdiction as in United
Mine Workers v. Gibbs.4 4 A federal prosecutor might bring a
federal criminal charge against a defendant and append a related
state charge. The second is pendent party defendant jurisdiction
as in Aldinger v. Howard4' and Finley v. United States. 466 A
federal prosecutor might bring a federal criminal charge against
one defendant and add a related state criminal charge against an
additional defendant. The third is the analogue to civil pendent
party plaintiff jurisdiction.467 A state prosecutor might join a
federal criminal case and assert a related state criminal charge,
either against the original defendant or a new defendant.
Courts should consider the same factors that they consider in
civil cases when deciding whether to exercise supplemental
jurisdiction.4  If supplemental jurisdiction will foster judicial
economy, convenience, and fairness, courts should exercise it. If
the opposite is true, they shouldn't. Courts also should consider
the relative seriousness of the federal and state charges. If a
prosecutor brought a minor federal charge and appended a related
state murder charge, the court should probably decline to exercise
jurisdiction over the state charge. If, on the other hand, the
federal and state charges are both serious, or the federal charges
predominate, a court probably should hear the state charges.
Although supplemental jurisdiction plainly provides opportunities
for better federal-state cooperation, it also might cause federal-
state friction if federal prosecutors proceed without the knowledge
and/or permission of state prosecutors. One can imagine the
reaction of a state prosecutor who initiates a case in state court
463. When state criminal cases are removed to federal court, state prosecutors
prosecute. See, e.g., City of Norfolk v. McFarland, 143 F. Supp. 587, 590 (E.D. Va. 1956);
Carter v. Tennessee, 18 F.2d 850, 855 (6th Cir. 1927). In addition, Congress has already
provided that in some instances state prosecutors may receive a special temporary
designation as a federal prosecutor to help bring a case in federal court. See 5 U.S.C. §§
3371-3372, 3374 (1988 & Supp. V 1994).
464. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966). See supra notes 399-404 and
accompanying text.
465. Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976). See supra note 407 and accompanying
text.
466. Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545 (1989). See supra notes 408-11 and
accompanying text.
467. See supra notes 415-417 and accompanying text.
468. See supra note 403 and accompanying text.
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only to find that a federal prosecutor is already pursuing the
charges in a federal forum. Of course, federal prosecutors could
easily avoid this problem by consulting with their state
counterparts before filing state charges in federal court. The
federal court could ensure that consultation takes place by
declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction unless the state
prosecutor either appears and assists in the case, or affirmatively
indicates that he does not object to federal prosecution of the state
charges.
Finally, changing the jurisdictional exclusivity rules might
slow the growing federalization of state criminal law. If federal
courts exercised supplemental jurisdiction over state crimes
relating to a core federal violation, incorporating state crimes into
federal statutes would simply be unnecessary. Congress could
criminalize only the wrongdoing that directly affects federal
interests, and state law would provide any additional charges
necessary for complete prosecution.
It might be argued that supplemental jurisdiction would
interfere with state sovereignty even more than present practices.
Now, only selected state law crimes are incorporated into federal
statutes. Under my proposal, any related state charges could be
heard in federal court, thus opening up entire state criminal codes
for federal enforcement and working a de facto, if not de jure,
federalization of state criminal law.
I have several responses. The present system literally
federalizes state law. Federal law then governs the definition and
content of those crimes, and federal prosecutors can enforce the
statute without any consultation with state authorities. With
supplemental jurisdiction, by contrast, no new federal law would
be created.46 The federal government would merely enforce
state law, rather than creating duplicate federal crimes and
thereafter ignoring state law. In addition, state law presumably
would govern the definition and content of state crimes, and
federal prosecutors would be obliged to consult with state
prosecutors. Moreover, since supplemental jurisdiction is a
doctrine of discretion, a federal court could dismiss state charges
if appropriate. Finally, the federal courts routinely exercise
supplemental jurisdiction over state claims in civil cases, and
469. Indeed, much of the state law presently incorporated into federal statutes could
be removed as unnecessary.
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Congress recently affirmed and expanded the practice.4 71 If
supplemental jurisdiction does not improperly invade state
interests in civil cases, it is difficult to see why it would do so in
criminal cases.47'
I have made a strong case for relaxing the jurisdictional
exclusivity rules and allowing related federal and state criminal
charges to be brought together in either federal or state court. It
seems prudent, however, to examine the traditional criteria for
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction should be
exclusive to see if they support exclusive jurisdiction in criminal
cases. The criteria are (1) whether there is a need for uniformity
in the interpretation and application of the law, (2) whether the
issues are difficult and complex so that expertise is needed among
a small and cohesive group of judges, and (3) whether it is likely
that judges from other courts will be hostile to the objectives of
470. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (Supp. V 1994); see supra notes 414-16 and accompanying
text.
471. On the civil side, the Supreme Court has refused to directly federalize state
claims, but the federal courts have enforced the same claims using supplemental
jurisdiction. In several recent cases, the Court held that 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not encompass claims against state
officials that can be brought as tort claims in state court. The Court reasoned that direct
incorporation of state law would disturb the federal-state balance. It is clear, however,
that the federal courts would hear these claims if they were appended to properly
cognizable federal claims. For example, in Paul v. Davis, the police chief of Louisville,
Kentucky distributed Davis's picture on a flyer, calling him an "active shoplifter,* even
though he had not been convicted of that crime. Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 695r96 (1976).
The Supreme Court held that the police chief deprived Davis of due process. Without a
more concrete injury, such as loss of his job, the complaint simply stated a defamation
claim that must be brought in state court. To hold otherwise, the Court stated, would lead
to a vast federalization of state tort law. Id. at 697-701. If, however, Davis had suffered
an injury cognizable under the Due Process Clause, like loss of his job, he could have
appended the state defamation claim and the Court would have heard it. Id. at 701. Thus,
although the defamation claim cannot be read directly into federal law, it can be heard
under supplemental jurisdiction.
Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984), provides another example. An inmate
alleged that a prison guard entered his cell and gratuitously destroyed property. Id. at 519-
20. He sued for deprivation of the property without due process. Id. at 520. The Court
denied the claim because the state could not provide any meaningful pre-deprivation
process before an employee committed a random, unauthorized act. Id. at 533. The Court
concluded that the inmate alleged only a tort claim actionable in state court. Id. at 534-35.
If we assume, however, that a prison adopted a policy of randomly destroying inmates'
property, inmates could challenge that policy under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
federal courts would entertain any related state tort claims against the prison or against
individual guards for damages. Thus, the same tort-intentional destruction of
property--cannot be heard directly but can be heard indirectly using supplemental
jurisdiction. In sum, exercising supplemental jurisdiction over state tort claims does not
improperly usurp state authority, while directly federalizing such claims does.
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the law.4 72 Upon examination, these criteria do not support the
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal and state courts in criminal
cases.
Uniformity in the interpretation and application of the
criminal law is per se a good thing.4 73  As more judges from
different courts make rulings, the law inevitably becomes less
uniform. It is impossible, however, to achieve complete
uniformity. Even when jurisdiction is exclusive to one court, the
judges of that court often disagree with each other. The real issue
is whether concurrent jurisdiction will be so disruptive that its
costs outweigh the benefits. If concurrent jurisdiction will create
such extreme variations in the interpretation and application of
the law that people will not know what their rights and duties are
or how to order their affairs, then jurisdiction should be exclusive.
Concurrent jurisdiction over criminal cases will not create
this level of uncertainty. There is, as already noted, overlap
between the two systems. Both federal and state judges know the
basic concepts and doctrines of criminal law and procedure.4 74
The criminal law is not new, and a substantial body of precedent
has developed over time. This, coupled with the easy access to
legal research materials, makes it unlikely that federal and state
judges will adopt widely divergent interpretations of each other's
law. Federal judges will be guided by state court interpretation
of state law, as they are in diversity cases.475 State judges will
be guided by federal interpretation of federal law, as they are in
other cases where they must apply federal law.476 In addition,
judges of one system do not have to follow decisions from the
other system that wrongly interpret the first system's law.477
Professor Redish suggests asking whether a body of law is either
detailed and specific or more general and vague, since uniformity
is more difficult to achieve in the latter than in the former
472. Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 464 (1990); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp.,
453 U.S. 473, 483-84 (1981). See also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 55, at 480.
473. See Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 517-18 (1859).
474. Anderson, supra note 3, at 1203 (noting "the increasing overlap of subject matter
being litigated in federal and state courts and the growing uniformity of standards to be
applied in the decision-making process under recent Supreme Court decisions").
475. Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
476. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359, 361 (1952) (holding that
federal law governs the issue of the validity of releases in a Federal Employers' Liability
Act case brought in state court).
477. Tafflin, 493 U.S. at 465.
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instance.478  As law goes, criminal law is relatively clear and
specific. It is almost entirely statutory,4 7 9 and because of the
harsh sanctions involved, it is written with precision so that
people may know exactly what conduct is prohibited. Thus,
modifying the jurisdictional exclusivity rules will not pose a
significant threat to uniformity in the interpretation and
application of criminal law.
Many of these same points are relevant in considering
whether exclusive jurisdiction is necessary to promote judicial
expertise. Both federal and state judges are expert in criminal
law and procedure, and they are competent to adjudicate federal
and state criminal charges.' Criminal law is not like patent
law, admiralty, or bankruptcy, which are technical and discrete.
As Judge Leslie L. Anderson states, "[p]roblems in the handling
of criminal cases are in many ways quite identical in both [the
federal and state] court systems .. .. 4 Moreover, as of
January 1, 1992, thirty-four states and Puerto Rico had adopted
the Federal Rules of Evidence,4 2 thus making federal and state
litigation even more similar. Consequently, exclusive jurisdiction
in criminal cases does not promote any unique expertise.
The third criterion is whether judges from one court system
will be hostile to the objectives of the laws promulgated by
another jurisdiction. Federal judges will not be hostile to state
criminal law; nor will state judges be hostile to federal criminal
law. Judges do not like criminals or piecemeal litigation. They
are likely to embrace changes that make it easier to fight crime
and to dispose of all charges in one case. In sum, the criteria for
determining whether subject matter jurisdiction should be
exclusive do not support exclusive jurisdiction in criminal cases.
478. Martin H. Redish and John E. Muench, Adjudication of Federal Causes of Action
in State Court, 75 MICH. L. REV. 311, 331 (1976).
479. There are no federal common law crimes. See supra notes 125-131 and
accompanying text.
480. The Supreme Court recently held that state courts are fully competent to
adjudicate issues of federal criminal law that arise in civil RICO actions brought in state
court, "particularly since many RICO cases involve asserted violations of state law, such
as state fraud claims, over which state courts presumably have greater expertise." Tafflin,
493 U.S. at 465.
481. Anderson, supra note 3, at 1204.
482. JACK B. WEINSTEIN ET AL., EVIDENCE: RULES, STATUTE AND CASE SUPPLEMENT
iii (1992).
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B. Proposed Changes in the Double Jeopardy Rules
There is much to be gained by changing the exclusivity rules.
But if Congress made the changes I suggest, it is by no means
clear that federal and state prosecutors would rush to embrace
the new system. Federal prosecutors probably would prefer to
remain in the familiar and more comfortable confines of the
federal courthouse rather than entering the rough and tumble
precincts of state criminal justice systems. Federal prosecutors
might add related state charges in some cases, but overworked
local prosecutors probably would not want to appear in federal
court to help press the charges. Thus, merely changing the
jurisdictional exclusivity rules might have little practical impact
unless prosecutors were given some additional incentive to bring
all charges together in one federal or state proceeding.
To provide this incentive, I suggest two changes in the
current double jeopardy rules. First, abandon the dual
sovereignty rule, which currently allows successive prosecutions,
in cases where all charges, state and federal, could be brought
together in either state or federal court. Second, adopt the broad
transactional standards used in civil cases to determine the scope
of an "offense" for double jeopardy purposes. If these changes
were made, claim preclusion rules from the civil side could apply
with -full force to successive federal and state criminal
prosecutions. In short, if both federal and state charges could be
brought from the same criminal transaction, and prosecutors fail
to bring any of those charges in the first proceeding, they would
be precluded from filing them in a second proceeding in either
system.4s3
The Fifth Amendment prohibition against twice being put in
jeopardy for the same offence41 is the criminal counterpart of
civil claim preclusion.4s A former conviction operates much like
483. Exceptions should be made in appropriate circumstances. See infra notes 507-
509, 524 and accompanying text.
484. The exact wording is "nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life or limb;..." U.S. CONST. amend. V. Benton v. Maryland, 395
U.S. 784 (1969), held this guarantee applicable against the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
485. Claim preclusion forbids a second suit asserting the same cause of action, and
binds the parties "'not only as to every matter which was offered and received to sustain
or defeat the claim or demand, but as to any other admissible matter which might have
been offered for that purpose.' Sea-Land Serv. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974)
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merger, a former acquittal much like bar. 6 Currently, there is
very little inter-system preclusion in criminal cases; neither
double jeopardy nor collateral estoppel prohibit successive
prosecutions by federal and state authorities for the same
misconduct." 7 The Supreme Court treats the states and the
United States as separate sovereigns that may enforce their laws
independently.4" The dual sovereignty theory is flawed. 9
Under our theory of government, sovereignty rests in the people,
(quoting Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 352 (1876)).
Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, applies in criminal as well as in civil
proceedings. Ashe v. Swenson. 397 U.S. 436, 445-46 (1970), held that issue preclusion is
.embodied in the Fifth Amendment guarantee against double jeopardy." As a practical
matter, however, issue preclusion plays a very limited role in criminal cases. See infra note
510.
486. Daniel K Mayers & Fletcher L. Yarbrough, Bis Vexari: New Trials and
Successive Prosecutions 74 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 n.10 (1960). Claim preclusion requires a
final judgment on the merits. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352-53. By contrast, jeopardy usually
attaches when the jury is sworn, Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978); Downum v. United
States, 372 U.S. 734 (1963), although courts make many exceptions. For example, jeopardy
does not attach when the defendant agrees to a mistrial, United States v. Dinitz, 424 U.S.
600 (1976), when the jury cannot agree on a verdict, United States v. Perez, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 579 (1824), or when a conviction is reversed on appeal on grounds other than
insufficiency of the evidence. United States v. Ball, 163 U.S. 662 (1895).
487. See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
488. United States v. Lanza sets forth the classic statement of the dual sovereignty
theory:
We have here two sovereignties, deriving power from different sources,
capable of dealing with the same subject-matter within the same territory...
• Each government in determining what shall be an offense against its peace
and dignity is exercising its own sovereignty, not that of the other.
It follows that an act denounced as a crime by both national and state
sovereignties is an offense against the peace and dignity of both and may be
punished by each.
United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). The Supreme Court reaffirmed this rule
in 1959. See Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959) (allowing a state proceeding after a
federal acquittal for the same misconduct); Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187 (1959)
(allowing a federal proceeding after a state conviction for the same wrongdoing). For an
historical review of the cases in this line, see Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 128-36; Harrison, supra
note 440, at 336-42.
Courts often deny defendants any inter-system issue preclusion on the ground that
state and federal prosecutors cannot be bound by factual findings in a proceeding where
they were not a party. See, e.g., State v. Mechtel, 499 N.W.2d 662, 666-67 (Wis. 1993);
People v. Nezaj, 528 N.Y.S.2d 491, 494-95 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1988); Turley v. Wyrick, 554 F.2d
840, 842 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 202 (4th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Hutul, 416 F.2d 607, 626 (7th Cir. 1969).
489. The dual sovereignty theory has been criticized heavily in the literature. See
Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again: Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King, and
the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REV. 609, 618-19 n.32, and sources cited therein.
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not in an artificial governmental entity.4 As a practical
matter, federal and state prosecutors represent the same
people.49' I grant that a federal prosecutor represents all of the
people of the United States while a state prosecutor represents
only a subgroup. Nonetheless, either a federal or a state
prosecution benefits essentially the same people.492  For
example, the people of California are the primary beneficiaries of
either a federal or state prosecution for smuggling drugs into
California. Thus, successive federal and state prosecutions are
not brought on behalf of different parties; in fact, only the lawyers
are different. A party cannot avoid res judicata simply by
changing counsel; the people should not be able to avoid double
jeopardy by changing their representative.
The jurisdictional exclusivity rules may underlie-or at least
reinforce-the dual sovereignty theory. The state and federal
courts generally exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over their
own criminal charges. Although the charges may overlap, they
cannot be brought together. Consequently, without the dual
sovereignty theory, double jeopardy would often completely
preclude one set of charges or the other. On the civil side, courts
do not preclude a second suit on a claim that could not have been
brought in an earlier action because the court lacked subject
490. See Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793) ("Sovereignty is the
right to govern; a nation or State-sovereign is the person or persons in whom that resides.
... [H]ere it rests with the people.... ."); THE FEDERALIST, supra note 62, No. 39, at 241
(James Madison) ([A] republic ... derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the
great body of the people...."); Alexis De Tocqueville, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 55 (Phillips
Bradley ed., 1945) ("[wlhenever the political laws of the United States are to be discussed,
it is with the doctrine of the sovereignty of the people that we must begin").
491. Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 22 (1852) (McLean, J., dissenting) ("It is
true, the criminal laws of the Federal and State Governments emanate from different
sovereignties; but they operate upon the same people, and should have the same end in
view."); Dawson, supra note 440, at 301 ([A] collection of citizens empaneled in a state
courthouse is [not] different in kind from a collection of citizens empaneled across the
street in a federal courthouse.").
492. See Harrison, supra note 440, at 327 ("[T]he states and federal government do
not protect separate societies. The federal government protects the same society as does
the state.... Thus, when an act is committed which violates the laws of two sovereigns,
no offense is committed against the 'peace and dignity of both'; rather the offense has been
committed against one society."). See also, King, supra note 440, at 485-86; Note, 80 HARV.
L. REV., supra note 432, at 1542-43 (1967).
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matter jurisdiction.493 The reason is that it is unfair to punish
a party for failing to do something she cannot do. Although never
articulated by the Supreme Court, this same reasoning helps
explain why the Court clings to the dual sovereignty theory. But,
of course, if the exclusivity rules are changed to allow all charges
to be brought together in one proceeding, this reason for the dual
sovereignty theory disappears.
Even if we consider federal and state prosecutors to be
different parties, developing principles of nonparty preclusion in
civil cases also support inter-system double jeopardy.
494
Traditionally, only parties to an action, or those in strict privity
with them, could be bound.495 Courts reasoned that it is a
denial of due process to bind a person who has not had a day in
court.4' Nonetheless, courts have begun to loosen these
rules497 and bind nonparties when the relationship between the
party and the nonparty is sufficiently close to make preclusion
fair.498 Courts are most willing to bind nonparties when two
493. JOHN J. COUND ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE 1298 (6th ed. 1993) ("[Virtually every
state follows the 'prior jurisdictional competency' rule, which prohibits preclusion of a claim
beyond the rendering court's jurisdiction."); Marrese v. American Acad. of Orthopaedic
Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373 (1985); Seagoing Uniform Corp. v. Texaco, 705 F. Supp. 918, 921,
923 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Brennan v. EMDE Med. Res., Inc., 652 F. Supp. 255, 264-65 (D. Nev.
1986); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 26(lXc) (1982).
494. For discussion of nonparty preclusion, see generally Robert G. Bone, Rethinking
the 'Day in Court' Ideal and Nonparty Preclusion, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 193 (1992); Lawrence
C. George, Sweet Uses of Adversity: Parklane Hosiery and the Collateral Class Action, 32
STAN. L. REV. 655 (1980); Note, Collateral Estoppel of Nonparties, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1485
(1974); John K. Morris, Comment, Nonparties and Preclusion by Judgment: The Privity
Rule Reconsidered, 56 CAL. L. REV. 1098 (1968).
495. Cromwell, 94 U.S. at 352; Baltimore S.S. Co. v. Phillips, 274 U.S. 316,319 (1927).
Privity was narrowly construed as a "[miutual or successive relationship to the same rights
of property." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1361 (4th ed. 1951). See also Golden State Bottling
Co. v. NLRB, 414 U.S. 168, 179 (1973). Nonparties could also be bound by adjudication
between others if they agreed to be bound, see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS §
40 (1982), or if they controlled the litigation. Id. § 39. Courts presumably would bind a
federal or state prosecutor who formally, or perhaps informally, agreed to abide by the
results of a prosecution in the other system. Similarly, if a federal or state prosecutor
"second-chaired" prosecution of her own charges in the other system without formally
appearing, courts presumably would preclude relitigation of those charges.
496. Blonder-Tongue Lab., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 329 (1971);
Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 44-45 (1940); Expert Elec., Inc. v. Levine, 554 F.2d 1227,
1233 (2d Cir. 1977).
497. Amalgamated Sugar Co. v. NL Indus., 825 F.2d 634, 640 (2d Cir. 1987); Bankers
Trust Co. v. Old Republic Ins. Co., 697 F. Supp. 1483, 1485 (N.D. Ill. 1988).
498. Amalgamated Sugar, 825 F.2d at 640; Southwest Airlines Co. v. Texas Int'l
Airlines, 546 F.2d 84, 95 (5th Cir. 1977); Phillips v. Kidder, Peabody & Co., 750 F. Supp.
603, 607 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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conditions are met: (1) the nonparty had notice of the suit and an
opportunity to participate, and (2) one of the parties adequately
represented the nonparty's interests.4
Both of these conditions could (or should) be satisfied when
a wrongdoer violates both federal and state criminal laws.
Federal and state prosecutors easily can devise means to inform
each other of these cases,"°° particularly if they limit notification
to important cases that both might actually want to prosecute.
Current law already allows federal and state prosecutors to
appear in each other's courts,'O and any necessary additional
authorization could easily be provided. Federal and state
prosecutors would have to be familiar with both federal and state
499. See, e.g., First Ala. Bank of Montgomery v. Parsons Steel, Inc., 747 F.2d 1367,
1379 (11th Cir. 1984), rev'd on other grounds, 474 U.S. 518 (1986) (trustee precluded
because he had an opportunity to intervene in first action and declined to do so and his
interests were identical with those of the plaintiffs in that case); Amalgamated Sugar, 825
F.2d at 637, 640-41 (shareholder held properly precluded when he had an opportunity to
participate in earlier litigation and declined to intervene and he had no interest to assert
that had not been previously asserted by the board of directors); Garcia v. Wilson, 820 P.2d
964, 967 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991) (passenger's personal injury action held properly precluded
by driver's property damage suit when passenger had notice of the first action, testified in
it, and admitted that she had no new evidence or witnesses to present in a second
proceeding). In Garcia, the Court also believed the passenger was maneuvering by failing
to intervene in the property damage action, hoping to obtain an estoppel if the driver won
and a second chance before a new jury if the defendant lost. Id.
In 1991, Congress enacted legislation prohibiting a challenge to consent decrees in
a federal employment discrimination suit by individuals who had notice of the suit and an
opportunity to intervene and whose interests were adequately represented by a party. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n) (Supp. V 1994). This statute overruled Martin v. Wilka, 490 U.S. 755
(1989). Martin refused to preclude white firefighters in Birmingham, Alabama from
challenging a consent decree in a prior suit between the City and black firefighters setting
goals for the hiring and promotion of blacks, notwithstanding that the whites had notice,
an opportunity to intervene, and their interests were adequately represented by the
defendants in the first suit. Id. The 1991 Act precludes only challenges to consent decrees.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(n). Courts have not precluded subsequent damage actions by
individual victims of discrimination, despite the fact that the individuals might have
intervened in the action producing the consent decree, because the individuals' interests
were not sufficiently similar to the interests of the parties in the prior action. See, e.g.,
Riddle v. Cerro Wire & Cable Group, Inc. 902 F.2d 918,922-23 (11th Cir. 1990); Loveridge
v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 864 P.2d 417, 421-22 (Wash. Ct. App. 1993).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(cX2) and (a4) allow unnamed members ofa (bX3)
plaintiff class to be bound if they are given notice and an opportunity to opt out or appear
if their interests are adequately represented by the named parties.
500. Note, 80 HARv. L. REV., supra note 432, at 1551, 1556.
501. See supra notes 460-63 and accompanying text.
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criminal law so they could identify appropriate cases for combined
charges. This requirement would not be overly burdensome. °2
In deciding whether a nonparty was adequately represented
by a party, courts look to seek whether the nonparty shared the
same or similar litigation goals as the party, and whether the
party vigorously litigated the suit.50 3  In cases in which a
wrongdoer violates both state and federal law, the interests of
federal and state prosecutors are virtually identical-they want
to convict and punish the person.' In addition, in these days
of tight jobs and merit selection, both federal and state
prosecutors hire some of the most talented law school graduates.
Despite large case loads, both have sufficient resources to litigate
important cases vigorously.
In some instances, federal and state authorities might work
at cross-purposes or undermine each other. A corrupt federal
prosecutor might allow a defendant to plead guilty to a minor
charge, thus precluding more serious charges in state court. A
local prosecutor or jury in a conservative area might protect a
defendant who took politically popular but illegal action by, again,
allowing a plea to a minor charge, or by acquitting altogether. 5
The Supreme Court has specifically relied on the possibility of
such misconduct in affirming the dual sovereignty rule, arguing
that a contrary rule would allow the nation and the states to
frustrate each other's interests.5 6
502. See supra notes 457-59 and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held
that it is reasonable to expect federal officials working for the Small Business
Administration and the Farmers Home Administration to know and apply state law in
tailoring loan agreements. See United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 729 (1979).
503. Bone, supra note 494 at 203; Aerojet-General Corp. v. Askew, 511 F.2d 710 (5th
Cir. 1975); First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, 747 F.2d at 1379; Garcia, 820 P.2d 966-67.
504. Note, S0 HARV. L. REV., supra note 432, at 1550, 1553. Although a small portion
of federal criminal law protects uniquely federal interests, see supra notes 427-36 and
accompanying text, Congress passes most federal criminal legislation to achieve the same
goals than as states, and to supplement local enforcement efforts and fight large-scale
criminal activity that spreads interstate. See supra notes 432-33 and accompanying text.
505. See Herman, supra note 489, at 630-31.
506. See Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 137 ("Were the federal prosecution of a comparatively
minor offense to prevent state prosecution of [a] grave.., infraction of state law, the result
would be a shocking and untoward deprivation of the historic right and obligation of the
States to maintain peace and order within their confines."); Abbate v. United States, 359
U.S. 187, 195 (1959) ([I]f the States are free to prosecute criminal acts violating their
laws, and the resultant state prosecutions bar federal prosecutions based on the same acts,
federal law enforcement must necessarily be hindered."). See also United States v. Lanza,
260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922).
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The possibility of abuse does not justify the dual sovereignty
rule. As Justice Black noted in Bartkus v. Illinois, such abuse
will be very rare. °7 It makes little sense to allow successive
prosecutions in all cases because abuse may occur in a few. It
makes more sense to adopt a rule prohibiting successive
prosecutions when one prosecutor adequately represents the
interests of the other, and to allow exceptions for the rare case
when he does not.sc This is the rule on the civil side, where a
prior judgment binds parties, and in appropriate cases,
nonparties, unless fraud or other extraordinary circumstances
make preclusion unfair."°  In sum, the dual sovereignty theory
is conceptually flawed and outmoded. It should be abandoned.
Although double jeopardy rarely prevents successive
prosecutions in different systems, it does prevent a second
prosecution of the same offense within the same system. Courts
limit its effect, however, by defining an "offense" narrowly.510
The federal courts and most state courts use the so-called "same
evidence" test to decide whether a successive prosecution is for the
507. Bartkus, 359 U.S. at 157 (Black, J., dissenting).
508. In framing its position against the dual sovereignty theory, the American Civil
Liberties Union considered making a sham prosecution exception to a general rule
prohibiting successive federal and state prosecution for the same misconduct. Herman,
supra note 489, at 630-31. The ACLU rejected the exception for two reasons. First, some
feared that the exception was so vague that it might swallow the rule. Id. Second, there
are alternative means of disciplining prosecutors who conduct sham prosecutions. Id.
509. See Sea-Land Serv., 414 U.S. at 579. The Restatement (Second) of Judgments
allows exceptions to both claim and issue preclusion for extraordinary circumstances,
including fraud. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS, § 28(5Xa) (1980) (allowing an
exception "because of the potential adverse impact of the determination on the public
interest"); id. §26, cmt. j (no preclusion in cases of "fraud, concealment, or
misrepresentation"). Unnamed members ofa plaintiffclass are not bound by the judgment
in a class action when their interests have not been adequately represented. See
Hansberry, 311 U.S. 32; Gonzales v. Cassidy, 474 F.2d 67 (5th Cir. 1973).
510. Collateral estoppel rarely precludes a successive prosecution for the same
misconduct. A person seeking an estoppel on an issue must establish that the issue was
actually litigated and necessary to the result in the prior proceeding. Cromwell, 94 U.S.
at 354; See also Rios v. Davis, 373 S.W.2d 386 (Tex. Civ. App. 1963); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1982). Courts will not give an estoppel if the record of the
first proceeding is ambiguous. Russell v. Place, 94 U.S. 606 (1876); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF JUDGMENTS § 27, cmt. e (1980). Most crimes have several elements and a defendant
may interpose more than one defense. A simple "Not Guilty" verdict is opaque, and does
not reveal which issues in the case were decided in the defendant's favor. A defendant
cannot obtain an estoppel on an issue unless the record shows that the jury must have
based its decision on that issue. Mayers & Yarbrough, supra note 486, at 33-34; Walter V.
Schaefer, Unresolved Issues in the Law of Double Jeopardy: Waller and Ashe, 58 CAL. L.
REV. 391, 394 (1970); United States v. Smith, 446 F.2d 200, 202-03 (1971); Commonwealth
v. Campana, 304 A.2d 432, 437-38 (Pa. 1973).
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same offense.5 ' Blockburger v. United States gives the classic
statement of the test: "[W]here the same act or transaction
constitutes a violation of two distinct statutory provisions, the test
to be applied to determine whether there are two offenses or only
one, is whether each provision requires proof of a[n additional]
fact which the other does not."512
As the Supreme Court notes in Brown v. Ohio, the test
emphasizes the elements of the two offenses." 3 As long as each
requires proof of a fact that the other does not, successive
prosecutions are allowed, even though the proof overlaps
substantially and the two charges are a part of the same criminal
episode.514 For example, if a person robs someone at knife-
point, taking her money and stabbing her, he could be tried first
for assault and battery with a deadly weapon with intent to kill,
and later for robbery with a dangerous weapon. The same
evidence test allows the second prosecution because intent to kill
is not an element of robbery, and taking property from the victim
is not an element of assault with intent to kill.
51 5
The same evidence test plainly does little to prevent
successive prosecutions for the same wrongdoing." 6 Justice
Brennan opined that it "virtually annuls the constitutional
guarantee."5" The test also has spawned tortured decisions by
511. United States v. Dixon, 113 S.Ct. 2849, 2860 (1993) (reaffirming the same
evidence test); Johnson v. State, 66 P.2d 1137, 1140 (Okla. Crim. App. 1980) ("Extensive
research... indicates that the 'same evidence test' is utilized by a majority of state and
federal courts."); Cousins v. State, 354 A-2d 825, 829, 831 (Md. 1976); Ashe, 397 U.S. at 451
(Brennan, J. concurring); State v. Ahuna, 474 P.2d 704, 706 (Haw. 1970) (all affirming that
the same evidence test is the majority rule).
512. Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299,304 (1932) (citing Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342 (1911)). The test has been used in this country since the late
1800s. See Morey v. Commmonwealth, 108 Mass. 433, 434 (1871).
513. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
514. Id. at 166.
515. See Johnson, 611 P.2d at 1142. The same evidence test also allows multiple
prosecutions if a single criminal episode involves several victims, or can be divided into
chronologically discrete crimes. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J. concurring).
516. Campana, 304 A.2d at 437 (The same evidence test "has been almost
unanimously regarded as totally ineffective to implement the important double jeopardy
guarantee of preventing successive prosecutions.").
517. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 451 (Brennan, J. concurring). Justice Brennan continued:
"Given the tendency of modern criminal legislation to divide the phases of a criminal
transaction into numerous separate crimes, the opportunities for multiple prosecutions for
an essentially unitary criminal episode are frightening." Id. at 452. See also, People v.
White, 212 N.W.2d 222, 227-28 (Mich. 1973).
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the federal and state courts struggling to avoid its harsher
effects.518
To enhance double jeopardy protection, some states have
adopted the "same transaction" test to define the scope of an
offense.51 9 This test is borrowed from civil cases that use it to
define the scope of a claim for res judicata, joinder, and
supplemental jurisdiction purposes.520 Under the Restatement
(Second) of Judgments, a valid final judgment extinguishes a
claim, including "all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the
defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or
series of connected transactions, out of which the action
518. In Grady u. Corbin, the Supreme Court held that even if successive prosecutions
were not barred by the Blockburger test, "the Double Jeopardy Clause bars a subsequent
prosecution if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecution,
the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has
already been prosecuted." Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990). Shortly thereafter,
however, the Court recognized a major exception to the new rule, holding that prosecution
for conspiracy is not precluded by a prior prosecution for the underlying substantive
offense. United States v. Felix, 112 S.Ct. 1377, 1384-85 (1992). In 1993 the Court
overruled Grady, calling it 'wrong in principle" and "unstable in application." Dixon, 113
S.Ct. at 2860, 2863.
The states have struggled as well. For example, Oklahoma and Hawaii do not follow
either the same evidence test or the same transaction test exclusively, preferring instead
to base decisions on the facts of individual cases. See Johnson, 611 P.2d at 1142; Ahuna,
474 P.2d at 706-07. Other states apply some amalgam of the two tests. For example, in
State v. Richardson, the defendant attempted to rob a liquor store by brandishing a
butcher knife and placing it against the stomach of the clerk on duty. State v. Richardson,
460 S.W.2d 537, 537-38 (Mo. 1970) (en banc). He pled guilty to attempted robbery, but was
later convicted of assault with intent to maim for the same incident. Even though the
same evidence test did not preclude the second prosecution because intent to maim is
different than intent to rob, the Missouri Supreme Court reversed the second conviction.
Id. at 539-40.
519. See, e.g., White, 212 N.W.2d at 228; State v. Coming, 184 N.W.2d 603, 605-06
,971), State v. Galhup, -16 P.2d -69, 671 0r. Ct. App. 1991); .mpana, 304 A.2d
at 441; Walton v. State, 448 S.W.2d 690, 696 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1969). The United States
Supreme Court has specifically declined to adopt this standard. See Garrett v. United
States, 471 U.S. 773, 790 (1985). Both the Model Penal Code and the ABA Project on
Minimum Standards for Criminal Justice recommend adoption of the same transaction test
for double jeopardy purposes. See Model Penal Code § 1.07(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962); Standards Relating to Joinder and Severance, A.BA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 1.3 (Approved Draft 1968).
520. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 453-56 (Brennan, J. concurring); White, 212 N.W.2d at 228;
Campana, 304 A.2d at 439-441.
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arose."521 The Restatement explains the scope of this rule as
follows:
The present trend is to see claim in factual terms and
to make it coterminous with the transaction regardless of
the number of substantive theories, or variant forms of
relief flowing from those theories, that may be available
to the plaintiff; regardless of the number of primary
rights that may have been invaded; and regardless of the
variations in the evidence needed to support the theories
or rights. The transaction is the basis of the litigative
unit or entity which may not be split.
22
Arguments of fairness and efficiency strongly support
extending this standard to criminal cases. As Justice Brennan
argued in Ashe v. Swenson:
Given the tendency of modern criminal legislation to
divide the phases of a criminal transaction into numerous
separate crimes, the opportunities for multiple
prosecutions for an essentially unitary criminal episode
are frightening. And given our tradition of virtually
unreviewable prosecutorial discretion concerning the
initiation and scope of a criminal prosecution, the
potentialities for abuse inherent in the "same evidence"
test are simply intolerable.
[The] "same transaction" test of "same offense" not only
enforces the ancient prohibition against vexatious
multiple prosecutions embodied in the Double Jeopardy
Clause, but responds as well to the increasingly
widespread recognition that the consolidation in one
lawsuit of all issues arising out of single transaction or
521. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 24(1) (1982). Section 24 also states
that defining a transaction or series of connected transactions should be done
pragmatically, "giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in
time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether
their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations . . . ." Id. § 24(2).
522. Id. § 24 cmt. a.
1995] Twins: Criminal & Civil Jurisdiction 791
occurrence best promotes justice, economy, and
523convenience.
In addition, if the law affords parties in civil suits the protection
of the same transaction test, it follows a fortiori that criminal
defendants should receive at least the same protection.524
If the dual sovereignty theory were abandoned and the same
transaction test were used to define an offense, the modern rules
of civil claim preclusion would apply when defendants violated
both state and federal criminal law. On the civil side, courts
routinely grant claim preclusion if the plaintiff in a state action
fails to bring a federal claim that is transactionally-related to the
state claim and within the state court's jurisdiction.
5
Similarly, if a plaintiff files a federal action and fails to join a
related state claim by use of supplemental jurisdiction, the
plaintiff is precluded from bringing the state claim in a later
proceeding.5 26 Adopting these standards in criminal cases would
523. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 452-54 (Brennan, J., concurring). See also, White, 212 N.W.2d
at 228; Campana, 304 A.2d at 440-41.
524. Ashe, 397 U.S. at 456-57 (Brennan, J., concurring); White, 212 N.W.2d at 228;
People v. Noth, 189 N.W.2d 779, 789 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971) (Levin, J., dissenting); State
v. Cooper, 13 N.J.L. 361, 365-76 (1833).
Courts applying the same transaction test in criminal cases make common sense
exceptions. Thus, successive prosecutions are allowed if a single court does not have
jurisdiction over all of the crimes, or if the prosecutor could not know of all offenses at the
time of the first trial, or if some extraordinary prejudice will occur. See, e.g., Campana, 304
A.2d at 440 n.37.
525. See e.g., Migra v. Board of Educ., 465 U.S. 75 (1984) (plaintiff's failure to file §
1983 claim in state action for wrongful firing precluded later federal suit); Pasterczyk v.
Fair, 819 F.2d 12, 14 (1st Cir. 1987) (federal action for damages for wrongly computing
plaintiffs prison term precluded by earlier state action that sought declaratory and
injunctive relief); Swanson v. Best Buy Co., 731 F. Supp. 914,918 (S.D. Iowa 1990) (federal
suit against employer for discrimination and wrongful discharge precluded by prior state
action for failure to pay employee in accordance with employment agreement); Gray v.
Coomer, 706 F. Supp. 539, 541 (W.D. Ky. 1988) (plaintiffs federal RICO action precluded
because plaintiff filed state fraud action and did not include a RICO claim arising from the
same misconduct); JBK, Inc. v. Kansas City, Mo., 641 F. Supp. 893, 899 (W.D. Mo. 1986)
(challenge to constitutionality of ordinance regulating massage parlors precluded by failure
to raise the claim in an earlier state proceeding).
526. See, e.g., First Ala. Bank of Montgomery, 747 F.2d 1372-73 (plaintiffs' failure to
assert common law fraud claim in federal court using pendent jurisdiction precluded later
assertion of that claim in state court); Woods Explor. & Prod. Co. v. Aluminum Co. of Am.,
438 F.2d 1286, 1315 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1047 (1972) (state action
precluded by failure to assert state claim in earlier federal case by using pendent
jurisdiction); Jeanes v. Henderson, 688 S.W.2d 100, 102-04 (Tex. 1985) (plaintiffs failure
to assert declaratory judgment claim in federal action precluded later assertion of that
theory of recovery in state court); Rennie v. Freeway Transp., 656 P.2d 919 (Or. 1982);
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require prosecutors to cooperate and to combine all charges that
they wish to bring in one state or federal criminal prosecution.
Federal and state prosecutors could no longer ignore each
other, for the actions of one would bind the other. A state
prosecutor would have to consider possible federal charges, and a
federal prosecutor would have to consider possible state charges.
Prosecutors would be forced to talk to each other and to consider
their options.527 There is no unfairness here. Prosecutors would
not be sandbagged or otherwise disadvantaged as long as they
were aware of each other's laws and they talked to each other.
CONCLUSION
This article has compared the development of the civil and
criminal arising under jurisdiction and has suggested changes to
make the criminal branch more like the civil. It has also shown
that the changes are both workable and just. These modifications
would significantly alter the criminal arising under jurisdiction.
But jurisdictional rules, like other rules of law, must change with
the times. As Justice Frankfurter once stated:
Not inherent reasons, then, but practical justifications
explain the past judiciary acts and must vindicate
existing jurisdiction. The force and dangers of parochial
attachments, the effectiveness and limitations of a
centralized judiciary administering law over a continent,
the dependability of state courts, the convenience of
suitors, shifting economic and political sentiments-such
influences, with varying incidence, have shaped the
accomodations of authority distributed between the
national judiciary and the state courts. The present
jurisdiction cannot rely on tradition. Always have the
Eagle Prop. v. Scharbauer, 758 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988) (both granted claim
preclusion because federal court had pendent jurisdiction over state claims in prior actions,
and there was no indication it would have declined to exercise it).
Courts make exceptions in appropriate cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Maher, 515 A.2d 134,
139 (Conn. 1986) (state action challenging on state constitutional grounds restrictions on
funding for abortions not precluded by prior federal action because the federal judge
specifically reserved the state constitutional issues); Capital Tel. Co. v. N.Y. Tel. Co., 540
N.Y.S.2d 895, 898 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (plaintiff's state antitrust claims not precluded by
earlier federal antitrust case because federal court would not have exercised pendent
jurisdiction over the state claim).
527. See supra notes 455-457 and accompanying text.
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accomodations been temporary. The only enduring
tradition represented by the voluminous body of
congressional enactments governing the federal judiciary
is the tradition of questioning and compromise, of
contemporary adequacy and timely fitness. 28
528. Frankfurter, supra note 248, at 514-15.
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